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Abstract 
Existential Risk and the Technological Understanding of Being 
Kim Caspar Hecker 
 
 
‘Existential risk research’ or ‘existential risk studies’ is an emerging, interdisciplinary genre that 
seeks to provide an integrative, scientific framework for the study of existential dangers to humanity. 
Having been introduced by Oxford Philosopher Nick Bostrom in the early 2000s, existential risk 
research over the past ca. 15 years has become increasingly popular amongst scientists from a wide 
variety of academic disciplines and recent years have seen the foundation of research institutes, 
dedicated exclusively to the study of existential risk, at some of the most prestigious research 
universities in Europe and the United States. In spite of its interdisciplinary character, neither history 
nor political theory play a prominent role in existential risk research. This dissertation argues that this 
is a regrettable state of affairs and presents the first systematic attempt to survey and frame 
existential risk research from a political thought perspective. Drawing on three authors who wrote 
about deeply related questions in the post-war decades - Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and 
Günther Anders - it contextualises existential risk studies in the light of long-standing discussions 
about the interrelations between modern technology, human value and human agency under 
existential conditions. At the heart of these discussions the dissertation identifies a range of 
ontological complications. It demonstrates that, despite the fact that existential risk scholarship tends 
to side-line the type of ontological problems that have been uncovered by Heidegger, Arendt and 
Anders, it cannot escape this dimension altogether but instead highlights the imminent relevance of 
these authors’ analyses. One instance in which this becomes particularly salient is in the context of 
existential fears surrounding artificial intelligence. The dissertation therefore closes with a discussion 









I want to express my gratitude to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom and the German 
Federal Ministry for Education and Research for providing the funds which allowed me to embark on 
and realise this project. I equally want to thank Cambridge University’s Economic and Social 
Research Council Doctoral Training Partnership for their generous support over the past four years. 
 
There are many people whose help and criticism has been essential in writing this dissertation. I 
would like to thank my supervisor, David Runciman, for his detailed guidance, his support, and many 
inspiring conversations throughout this journey. I also want to thank my examiners Casper Sylvest 
and Duncan Bell for their highly instructive and encouraging feedback. Furthermore, I am very 
grateful that I had the opportunity to discuss my ideas with many inspiring people from a wide 
variety of disciplinary backgrounds over the past years. Specifically, I would like to express my 
gratitude to Duncan Kelly, Yasmin Shearmur, Baruch Malewich, Rodrigo Garcia-Velasco, Jens van’t 
Klooster, and Hardy Schilgen for reading and discussing my work with me. 
 
My greatest debt is to those who made this dissertation possible in the most fundamental sense. I 
would like to thank my wonderful family, Bettina Lange-Hecker, Gereon Hecker, and Felix Hecker, 
whose intellectual curiosity has always been an inspiration for me and on whose encouragement and 
support I could always count, not only whilst writing this dissertation but ever since I can remember. 
I am forever grateful for that. And, finally, I would like to thank Charlotte, without whose sharp 
mind, continuous, challenging feedback, and positive presence in my life quite simply none of this 
would have been possible. 
 viii 




Declaration ..................................................................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................................... iv 
Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................................... vi 
Contents ......................................................................................................................................................... ix 
Note on transliteration and text .................................................................................................................... 1 
Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................. 2 
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 3 
1. Existential risk studies – an introduction to the field ........................................................................... 12 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 The concept of existential risk ............................................................................................................. 14 
1.2 Existential risk scholarship – basic ideas ........................................................................................... 17 
1.3 The existential risk eco-system ............................................................................................................ 21 
1.4 Academic disciplines in existential risk research ................................................................................ 23 
1.5 The ‘science of existential risk’ ........................................................................................................... 24 
1.6 Existential risk theory – an analysis .................................................................................................... 35 
Conclusion - technology as destiny ........................................................................................................... 48 
2. The technological understanding of being ............................................................................................. 50 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 50 
2.1 Technology in Heidegger’s philosophy ............................................................................................... 55 
2.2 Enframing ............................................................................................................................................ 57 
2.3 The dangers ......................................................................................................................................... 61 
2.4 Modern technology and ordering revealing ........................................................................................ 70 
2.5 The instrumental conception of technology ......................................................................................... 72 
2.6 Existential risk from a Heideggerian perspective ............................................................................... 75 
2.7 Existential risk research as technological behaviour ......................................................................... 79 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 82 
3. Existential pressure .................................................................................................................................. 88 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 88 
3.1 Promethean shame .............................................................................................................................. 95 
3.2 Technology as action ......................................................................................................................... 104 
3.3 All-or-nothing or the radical evil ...................................................................................................... 114 
3.4 The schizophrenic condition of modern existence ............................................................................. 127 
Conclusion - a problem of benchmarks ................................................................................................... 132 
 x 
4. Technology awakes ................................................................................................................................ 139 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 139 
4.1 The existential risk from AI ............................................................................................................... 141 
4.2 Framing the AI-risk argument .......................................................................................................... 152 
4.3 Is the belief in the singularity fideistic? ............................................................................................ 155 
4.4 Fideism or ontological transparency? .............................................................................................. 161 
4.5 Technology awakes ........................................................................................................................... 165 
4.6. Existential fears and existential hopes ............................................................................................. 170 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 175 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 181 
  
 1 
Note on transliteration and text 
 
This thesis uses double-inverted commas (“”) for quotations. Indirect quotations are marked by 
single inverted commas (‘’). Further, single inverted commas (‘’) are used to emphasise that concepts 
are invoked which have a specific meaning within the works of authors covered in this thesis.  
 
Several of Günther Anders’ works have not yet been translated into English. For this reason, I 
translated some passages myself. Wherever I did so, this is indicated in the footnotes with the remark 
‘translated by the author’. Typically, the original German text passage is not quoted in the footnotes. 
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Over the past 15 years approximately, a new genre of scientific study has emerged, which will 
hereafter be referred to as ‘existential risk research’ or ‘existential risk studies’. In the field, an 
existential risk is commonly defined as “one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-
originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future 
development”.1 Developed by Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom in the early 2000s, the concept was 
gradually adopted by a growing community of scholars. Over time a movement emerged, comprising 
a growing range of institutes and activist groups, some outside of academia, others affiliated to 
globally leading universities, all united by a drive to study the most serious hazards threatening 
humanity along the lines pioneered by Bostrom. In short, we appear to be witnessing the emergence 
of a self-declared, new research community that converges around a range of shared concerns, 
concepts, canonical works and convenes at shared platforms such as the Cambridge Conference on 
Catastrophic Risk, or the Colloquium on Catastrophic and Existential Risk at the University of 
California, Los Angeles.2 
This thesis sets out to explore existential risk studies as a subject of critical reflection from a 
political thought perspective. The existential risk community is a highly diverse and interdisciplinary 
community, or “eco-system”, as one of its many prominent members, Skype founder Jaan Tallinn, 
refers to it.3 It enjoys the support, financial and otherwise, of some of the world’s most prominent 
technology tycoons such as the above-mentioned Jaan Tallinn, but also Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Reid 
Hoffmann, or Peter Thiel. Furthermore, several of the academics who are or have been active in the 
field are comparably well known, including for instance physicists such as the late Stephen Hawking, 
Astronomer Royal Martin Rees, Oxford physicist David Deutsch, or Nobel laureate Frank Wilczek, 
philosophers such as Huw Price and Peter Singer, or leading computer scientists such as Berkeley’s 
Stuart Russell, Murray Shanahan, robotics professor at Imperial College London, and MIT’s Eric 
Brynjolfsson. This list of but a few of its most prominent members illustrates the degree of academic 
interdisciplinarity which is characteristic of the field. However, after a closer look, it quickly 
becomes clear that scholars who contribute to the study of existential risk bring together expertise 
from public policy scholarship, computer science, law, economics, astrophysics, philosophy of 
science, moral philosophy, mathematics, statistics, ethics, synthetic biology, and many other 
disciplines.  
In spite of its interdisciplinary character, neither history nor political theory appear to play a 
prominent role in existential risk research. To an extent this may not be surprising. The mission of 
                                               
1 See Bostrom, N. (2002), p. 2 or Bostrom, N. (2013), p. 15. 
2 See respectively CSER (2016), Lin, F. (2017). 
3 Jaan Tallinn as quoted in CSER (2016), and Torres, P. (2017b), p. 2. 
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existential risk research is an avowedly practical one. It seeks to study and raise attention for the 
worst possible threats, present and future, humanity might be exposed to, provide an integrative, 
scientific framework for their analysis, and to make their concerns heard in the upper echelons of the 
corporate world, of academia, civil society, as well as on the highest levels of national government 
and international governmental institutions, in an effort to minimise the overall threat level. Political 
theory and history, being largely reflective disciplines, do not necessarily yield themselves to such 
pragmatic purposes.  
This thesis contends, however, that the lack of historical and political-theoretical perspective 
in contemporary discourses about existential risk is a nonetheless regrettable state of affairs. A side-
effect of the relative absence of history and political theory in existential risk research is that authors 
in the field believe they are virtually alone with their concerns. Martin Rees (2017) for instance 
claims that existential risks “have hitherto been seriously addressed by only a small community of 
serious thinkers” and “that there needs to be a much-extended research program, involving natural 
and social scientists, to compile a more complete register of possible ‘x-risks’”.4 Nick Bostrom 
(2009) argues in a similar vein that “existential risks have not received as much scholarly attention as 
they deserve. In recent years, there have been three serious books and one major paper on this 
topic”.5 Simply put, the aim of this thesis is to develop a better understanding of such claims. It asks 
if existential risk research is as new as authors in the field appear to believe it is, and, if so, in what 
respects.  
Bringing a historically informed political theory perspective to bear on existential risk 
research allows us to answer that question in two ways. First, the analytical use of historical concepts 
allows us to identify and outline a range of, as of yet underarticulated, central theoretical problems 
and puzzles at its heart. Existential risk research, in spite of its interdisciplinary character, appears to 
be curiously isolated within the wider academic world. That is, even though the scholars who 
contribute to existential risk research have a wide variety of academic backgrounds, the output of 
existential risk research, which hereafter will be referred to as existential risk theory, is not widely 
discussed outside of the existential risk ecosystem itself. Whilst existential risk research imports 
methods and insights from a multitude of different disciplines for its practical aims, it has itself not 
yet been uncovered as a subject of scholarly attention and interlocution from an external perspective. 
For instance, apart from two references to existential risk theory by international relations (IR) 
scholars,6 who peripherally touch upon the literature in the context of discussions about challenges to 
IR theory presented by the Anthropocene concept, existential risk theory has not yet been discussed 
in political science scholarship. Similar observations can be made for most other disciplines in the 
humanities and social sciences. A result of this absence of external interlocution is that existential 
                                               
4 Rees, M. (2017a), p. iv. 
5 Bostrom, N. (2009), p. 196. 
6 See Harrington, C. (2016) and Mitchell, A. (2017). 
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risk research has been subjected to little theoretical scrutiny. Once we expose it to such scrutiny from 
a historically informed political theory perspective, it becomes clear that, beneath its pragmatic, 
technical, argumentative surface, existential risk research presents us with an interesting and rather 
distinct take on the problematic interface between modern technology, human agency and human 
value.  
This interface, however, has been the subject matter of political-theoretical and, widening the 
focus beyond that, philosophical reflection for centuries. From a historically informed perspective, it 
quickly becomes clear that the puzzles with which existential risk research confronts us, puzzles in 
relation to the above-mentioned interface, can be meaningfully connected to long standing 
discussions in political theory and philosophy. Situating existential risk research within such 
temporally-extended debates allows us to develop a better understanding of existential risk research 
as occupying a historically and conceptually contingent position within them. It further allows us to 
see that the idea that existential risk research presents a fundamentally new and neglected field of 
inquiry, is intelligible only from within the applications-focused framework of existential risk 
research itself, i.e. when judged by its own standards. When one looks beneath the surface and takes 
the deeper questions of its core concerns as a benchmark, then the idea that existential risk research 
occupies an otherwise unpopulated space of intellectual activity speaks, if anything, to a lack of 
knowledge about itself. A historical perspective on the topic thus allows us to frame existential risk 
research as a historically and theoretically contingent phenomenon, as a type of response to a range 
of concerns, where both the type of response and the concerns have precursors in history. At the 
same time, however, it allows us to identify facets in existential risk research, in its language, its 
concepts, its methodology, etc., that indeed do appear to be new and which offer partially new 
perspectives on the deeper problems and puzzles at its core.   
In sum, the relative absence of history and political theory in existential risk research is 
regrettable for at least two reasons. Firstly, because existential risk research and our understanding of 
the problems it has uncovered can gain in nuance by being connected to older debates in political 
theory and, secondly, because the same holds in the opposite direction. Existential risk theory 
provides us with an opportunity to re-examine and re-appreciate the striking relevance of older 
debates in a new light, highlighting their lasting insightfulness in present circumstances. 
This thesis suggests that one suitable starting point for the historical and theoretical 
embedding of existential risk research can be found in the post-World War II works of three authors: 
Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders. Emerging from within its pragmatic 
framework, existential risk research presents us with a distinctive perspective on the future of 
humanity, namely one in which the future is transformed into a technological optimisation problem. 
At a later point in the thesis, this perspective on the future of humanity will be referred to as one in 
which technology emerges as ‘humanity’s destiny’ in the sense that the space of technological 
possibilities becomes our benchmark, the defining lens through which we envision potential futures. 
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What opens up beneath the language of risk and risk management is thus an argument about, or 
rather a range of assumptions and propositions on, the status of human agency and of the human 
being under conditions of modern technology. However, in existential risk research itself, due to the 
relative absence of history and political theory, this complex of assumptions, propositions, etc., and 
their deeper significance in the context of existential risk tends to remain unquestioned, unexplored, 
and largely abstracted from. The works of Heidegger, Arendt and Anders provide us with a rich 
conceptual repertoire to not only contour this complex, but also to pinpoint the puzzles and 
philosophical problems underpinning it. They therefore help to identify and offer new perspectives 
on the underlying issues in existential risk research. Writing against the backdrop of the emergence 
of the arguably first human-made existential risk – the ever present possibility of an all-out nuclear 
war during the cold war period – and in the shadow of the horrors of the second World War, 
Heidegger, Arendt and Anders  identified in technology a fateful force, one impacting the very 
fundamentals, physical and ideational, of human existence and that was in the process of 
transforming  the human condition on its own terms. A non-negligible proportion of their post-War 
works can be read as philosophical efforts to understand the roots and implications of that process – 
in Heidegger’s case from a metaphysical perspective, in Arendt’s from a political perspective, and in 
Anders’ from what he refers to as a “philosophical anthropological” perspective.7  
This thesis seeks to demonstrate that Heidegger, Arendt and Anders were, broadly speaking, 
already observing the same phenomenon, the same transformational process that existential risk 
researchers today seek to raise attention for, but that they were approaching and writing about it from 
an inverse perspective, namely an interpretive one. Where existential risk research’s analysis seeks to 
stress and direct the imminent need for action in response to the existential threats humanity is 
facing, Heidegger, Arendt and Anders were first and foremost engaged in an effort to understand the 
transformation of the human condition which this novel type of need for action was expressive of. 
What they identified in what we now call existential risk was, roughly speaking, one of the starkest 
manifestations of an ontologically rooted, alienating dynamic, whereby modern technology was 
placing humanity in an increasingly schizophrenic condition, left to occupy two fundamentally 
different realities: one of everyday sense-experience, language, thought, commitments, common-
sense, intuition, etc., and one of abstract, technical knowledge, which becomes physical reality 
through modern technological objects and of which the possibility of collective nuclear self-
annihilation was both a consequence and an instance. The problematic relationship between these 
two realities is the common theme of Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ thought on modern 
technology and science, and their political and philosophical ramifications. At its centre is the 
problem that, in the midst of this alienating dynamic, the human being emerges as an increasingly 
paradoxical figure: simultaneously omnipotent and hopelessly outdated; both becoming aware of the 
                                               
7 See Anders, G. (1992), p. 9. 
 
 7 
unique preciousness of life on Earth, and attaining the capability to annihilate it; at once separated 
from and elevated above the natural realm by abstract, objectifying knowledge of it and reduced to it 
by that very same knowledge.  
Existential risk research presents us with several such paradoxes and dilemmas. Most 
importantly, it appears to want to save something, humanity, based on a logic that cannot make sense 
of this concept to begin with. By infusing existential risk research with history and political theory 
we are in a position to identify and unravel these deeper puzzles at its heart. This allows us both to 
develop a more comprehensive and more nuanced perspective on the extremes of our contemporary 
technological predicament as sketched out by existential risk research, as well as to re-examine and 
reappreciate the actuality of Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ thought in the context of a new genre 
of scholarship.  
The basis for the systematic integration of existential risk research into older debates in 
political theory and philosophy, consists in a survey of ‘existential risk literature’. By surveying texts 
from monographs, to academic articles, working papers, conference papers, blog posts, whitepapers, 
newspaper and magazine articles, web pages, etc., of existential risk researchers and institutes and 
connecting them to one-another, the thesis seeks to extract the central themes, arguments, claims and 
assumptions, and to identify a shared theoretical framework which can then be connected and related 
to older traditions of thought, in this case central writings of Hannah Arendt, Günther Anders and 
Martin Heidegger. 
To be more precise, in developing the above arguments, I proceed in four steps. Chapter 1 
provides an overview and a preliminary analysis of the emerging genre of existential risk research. It 
draws on key texts in the field, most importantly the publications of Nick Bostrom who is largely 
recognised as the central figure in the field, both because of his role as founder and director of 
Oxford University’s Future of Humanity Institute as well as because of the central position his 
publications assume in the writings of most other existential risk scholars. Bostrom’s writings are 
complemented with texts published by several other authors in the field in order to provide a more 
comprehensive overview of existential risk research and its theoretical framework. The chapter 
discusses existential risk research’s ethics, its methodology and mission, its policy recommendations, 
and traces the scope and shape of its ‘eco-system’ in form of research institutes, individual 
researchers, etc. The second half of the chapter presents the first analytical step of the thesis. It seeks 
to bring out the deeper arguments and ramifications of existential risk research and highlights the 
pivotal position technology assumes in it, demonstrating how, by framing the future in terms of 
potential end-time scenarios, technology emerges as humanity’s destiny.  
Having established that the problematic relationship between technology and human agency 
can be identified as the central theme in existential risk research, chapter 2 proceeds to connect 
existential risk research to Martin Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s thought is a particularly suitable 
vantage point for contextualising existential risk research for a variety reasons. From a historical 
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perspective, it seems sensible for at least two reasons. First, Heidegger was amongst the very first 
thinkers who began to systematically study technology as a philosophical problem in its own right.8 
Secondly, Heidegger attributed a comparably pivotal role to technology as existential risk research 
does today. Like existential risk research, he found in technology both a potential destiny of 
humanity as well as a source of gravest danger, providing us with a basis to relate existential risk 
research to older traditions of thought, thinking about technology along, broadly speaking, existential 
lines. In a way, we might argue that both occupy the same intellectual space when it comes to their 
thinking about technology, a space where technology is framed as perhaps the single most important 
force in human history. Historically speaking, then, Heidegger’s philosophy of technology provides 
us with a touchstone to locate existential risk research in a spectrum of traditions of thought 
surrounding the role of technology in human life and develop a better idea of what might be new or 
distinctive about it.  
Conceptually, Heidegger’s philosophy is a suitable starting point both because his 
phenomenologically and metaphysically rooted critique of technology provides us with highly 
critical perspectives on existential risk research, allowing us to philosophically ‘unpack’ the notion of 
‘technology’ and thus to uncover some of the defining intellectual puzzles existential risk research 
confronts us with. It is also a fruitful starting point because he is at the origin of a tradition of critical 
thinking about technology, continued by Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders, whose work forms the 
bedrock of the political-theoretical discussion of existential risk in chapter 3. Specifically, 
Heidegger’s phenomenological method shows that the notion of technology itself cannot be 
employed ‘neutrally’, or purely pragmatically, as existential risk researchers tend to, but that it is 
inherently tied up with ontological problems which inevitably confront us with puzzles regarding the 
status of human agency and the idea of value under modern (technological) conditions.  
Heidegger’s ontological grounding of the problem of technology serves to introduce a useful 
juxtaposition, which will function as a theoretical bracket for the further political-theoretical 
embedding of existential risk theory – the apparent irreconcilability between phenomenal reality, as it 
appears ‘naturally’ to our consciousness on the one hand, and abstract, technical, scientific 
knowledge, which he calls the ‘technological understanding of being’, as well as its physical 
manifestation in the form of modern technological instruments and systems, on the other. A central 
argument this thesis advances is that existential risk research, in its lack of interest in historical and 
political-theoretical perspectives, tends to abstract from the normative complications that arise from 
the ontological tension Heidegger had uncovered. The thesis holds that the field ultimately cannot 
escape these complications for precisely the reasons presented by Heidegger and that were further 
developed by his students Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders. However, as we will see, the 
connection between existential risk research and Heidegger’s philosophy of technology leads into an 
                                               
8 Viz. Mitcham, C. (1994). 
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aporetic ending. Where existential risk researchers stress the urgent need for action, thus highlighting 
the role of agency in the context of existential risk, Heidegger argues that any kind of action under 
the paradigm of ‘the technological understanding of being’ can only serve to aggravate the dangers 
humanity finds itself in. For Heidegger, the very concern for the survival of the species turned out to 
be expressive of the technological will for mastery. As a result of Heidegger’s ontotheological 
perspective on technology we thus find a curious lack of interest in the problem of human extinction 
as a philosophical and ethical problem unique in its own right. Whilst Heidegger provides us with a 
basis to demonstrate that existential risk research’s particular theoretical framework can be 
meaningfully connected to old controversies about the interrelations between technology, human 
agency and value, his holistic, ontotheological perspective on this complex of issues leads us into an 
impasse should we want to develop a better understanding of the particular political and 
philosophical ramifications the problem of human extinction entails, and to what extent existential 
risk research may or may not offer new perspectives on them. 
Chapter 3 therefore turns to Heidegger’s students Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders. 
Arendt and Anders can be shown to occupy a middle ground between Heidegger and existential risk 
research. Uniting fundamental insights of Heidegger’s phenomenological critique of technology with 
a concern for the survival of the species and thus an awareness for the need for political action, 
Anders’ and Arendt’s work allow us to approach the problem of human extinction as a complex, 
multi-dimensional, political problem of uniquely transformative qualities, emerging from changing 
technological realities intertwined with problematic constellations of attitudes, irrational hopes and 
desires, and anachronistic conceptions of technology that determine how we respond to these realities 
in thought and action. As in the case of Heidegger, the study of Arendt’s and Anders’ work 
demonstrates that existential risk research is not a qualitatively new response to the increasing 
powers of technology. However, their interest in the complexities of human psychology and political 
life meant that they were in an arguably much better position than Heidegger to investigate this type 
of response as part of a world reconfiguring itself around the spectre of extinction, the emergence of 
which they witnessed as part of the nuclear conundrum of their days. Arendt’s and Anders’ post-war 
works thus are particularly insightful in the context of existential risk research because they add a 
level of analysis, demonstrating how the ontological puzzles we can identify at its core and the roots 
of which Heidegger had uncovered, are reflected in politically highly problematic imbalances 
between different human faculties – the capacity for action on the one hand and capacities such as 
understanding and imagination on the other hand side – and what these imbalances in turn might 
imply for our temporal consciousness, our self-understanding, our hopes, fears, and values, under 
conditions of existential risk. 
In the final chapter of the thesis my discussion of existential risk in the light of Heidegger’s, 
Arendt’s and Anders’ thought, is brought to bear on contemporary discussions surrounding artificial 
intelligence (AI), which presently occupy a prominent position in existential risk research. These 
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debates surrounding AI, in particular so called ‘superintelligence’, it is argued, also do not appear to 
be qualitatively new. In a way they echo almost uncannily closely Heidegger’s concerns regarding 
the ‘thoughtless’ nature of the technological understanding of being. Furthermore, since AI is seen 
both as a potential threat to humanity as well as a potential solution to all of our problems, it also 
highlights some of the pathologies that characterise our daily interaction and thinking about 
technology, which Günther Anders had uncovered. In other words, in the context of AI the deep 
puzzles concerning the relationship between technology, human agency, and human value are present 
in the context of discussions of one particular technology. To the reader, however, this may not come 
as a surprise since speculations about the ultimate possibilities of AI are in effect no less than 
speculations about whether or not technology and humanity are interchangeable and therewith about 
whether or not (the reality, illusion, awareness, or experience of) agency, freedom, and value, etc., 
can be technologically reproduced. 
Before embarking on the first chapter, a final preliminary remark. The scope of this thesis 
could clearly have been much wider. Since this thesis constitutes, to the author’s knowledge, the first 
attempt to uncover existential risk research as a research topic in its own right, there is no secondary 
literature it could have drawn on and used as orientation in its efforts to historically and conceptually 
embed existential risk research. It therefore is bound to miss out on interesting connections that could 
have been established from other perspectives, drawing on other schools of thought in political 
science and related disciplines. Without doubt, for instance existential risk research could have been 
approached from an International Relations perspective, integrating it into debates about global 
public bads and the becoming of a global political consciousness as a response to planetary threats, it 
could also have been approached from a security studies perspective,9 a futures research 
perspective,10 a risk studies perspective,11 or a social theory perspective, most obviously, perhaps, by 
relating it to Ulrich Beck’s  risk society concept.12 However, given the limited scope of this thesis, it 
clearly would have been unfeasible to try and provide a comprehensive survey of interesting 
historical and conceptual connections between existential risk research and older debates in political 
theory and related disciplines.  
The aim of this thesis is modestly to begin this conversation and to uncover existential risk 
research as a field of inquiry through the lens of one particular intellectual tradition. It holds that one 
of arguably many promising ways to approach this task is to conceive of existential risk research as 
                                               
9 For instructive discussions of the topic of catastrophe and emergency from a security studies or a democratic 
theory perspective see for instance Honig, B. (2011), Aradau, C. & Munster, R. (2011), Albertson, B. & 
Gadarian, S. (2015). All of these works would provide promising starting points to begin situating existential 
risk research from a political theory perspective. 
10 A particularly suitable starting point for situating existential risk research from this angle would be the recent 
work of Andersson, J. (2012, 2018) on the history of futures research. A similarly interesting touchstone could 
be found in the work of Amadae, S. M. (2016, 2018). 
11 See for instance Taleb, N. (2007), Sunstein, C. (2005, 2009), Dupuy, J. P. (2012). 
12 See e.g. Beck, U. (1992, 2007), Adam, B., et al. (2000). 
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part of an ongoing conversation about the problematic, multi-faceted, puzzling relationship between 
technology, human value, and human agency. It further holds that a good basis to bring out these 
deeper puzzles and to develop a better idea of what might be new and distinctive about existential 
risk research can be found in the post-war works of Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt and Günther 
Anders, even though, without doubt, many other authors could have been chosen as starting points. 
However, if the thesis succeeds in presenting existential risk research as a rich, new subject of 
intellectual inquiry from this particular perspective and manages to throw light on further puzzles 
along the way - puzzles which it does not itself address - it will already have achieved part of what it 










Since ca. 2010 the spectre of human extinction appears to have featured particularly prominently in 
the newspaper headlines of the Anglo-Saxon world.13 The Atlantic told its readers that “We’re 
underestimating the risk of human extinction”;14 the BBC asked “How are humans going to become 
extinct?”15, Science Magazine diagnosed a “Denial of catastrophic risk”;16 The Irish Times asked 
“How long will the human species survive on Earth”?17 and The Express cried “Humanity will go 
EXTINCT in 100 years”.18 Leaving aside the media’s proclivity for sensationalist headlines, 
doomsday-heavy language of this kind does seem to reflect a form of collective existential fear that 
appears to have taken hold not only parts of the academic community, but also of the wider public.  
Global warming is evolving from a distant, somewhat abstract phenomenon into a problem 
with immediate, real, and tangible consequences. Until recently, its effects were observed almost 
exclusively by experts, leaving their mark only in scientific models and in remote glacial regions of 
the planet. Now global warming is directly interfering with people’s lives through rising sea levels, 
hurricanes, wild fires, and prolonged periods of drought.19 Trends suggest worse is yet to come. As it 
stands, according to Nicholas Stern, “Bangladeshi farmers and Cairo city-dwellers are at severe risk 
of flooding and storms; southern Europe and parts of Africa and the Americas are threatened by 
desertification. Perhaps hundreds of millions of people may need to migrate as a result, posing an 
immense risk of conflict”.20  
And despite being the focus of our fears of climate change, its direct effects on human 
civilisation in the form of flooding, storms, draught and desertification, etc., are only the tip of the 
iceberg. The 2015 Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction was awarded to the journalist Elizabeth 
Kolbert for her book on The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History, where she links global warming 
to sharply increasing losses in global biodiversity. Kolbert claims that we are entering a sixth mass 
extinction event - episodes in the Earth’s history when the diversity of life plummets so sharply that, 
in a short geological interval, over three-quarters of all living species die out - a fear that is widely 
                                               
13 The focus of the thesis is the Anglo-Saxon world. To an extent this decision was made in order to narrow 
down the scope of the thesis. However, it also appears to be the case that the existential risk eco-system is 
largely limited to Great Britain and the Unites States. The focus on the Anglo-Saxon world therefore appears to 
be sufficiently wide to provide a representative portrayal of the existential risk research landscape. 
14 Andersen, R. (2012). 
15 Coughlan, S. (2013). 
16 Rees, M. (2013). 
17 Reville, M. (2016). 
18 Martin, S. (2017). 
19 IPCC (2014), pp. 4-7. 
20 Stern, N. (2016a). 
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shared within the scientific community.21 This, Kolbert argues, constitutes not only a threat to the 
“living things with which we share Earth”, it threatens to disrupt crucial “ecosystem services such as 
crop pollination and water purification” on which human survival depends.22 “By disrupting these 
systems” Kolbert argues, “we’re putting our own survival in danger”.23 The underlying concern is 
that humankind will not be able to isolate itself from the dynamics it unleashed on the world. 
Contributing to this tense and fearful atmosphere, the world has recently experienced a 
comeback of fears of nuclear war. After years of relative tranquillity and stability following the end 
of the Cold War, nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea have raised fears of nuclear conflict to 
such an extent that the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2018 decided to shift its doomsday clock 
forwards to “two minutes to midnight”, as close to midnight as it has been since 1953, the year in 
which the USSR succeeded in developing thermonuclear weapons.24 According to the Bulletin, the 
doomsday clock should be seen as something akin to a barometer of apocalyptic fears, “a universally 
recognized indicator of the world’s vulnerability to catastrophe from nuclear weapons, climate 
change, and new technologies emerging in other domains”.25 With midnight symbolising global 
catastrophe, the clock’s minute handle conveys how close “we are to destroying our world”. 26 
According to the Bulletin’s Science and Security board, humanity’s situation in 2018 has not been 
this precarious since 1953: “world leaders failed to respond effectively to the looming threats of 
nuclear war and climate change, making the world security situation […] as dangerous as it has been 
since World War II”.27  
As if to encapsulate this gloomy zeitgeist, the past two decades have witnessed the steady 
rise in prominence of a new field of scientific inquiry: existential risk research, also sometimes 
referred to as existential risk scholarship or existential risk studies (in the following these 
appellations will be used interchangeably). The aim of this chapter is to scope this emerging field of 
inquiry, to survey its self-understanding, its methodology, and its aims, in order to arrive at a better 
understanding of what might be distinctive and perhaps new about it. Anticipating a little, what 
appears to be genuinely new about existential risk research is its attempt to open up the problem of 
human extinction as a field of scientific inquiry in its own right. Phil Torres, one of the field’s most 
influential authors, for instance argues that existential risk scholarship “uses the tools and methods of 
rational empiricism to map out the obstacle course of risks that civilization must navigate in the 
coming centuries – and beyond”.28 That is, whilst stark warnings of human extinction or civilisational 
                                               
21 See for instance Ceballos, G. Ehrlich, P. et al. (2015), Barnodsky, A. et al. (2011), Wake, D. & Vredenburg, 
V. (2008).  
22 Kolbert, E. (2014), p. 472. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Bronson, R. (2018), p. 3. 
25 Ibid, p. 3. 
26 See Benedict, K. (2018). 
27 Bronson, R. (2018), p. 2. 
28 Torres, P. (2017b). 
 14 
collapse such as those voiced by Elizabeth Kolbert, Paul Ehrlich, or the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), are pervasive and arguably have been for a long while, they typically are 
connected to and arise from observations of specific ecological, geological, technological, social, or 
geo-political trends. Existential risk research, however, inverts this perspective and takes a deductive 
approach. It makes the problem of human extinction its starting point for thinking about human 
affairs, present, and future and screens and analyses contemporary developments under this single 
aspect. Doing so, existential risk studies introduces a range of new concepts and methods and 
ultimately arrives at a distinctive set of ethical principles and policy recommendations. Rather than 
merely providing a descriptive analysis of the genre, however, this chapter seeks to establish to what 
extent this rather peculiar perspective on humanity and its future presents us with something 
qualitatively new. In laying the groundwork for the more detailed and interpretive analysis to follow, 
this chapter distils the underlying assumptions and implications that have remained – until now – 
implicit or underexplored. 
 
 
1.1 The concept of existential risk 
 
The concept of existential risk was formalised by Oxford philosopher Nick Bostrom in a 2002 paper 
entitled ‘Existential risks and related hazards’, which, in hindsight, can be regarded as the historic 
nucleus of ‘existential risk research’.29 In ‘Existential risks and related hazards’, Bostrom defines 
existential risks as “threats that could cause our extinction or destroy the potential of Earth-
originating intelligent life”.30 Climate change and nuclear war, as we have seen, are often considered 
threats which could cause our extinction and are therefore typically included in the list of such risks. 
Bostrom goes further than that, however, and argues that we are presently living in the perhaps most 
critical phase of human history: “one might argue […] that the current century, or the next few 
centuries, will be a critical phase for humanity”.31 Increasing technological powers, he argues, are 
expected to multiply the potential sources of existential risk. Indeed, in addition to nuclear war and 
climate change, Bostrom argues humanity will be exposed to unprecedented existential risks from 
emerging technologies, such as nano-technology, synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, or geo-
engineering: “Advances in biotechnology might make it possible to design new viruses that combine 
the easy contagion and mutability of the influenza virus with the lethality of HIV. Molecular 
nanotechnology might make it possible to create weapons systems with a destructive power dwarfing 
                                               
29 Viz. Torres, P. (2017b). 
30 Bostrom, N. (2002), p. 1. 
31 Bostrom, N. (2009), p. 211. This position is widely shared in the existential risk movement. Stephen 
Hawking, who was affiliated to both CSER and the FLI, to give just one other example at this point, for 




that of both thermonuclear bombs and biowarfare agents. Superintelligent machines might be built 
and their actions could determine the future of humanity ‐ and whether there will be one”.32  
Against this backdrop, one might be inclined to think of existential risk theory as merely 
another strand of literature seeking to raise attention about the “world’s vulnerability to catastrophe,” 
as it were, adding a perhaps superfluous voice to the amalgam of voices prophesying doom. But 
curiously, scholars in the field sometimes claim that they are rather isolated with their research 
interests, complaining about a perceived neglect of their concerns by the wider academic community. 
In a 2009 paper Bostrom argues that “existential risks have not received as much scholarly attention 
as they deserve. In recent years, there have been three serious books and one major paper on this 
topic”.33 In a 2013 piece, Bostrom again states that existential risk receives comparatively little 
scholarly attention relative to more profane topics: “In light of [the] very high value in studying 
existential risks and in analysing potential mitigation strategies, it is striking how little academic 
attention these issues have received, compared to other topics that are less important”.34 He then 
presents a figure in which the number of ‘Scopus’35 search results for the key-word ‘human 
extinction’ is compared to the number of search results for key words such as ‘dung beetles’, ‘star 
trek’ or ‘zinc oxalate’: 36 
 
Figure 1: Number of academic papers on various topics (listed in Scopus, August 2012) 
 
Source: Bostrom (2013), p. 26, fig. 6 
 
The figure suggests there is far greater academic interest in dung beetles than in human extinction. 
Bostrom takes this as a starting point to speculate about potential reasons for such ostensible neglect 
by the wider research community and argues that  
                                               
32 Bostrom, N. (2009), p. 198. 
33 Bostrom, N. (2009), p. 196. 
34 Bostrom. N. (2013), p. 26. 
35 Scopus is an abstract and citation database of peer reviewed journals, books and conference proceedings 
provided by Elsevier. See: https://www.elsevier.com/solutions/scopus. 
36 Bostrom (2013), p. 26, fig. 6. 
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“many factors conspire against the study and mitigation of existential risks. Research is perhaps 
inhibited by the multidisciplinary nature of the problem, but also by deeper epistemological 
issues. The biggest existential risks are not amenable to plug-and-play scientific research 
methodologies. Furthermore, there are unresolved foundational issues, particularly concerning 
observation selection theory and population ethics, which are crucial to the assessment of 
existential risk; and these theoretical difficulties are compounded by psychological factors that 
make it difficult to think clearly about issues such as the end of humanity”.37  
 
Jason Matheny, another author in the field, similarly speculates about the perceived lack of scholarly 
research on human extinction, arguing it might be because “human extinction seems impossible, 
inevitable, or, in either case, beyond our control; maybe human extinction seems inconsequential 
compared to the other social issues to which cost-effectiveness analysis has been applied; or maybe 
the methodological and philosophical problems involved seem insuperable”.38 The contention that 
the problem of human extinction is not being taken seriously enough appears to be a common theme 
in the existential risk research community.39  
 My aim in this chapter is to develop a better idea of what authors such as Bostrom and 
Matheny might have in mind when they allege a lack of scholarly attention to the problem of human 
extinction. Quite clearly, if superficially, there appears to be no scarcity of collective existential fear; 
the spectre of human extinction is and has been on the mind of many scholars for decades. Countless 
numbers of books and journal articles have been written about global environmental crises, nuclear 
war, or pandemics and their potentially apocalyptic implications. What is it then that sets existential 
risk theory apart from long-standing anxieties about the fate of humanity? Are existential risk 
researchers justified in their belief that they are virtually alone in caring about the problem of human 
extinction, whilst the rest of the world is busy researching dung beetles?  
My discussion of this question is bipartite. My central claim in this chapter is that existential 
risk researchers truly appear to be approaching the problem of human extinction in a new way, 
introducing a range of concepts and a new, integrative perspective to study the topic. Whilst their 
research certainly is emblematic of a zeitgeist that is characterised by a deep sense of the ‘world’s 
vulnerability to catastrophe’, and as such can be conceived of as an organic outgrowth of the plethora 
of existential fears outlined above – they are neither alone in worrying about the possibility of human 
extinction, nor in discussing specific risks - existential risk theory sets out to provide a rigorous 
analytical framework for structuring this landscape of fears: it seeks to infuse it with conceptual 
clarity by studying risks to the survival of the human species as one ‘integrated field’.40 As Pamlin, 
Armstrong, et al. (2015) argue, existential risk research is “a scientific assessment about the 
                                               
37 Ibid, p. 26. 
38 Matheny, J. (2007), p. 1335. 
39 See also Rees, M. (2017a). 
40 Baum, S. (2015); Bostrom, N. & M. Ćirković (2008). 
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possibility of oblivion” in general.41 It seeks to study end-time scenarios in an overarching, non-
domain-specific way and to devise overarching strategies for risk minimisation based on such an 
integrative approach. This generates a genuinely new perspective on the future of humanity. When 
Bostrom suggests a neglect of the problem of human extinction, he thus does not mean that there is a 
disregard for the problem of the possibility of human extinction in specific contexts. Rather, he refers 
to a lack of rigorous, general, non-domain-specific attention to the problem. The claim that 
existential risk theory is isolated therefore is intelligible only in this highly specific sense.  
 The second part of my discussion shifts the focus from the descriptive to the interpretive, 
from the question what existential risk theory is, to the question of what the new conceptual toolkit it 
provides implies for our perspective on humanity. My main argument here is that existential risk 
theory, albeit ostensibly concerned with the study of threats to the survival of the human species, 
quickly evolves into a story about the relationship between technology and humanity. That in fact, 
the framing of the future of humanity in terms of survival means that technology emerges as 
humanity’s destiny. This, I argue, is a direct consequence of the generalised perspective on human 
extinction scenarios it introduces. Albeit new in the conceptual sense described above, a more 
substantive reading of existential risk theory resonates with a rich history of thought in philosophy 
and political theory, echoing both high hopes and deeply rooted anxieties about modern science and 
technology and its implications for human life. The perspectives on that relationship, on how 
existential risk theory relates to older narratives, will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 
In accordance with these two dimensions of my discussion, this chapter proceeds in two 
steps. In the first sections, a brief overview of the emerging genre of existential risk theory and the 
associated research movement is provided. They map out the evolving network of research institutes 
and scholars working in the field and are intended to carve out the theoretical scaffolding of 
existential risk theory – shared assumptions, shared narratives (normative and otherwise) and policy 
recommendations. The final section of the chapter then transitions to my discussion of existential risk 
theory’s substantive implications, namely the role of technology in existential risk theory and 
demonstrating how technology emerges as the decisive determinant of human destiny.  
 
1.2 Existential risk scholarship – basic ideas 
 
Existential risk theory is predicated on the belief that human extinction is not receiving sufficient 
attention by the academic community. Per Bostrom: “existential risks have not received as much 
scholarly attention as they deserve”.42 According to many authors in the field, the problem begins 
with the fact that people rarely fully appreciate what human extinction would actually entail, i.e. that 
people tend not to be fully aware of the stakes involved. A common starting point in the literature on 
                                               
41 Pamlin, D., Armstrong, S. et al. (2015), p. 6. 
42 Bostrom, N. (2009), p. 196, See also Pamlin, D., Armstrong, S. et al. (2015). 
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existential risk is a section of Derek Parfit’s seminal work Reasons and Persons.43 In a passage about 
the future prospects of moral and ethical progress, he asks the reader to compare three outcomes: 
 
“1. Peace. 2. A nuclear war that kills 99 per cent of the world’s existing population. 3. A nuclear 
war that kills 100 per cent. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which 
is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between 
(1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater … The Earth 
will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand 
years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of 
the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the 
difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history”.44 
 
This view, Parfit argues, must be true for both classical utilitarians as well as for those who attribute 
value to ‘ideal goods’ such as the arts and sciences, or moral and ethical progress. Carl Sagan, who is 
also often invoked by existential risk theorists, made effectively the same point in a 1983 article in 
Foreign Affairs: 
 
 “Some have argued that the difference between the deaths of several hundred million people in 
a nuclear war (as has been thought until recently to be a reasonable upper limit) and the death of 
every person on Earth (as now seems possible) is only a matter of one order of magnitude. For 
me, the difference is considerably greater. Restricting our attention only to those who die as a 
consequence of the war conceals its full impact. If we are required to calibrate extinction in 
numerical terms, I would be sure to include the number of people in future generations who 
would not be born. A nuclear war imperils all of our descendants, for as long as there will be 
humans. Even if the population remains static, with an average lifetime of the order of 100 
years, over a typical time period for the biological evolution of a successful species (roughly ten 
million years), we are talking about some 500 trillion people yet to come. By this criterion, the 
stakes are one million times greater for extinction than for the more modest nuclear wars that kill 
"only" hundreds of millions of people. There are many other possible measures of the potential 
loss—including culture and science, the evolutionary history of the planet, and the significance 
of the lives of all of our ancestors who contributed to the future of their descendants. Extinction 
is the undoing of the human enterprise”.45 
 
These two passages contain much of what must be known about existential risk theory. The starting 
point of existential risk theory is essentially an ethical one, akin to the dictum ‘quantity begets a 
quality of its own’. It is about making explicit and raising attention for the categorically different 
level of horror human extinction would amount to as compared to all large-scale catastrophes 
humanity has endured throughout its history, from pandemics, to world wars, to natural disasters.  
The basic conviction of existential risk theory is that, once reflected upon ‘soberly’,46 human 
extinction is even worse than our first emotional reaction to the idea might suggest. As the 
philosopher Peter Singer puts it in a recent article, co-authored by two philosophers from Bostrom’s 
Future of Humanity Institute: “One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of 
                                               
43 See for instance Bostrom, N. (2013), Matheny, J. (2007), Farquhar, S. et al. (2017). 
44 Parfit, D. (1984), p. 453. 
45 Sagan, C. (1983), p. 275. 
46 Bostrom, N. (2002), p. 4. 
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people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is, by far, not the worst thing about 
human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future 
generations”.47 Or, as another group of authors has it “what makes existential catastrophes especially 
bad is that they would “destroy the future”.48 The basic position is that, once we take heed of the fact 
that human extinction would imply a virtually infinitely negative impact, all other types of concerns, 
even catastrophes on the scale of the Spanish flu, fade in comparison.49  
Now, this might at first seem rather trivial, until one remembers that existential risk theory 
can be seen as the attempt to infuse the amalgam of anxieties permeating society and parts of the 
academic community with analytical rigour. To do so, the first step is to define what it is one is afraid 
of, to be clear about one’s anxieties, as it were. What existential risk researchers want to raise 
awareness for is that human extinction is a wholly different category of horror which should not 
uncritically be lumped together with other kinds of large scale catastrophes: “Tragic as such events 
are to the people immediately affected”, Bostrom argues, “in the big picture of things – from the 
perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the 
surface of the great sea of life.50 They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human 
suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species”.51 Human extinction, on the 
other hand, is terminal and precludes recovery. From the utilitarian perspective espoused by 
Bostrom, given the virtually infinite stakes involved,52 the prevention of human extinction should be 
morally paramount.53  
Taking human extinction seriously, making it the focus of one’s attention in its own right 
means taking all scenarios that could possibly result in human extinction into account. Bostrom 
acknowledges that the problem of global catastrophes, of civilisational collapse and, as an upper limit 
                                               
47 Singer, P., et al. (2013). 
48 Farquhar, S. et al. (2017), see also Baum, S. & Barrett, A. (2017). 
49 Most existential risk researchers take a pan-generational utilitarian perspective which is contested on a 
variety of grounds. The basic claim that human extinction would be an extraordinarily bad outcome, however, 
seems uncontroversial, even if one does not take a pan-generational utilitarian perspective. Several authors 
have shown that it would be worse than any other outcome even when considered from a non-utilitarian 
perspective and if one abstracts entirely from effects on future generations in one’s normative calculus 
[Scheffler, S. (2016), Dasgupta, P. (2017)]. 
50 In his original paper, Bostrom uses three dimensions to describe the magnitude of a risk: scope, intensity and 
probability. Scope refers to the size of the group of people that are at risk, intensity to the severity of the impact 
expected to affect each individual in the respective group and probability denotes the best current subjective 
estimate of the probability of the adverse outcome. In terms of scope, Bostrom distinguishes between personal, 
local, and global risks. In terms of intensity, he distinguishes between endurable and terminal risks. ‘Endurable’ 
means that the inflicted damage may cause great destruction in the short to medium term but, ultimately, is 
recoverable. ‘Terminal’ means that the inflicted damage is so intense that it is effectively unrecoverable: “the 
targets are either annihilated or irreversibly crippled in ways that radically reduce their potential to live the sort 
of life they aspire to”. Based on this initial categorisation, Bostrom identifies six qualitatively distinct types of 
risk, comprised of the six possible combinations of types of scope and intensity (probability is superimposed). 
An existential risk in this scheme is one that is terminal in intensity and global in scope. See Bostrom, N. 
(2002), p. 4. 
51 Bostrom, N. (2002), p. 2. 
52 Pamlin, D. & Armstrong, S. (2015), p. 31. 
53 Bostrom, N. (2013). 
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of such catastrophes, the problem of human extinction, has been on the mind of many authors writing 
throughout the 20th century. He references for instance Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, Paul Ehrlich’s 
Population Bomb, and the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth in the context of concerns regarding the 
potentially apocalyptic consequences of environmental degradation.54 However, in all of these cases 
the risk of human extinction is invoked only peripherally as a potential worst-case scenario and, even 
where it is discussed in a more focused manner, only within a specific context. The same could be 
said about Derek Parfit and Carl Sagan, as well as for the many other authors, who discussed the 
possibility of human extinction in the context of nuclear weapons throughout the 20th century – from 
Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein,55 to Jonathan Schell and Jeff McMahan, to name but a few.56 
According to Bostrom and Cirkovic (2008) this is no longer sufficient: “If we treat risks singly, and 
never as part of an overall threat profile, we may become unduly fixated on the one or two dangers 
that happen to have captured the public or expert imagination of the day, while neglecting other risks 
that are more severe or more amenable to mitigation”.57 Taking human extinction seriously, 
according to these authors, thus logically requires one “to take on board more generalised concerns” 
about human extinction and to develop an ‘overall threat profile’. This notion is the defining and 
distinctive feature of existential risk theory.58  
The first definition of existential risk can be found in Bostrom’s original piece on the topic 
‘Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards’.59 Bostrom here 
defines existential risks as “threats that could cause our extinction or destroy the potential of Earth-
originating intelligent life”.60 The definition, in particular its second component referring to Earth-
originating intelligent life, will be a matter of discussion at a later point - defining existential risk is 
not as straightforward as it might seem. For the moment, however, suffice it to say that the concept of 
existential risk may be understood narrowly as a category that allows for the unified discussion of 
‘all threats that could cause our extinction’ (Definition 1), or, in Sagan’s words, of all threats that 
could mean “the undoing of the human enterprise”. It is also in this narrow sense that the concept is 
usually employed throughout the literature. When Bostrom argued in 2009 that “only three serious 
books and one paper” had been written about the topic of human extinction, he had in mind not any 
publication where the problem of human extinction is invoked or serves as a backdrop for reflections 
about specific environmental, technological, or political developments, but the kind of systematic, 
                                               
54 Bostrom, N. (2009), p. 198. 
55 Russell, B. & Einstein, A. (1955). 
56 See Schell, J. (1982), McMahan, J. (1986). 
57 Bostrom, N. & Cirkovic, M. (2008), p. 2. 
58 Bostrom, N. (2013), p. 27. 
59 In a search for pre-2002 mentions of “existential risk” on Google Scholar results showed that the concept 
was almost exclusively employed to refer to life-threatening on an individual. Searches on Scopus yielded 
similar results. 
60 Bostrom, N. (2002), p. 1. 
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non-domain-specific reflection about human extinction in general, which the concept of existential 
risk is intended to allow for.61  
 
1.3 The existential risk eco-system 
 
Over the past decade the number of research institutes and individual scholars that chose to make 
existential risk their focus has grown rapidly. The emerging movement, or eco-system,62 had 
considerable success in raising attention for its concerns amongst the general public as well as in the 
upper echelons of the corporate world, academia, civil society and politics. In this section, a brief 
overview of the institutional structure of the existential risk movement is provided to convey an idea 
of the movement’s shape and reach. 
In 2005 Bostrom founded the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at Oxford University as 
part of the Faculty of Philosophy and the Oxford Martin School. The FHI’s mission reads as follows: 
“using the tools of mathematics, philosophy, and science, we explore the risks and opportunities that 
will arise from technological change, weigh ethical dilemmas, and evaluate global priorities. Our 
goal is to clarify the choices that will shape humanity’s long-term future “.63 To this day, the FHI 
remains arguably the most influential research institute in the field and a number of its researchers, 
such as Anders Sandberg, Toby Ord, Robin Hanson and Stuart Armstrong, will be discussed here. 
Since the FHI’s foundation many other institutes with a similar focus have been founded across 
Europe and the US.   
 In 2011 the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) was founded by Seth Baum and Tony 
Barrett, two other influential scholars in the field. The GCRI’s focus is not exclusively on existential 
risks but on global large-scale risks more generally. However, as will be discussed in greater depth 
later, this distinction is not entirely straightforward and much of the GCRI’s research can therefore 
be considered as existential risk research.64 The mission of the Global Challenges Foundation, 
founded in Sweden in 2012, is “to incite deeper understanding of the global risks that threaten 
humanity and catalyse ideas to tackle them. Rooted in a scientific analysis of risk, the Foundation 
brings together the brightest minds from academia, politics, business and civil society to forge 
transformative approaches to secure a better future for all”.65 The Centre for the Study of Existential 
Risk, founded in 2013 at the University of Cambridge by Astronomer Royal Martin Rees, 
                                               
61 Bostrom, N. & Cirkovic, M. (2008), p. 2. 
62 Torres, P. (2017b), p. 2. 
63 Please compare to FHI (2018a). 
64 The GCR’s mission statement reads as follows: “The Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (GCRI) is a 
nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank. GCRI was founded in 2011 by Seth Baum and Tony Barrett. GCRI studies 
the full range of GCRs and GCR topics in order to answer the big questions: Which risks should society be 
most worried about? How do the different risks affect each other? And above all, what are the best ways to 
reduce the risk?” Please see: GCRI (2018). 
65 See Baum, S. et al. (2016), p. 3. 
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philosopher Huw Price and Skype founder Jaan Tallinn, describes itself as “a multidisciplinary 
research centre dedicated to the study and mitigation of risks that could lead to human extinction. 
Our goal is to steer a small fraction of Cambridge’s great intellectual resources […] to the task of 
ensuring that our own species has a long-term future“.66 The Future of Life Institute, which was 
founded in 2014 by MIT physicist Max Tegmark as well as Jaan Tallinn, considers itself a “research 
and outreach organization working to mitigate existential risks facing humanity“ with the mission “to 
catalyse and support research and initiatives for safeguarding life and developing optimistic visions 
of the future, including positive ways for humanity to steer its own course considering new 
technologies and challenges“.67  
 Several more recently formed institutes can also be identified, with either an explicit focus on 
existential risk or at least list existential risk research among their top research priorities. The 
Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies (IEET), which was founded by Nick Bostrom in 
2004;68 the Foundational Research Institute (FRI), founded in 2013; 69 The Project for Future of 
Human Flourishing (FHF), formerly the Existential Risk Institute, founded in 2017;70 The Global 
Priorities Project (GPP), founded in 2014;71 The Berkeley Existential Risk Initiative, founded in 
2017;72 and the Global Priorities Institute (GPI), a research centre within the University of Oxford’s 
faculty of philosophy, founded in 2018.73 Several additional institutes have a focus on specific 
existential risks, in most cases those associated with artificial intelligence, and have close personal 
and institutional ties to one or more of the above named institutes. The Machine Intelligence 
Research Institute at the University of Berkeley, or Open AI, an independent research company 
funded by a range of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs and with close ties to the FLF, is one such 
example. Both of these institutes have a focus on developing ‘benevolent’ artificial general 
intelligence, a topic I will return to in chapter 4.74 I abstract from these institutes for the moment, 
however, as my focus here is on general existential risk research. 
What stands out, is that the movement was able to gather the intellectual and financial 
support of many highly prominent public figures with global reach, in particular from academia. 
Cambridge physicists Martin Rees and the late Stephen Hawking, were both on the board of CSER 
and the FLI; MIT physicists Max Tegmark, Alan Guth and Nobel laureate Frank Wilczek, are on the 
                                               
66 Please compare to the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk’s webpage, see CSER (2018a). 
67 Please compare to the Future of Life’s webpage, see FLI (2018d). 
68 See IEET (2018). 
69 See FRI (2018). 
70 See FHF (2018), the FHF’s mission statement reads as follows: “The Project for FHF aims to bring into 
conversation a wide range of research on issues relating not just to our near-term prospects, but to humanity’s 
long-term future in the universe. We aim to understand the formidable existential threats before us and to 
devise effective means for mitigating these threats.” 
71 The GPP is a joint initiative of the FHI and the Centre for Effective Altruism. See GPP (2018). 
72 See BERI (2018). 
73 See GPI (2018) 
74 Please see respectively: MIRI (2018a, 2018b) and OpenAI (2015). 
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scientific advisory board of the FLI;75 and high-profile Silicon Valley entrepreneurs such as Elon 
Musk, Jaan Tallinn, Peter Thiel, or Sam Altmann, financially support several of these institutes, such 
as CSER, the FLI and Open AI.  
 
1.4 Academic disciplines in existential risk research 
 
Organisationally, the existential risk movement is expanding rapidly and the above list of institutes 
may well continue to expand past the time of writing. The main purpose of this overview was to 
demonstrate that the existential risk eco-system is expanding rapidly, particularly between 2010 and 
2018, and to introduce some of the key research institutes and scholars in the field.  
The movement has not only expanded organisationally, but also on a disciplinary level. The 
origins of the field are, if we take Nick Bostrom as its figurehead, in transhumanist philosophy. 
Bostrom is one of the founders of the ‘World Transhumanist Association’, which was founded in 
1998 and is now called ‘Humanity+’, and one of the authors of the ‘Transhumanist Declaration’.76 
Many authors currently contributing to existential risk research have a background in transhumanist 
philosophy, particularly at Oxford’s FHI, for instance Stuart Armstrong, Robin Hanson, and Anders 
Sandberg, or Phil Torres of the FHF. The fact that existential risk research has its roots in 
transhumanism is interesting and to an extent revealing in its own right (we return to this later). The 
concept of existential risk has also attracted the attention of an increasing number of prominent 
scholars from a wide array of more traditional academic backgrounds, from legal scholars such as 
Richard Posner,77 Cass Sunstein,78 or Jonathan Wiener,79 to economists such as Partha Dasgupta,80 
mathematicians such as Olle Häggström,81 security scholars such as Frances Flannery or Gary 
Ackermann,82 to philosophers of mind, such as Susan Schneider, ethicists such as Oxford professors 
Hilary Greaves and Toby Ord,83 biologists, such as Harvard professor of genetics George Church, 
political scientists, such as Yale professor Allan Dafoe,84 and several experts in the field of artificial 
intelligence such as Berkeley professor Stuart Russell, Francesca Rossi of IBM, or Viktoriya 
Krakovna of Google DeepMind,85 to name just a few of the better-known personalities. 
                                               
75 Please see FLI (2018d). 
76 Please see Humanity+ (2018). 
77 Posner, R. (2006). 
78 Sunstein, C. (2009). 
79 Wiener, J. (2016). 
80 Partha Dasgupta is on the Management committee of Cambridge University’s Centre for the Study of 
Existential Risk. Please see CSER (2018c). 
81 Olle Häggström is a mathematics professor at Chalmers University in Sweden and sits on the board of the 
recently founded FHF. See FHF (2018b). He also recently published a book on existential risk, see Häggström, 
O. (2016). 
82 Both are on the board of the FHF. See FHF (2018b). 
83 Hilary Greaves is a professor of philosophy at Oxford University and founder of the GPI. 
84 Allan Dafoe is Director of the FHI’s ‘Governance of AI Program’. Please FHI (2018b). 
85 George Church, Stuart Russell and Viktoriya Krakovna are on the board of the FLI, see FLI (2018d). 
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Existential risk research is a rapidly growing and increasingly interdisciplinary field of study, 
which makes it difficult to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive account of its web of institutes 
and the associated literature. I therefore focus on some of the most central publications, such as those 
of Nick Bostrom or Martin Rees, and complement them, where relevant, with publications, reports, 
and other types of publications that were issued either by the above-named institutes or authors 
affiliated to them. This textual analysis is informed by insights gathered by means of participant 
observation. Over a period of 4 years, between October 2014 and October 2018, I immersed myself 
deeply in the UK existential risk community, regularly attending talks, seminars, workshops, and 
conferences organised by CSER at Cambridge University, by the FHI at Oxford University, and by 
the UK Parliament’s All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Future Generations at the House of 
Commons.  
I attended for instance the Cambridge Conference on Catastrophic Risk in 2016 and 2018, the CFI 
Conference 2017, many of CSER’s lectures, seminars and workshops, such as David Denkenberger’s 
lecture on ‘Feeding Everyone no Matter What’, or Toby Ord’s lecture on ‘Will We Cause our Own 
Extinction?’, or the APPG’s session on ‘How do We Make AI Safe for Future Generations?’,  to give but a 
few examples. Furthermore, I joined the Cambridge University’s ‘The Future of Sentience’ Society (a 
recently founded student society which serves as a link between CSER and Cambridge University’s 
student body) for several of its meetings. 
Immersing myself in the community in such a way helped me to develop an overview of the 
movement, to gain a better understanding of its priorities, its key figures and its core convictions, and to 
orientate and anchor my textual analysis. What unites the outlined movement, are two core convictions: 
1) that we, as the late Stephen Hawking noted, live in perhaps the most dangerous and most decisive 
period in human history ever because the contemporary world faces a growing number of 
unprecedented existential risks on ever more frontiers.86 2) That the chief contributing factor is 
humanity’s rapidly expanding technological powers. Martin Rees sums these two convictions up in 
one remark: “extending far into the future as well as into the past - the twenty-first century may be a 
defining moment. It is the first in our planet's history where one species - ours - has Earth' s future in 
its hands and could jeopardise not only itself but also life's immense potential”.87 These two 
contentions translate directly into the directive to make existential risk research a global priority. 
 
1.5 The ‘science of existential risk’ 
 
Two levels of existential risk research can be distinguished. The first deals with existential risks in 
general, treating them as one analytical category. As such it is concerned with identifying, 
conceptualising and analysing common features of existential risks and to investigate the ethical and 
                                               
86 See for instance Rees, M. (2004), Torres, P. (2016), Häggström, O. (2017). 
87 Rees, M. (2008), p. xi. 
 
 25 
political implications of the entire phenomenon without going into the detail of specific risks. This 
type of research is intended to provide conceptual and methodological clarity, define categories (of 
different existential risks for instance), think through the ethical status of the far future, and to derive 
policy recommendations. The FHI refers to this type of existential risk research as “macro-strategic” 
research, CSER calls it simply the “science of existential risk”.88 The second type of research is 
domain-specific. Research conducted on this level seeks to identify specific sources of existential 
risk, analyse their main drivers and discuss potential regulatory or technological solutions to them. 
Oftentimes research lies somewhere between these two poles and most of the research institutes 
introduced above work on both frontiers. My interest in the first three chapters lies specifically on the 
macro-strategic level of existential risk research because it is this dimension that appears to 
genuinely bring new facets to bear. Macro-strategic existential risk research presents us with is a 
quite distinctive perspective on the future of humanity. By making potential end-time scenarios its 
reference point for reflecting about human affairs, present and future, it manages to assume a 
singularly detached and ostensibly objective perspective on the future of humanity. In a curious way 
the focus on the end of humanity opens the future up as a field of rigorous inquiry whereby the future 
of humanity emerges as an open-ended “obstacle-course”,89 or a “mine-field”, which humanity must 
navigate.90 However, at some points in my analysis I will refer to debates on the applied level, as 
illustrations or clarifications. The discussion on artificial intelligence (AI), for instance, which I 
expand in chapter four, is particularly interesting because it lies between the two poles of existential 
risk research. On the one hand, AI is a single technology and therefore debates surrounding it can be 
considered domain-specific. On the other hand, AI cannot be lumped together with other 
technologies (if it can be called a technology to begin with). As we shall see, the problem of AI 
touches upon the very question of what it means to be human and therefore the question of AI 
overlaps in multiple ways with wider macro-strategic questions about the future of humanity in 
general. 
 
Macro-strategic existential risk research  
 
With respect to macro-strategic existential risk research the FHI is by far the most active institute. 
Bostrom, Ord, Armstrong and Sandberg regularly publish on the topic, and their work forms the bulk 
of my literature review.91  
                                               
88 Please see FHI (2018c) and CSER (2018a). 
89 Torres, P. (2017b), p. 2. 
90 Häggström, O. (2016), p. 6. 
91 CSER has taken up work only relatively recently and thus has not yet produced many academic publications. 
Martin Rees’s book Our Final Hour [Rees, M. (2004)] can be seen as an early contribution to macro-strategic 
existential risk research. The FLI in the long run wants to contribute to a better understanding of existential risk 
in general but currently focuses on risks associated with artificial intelligence and therefore focuses on research 
on the applied level, see FLI (2018d). Others publishing on topics in the field are the researchers linked to the 
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The most basic question underpinning macro-strategic existential risk research is how high 
the overall level of existential risk facing humanity at any given point might actually be. Drawing on 
John Leslie’s The End of The World: The Science and Ethics of Human Extinction, Bostrom 
distinguishes between direct and indirect methods of approximating the total level of existential risk. 
Direct estimates “analyse the various specific failure-modes, assign them probabilities, and then 
subtract the sum of these disaster-probabilities”.92 Most direct existential risk estimates start by 
distinguishing between natural existential risks, such as the risks associated with volcano eruptions, 
gamma-ray bursts, or asteroid impacts, and anthropogenic existential risks, i.e. risks that have their 
origin in human activity, for instance risks stemming from nuclear technology, or human 
interferences with the environment, such as anthropogenic climate change, which has its roots in 
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion.93 There is a wide consensus that natural 
existential risks constitute only a small share of overall existential risk since geological data suggests 
that natural events which could conceivably pose an existential threat to the human species are 
extremely rare occurrences.94 Existential risk researchers argue that, given that humanity (defined as 
the species of homo sapiens) has existed for only 200,000 years, whereas the median duration of 
mammalian species is about 2.2 million years, the probability of natural extinction events occurring 
is regarded as extremely low for any given century.95 In other words, it is with relatively high 
confidence that one can assume that we and the generations of humans who will succeed us will 
likely not be exposed to a civilisation threatening asteroid impact or a super volcano eruption, 
provided that the distribution of natural disasters does not change.96 
Existential risk researchers therefore argue that the overwhelming majority of existential 
risks we are facing in this century and beyond are likely to be man-made. These self-inflicted threats, 
however, as Rees (2013) argues, are a very new phenomenon and therefore we have virtually no data 
based on which we could confidently assume they are equally unlikely to materialise as natural 
existential disasters.97 On the contrary, the limited experience mankind has made with anthropogenic 
existential risks is grounds alone for serious concern. In the 20th century the probability of an all-out 
nuclear war (arguably the first anthropogenic existential risk), was at times very high. People closest 
to the situation, such US President John F. Kennedy or John von Neumann, believed nuclear war to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, specifically Seth Baum. Apart from that there are also a couple of 
researchers without any direct affiliation to one of the above institutes, most notably Cirkovic, Jason Matheny, 
Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein, who regularly contribute to research in the field and will be referenced 
repeatedly throughout the thesis. 
92 Bostrom, N. (2002), p. 15. 
93 See for instance Bostrom, N. (2002), p.20; Bostrom, N. (2013), p.15; or Rees, M. (2013). 
94 See Ibid, as well as for instance Smil, V. (2008), Matheny, J. (2007); Farquhar, S. et al. (2017); Todd, B. 
(2017), or Rees, M. (2013, 2014). 
95 Compare this argument to Beckstead, N. & Ord, T. (2014). p. 116; Similar arguments can be found in 
Matheny, J. (2007), p. 1336, and Rees, M. (2014). 
96 Rees, M. (2014). 
97 Rees, M. (2013), p. 1223; see also Bostrom, N. (2013), p. 15-16. 
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be extremely likely if not inevitable.98 Albeit being aware of the necessarily speculative nature of any 
precise figure, Martin Rees claims retrospectively that the “annual risk of thermonuclear destruction 
during the Cold War was about 10,000 times higher than from asteroid impact”.99 Many existential 
risk researchers share the opinion that this century must be expected to be no less dangerous than the 
last. If anything, they predict that humanity is going to face a variety of man-made challenges in the 
coming decades that might well expose it to even greater levels of existential risk than the Cold War 
did. Some of these risks, such as the ones associated with runaway climate change, are already quite 
well known. However, existential risk researchers are concerned that developments in emerging 
technologies might pose even greater threats. Technological existential risks are in fact expected to 
account for the ‘great bulk’ of existential risk humanity will be facing throughout the coming decades 
and centuries.100 For this reason most of the existential risk institutes currently focus on studying the 
risks associated with emerging technologies, rather than other anthropogenic existential risks, such as 
climate change. The technological focus might be driven by the fact these researchers regard 
technological risks as understudied, whereas climate change and ecological collapse are already 
widely discussed and thoroughly analysed ‘mainstream’ issues.101  
 The emerging technologies that are most frequently named as potential future sources of 
existential risks are synthetic biotechnology, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, and geo-
engineering.102 Synthetic biotechnology is expected to make it possible to overcome natural limits on 
virulence and transmissibility, which then might make it relatively easy to engineer pathogens of 
extreme lethality, that might cause pandemics of unprecedented scale and severity and pose an 
extinction risk to humanity.103 Many authors see biotechnology as a particularly problematic case 
because the barriers to make use of it are relatively low: “knowledge and equipment needed to 
engineer viruses is modest in comparison with what is required to create a nuclear weapon…a single 
undetected terrorist group would be able to develop and deploy engineered pathogens”.104  
 The existential risks posed by nanotechnology, defined as atomically precise manufacturing, 
on the other hand are still largely hypothetical. One scenario that is frequently named in the literature 
is that experiments in nanotechnology could accidentally lead to the emergence of self-replicating 
nano-machines, which, in a runaway replication process, could end up consuming the entire 
                                               
98 “President Kennedy is said to have at one point estimated the probability of a nuclear war between the US 
and the USSR to be “somewhere between one out of three and even”. John von Neumann (1903-1957), who as 
chairman of the Air Force Strategic Missiles Evaluation Committee was a key architect of early US nuclear 
strategy, is reported to have said it was  “absolutely certain (1) that there would be a nuclear war; and (2) that 
everyone would die in it”, as quoted in Bostrom, N. (2002), p. 3, fn. 4. 
99 Rees, M. (2014). 
100 Bostrom, N. (2013), p.16; see also e.g. Beckstead, N. & Ord, T. (2014); p. 118; Rees, M. (2013), p.1223; 
Baum, S., Farquhar, S., et al. (2016). 
101 See particularly Rees, M. (2014). 
102 See for example Beckstead, N. et al. (2014); Bostrom, N. (2002, 2013); Pamlin, D. & Armstrong, S. (2015); 
Beckstead, N. & Ord, T. (2014), p. 116. 
103 See for instance Beckstead, N. & Ord, T. (2014), p. 118. 
104 Beckstead, N. & Ord, T. (2014), p. 118. 
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biosphere and turn it into ‘grey goo’.105 Another, and perhaps more conventional, source of risk 
associated with nano-technology is comparable to those associated with synthetic biotechnology. 
Namely that, once nanotechnology has matured and can be used for ‘distributed manufacturing’, it 
could give an increasing number of people the means to produce their own arsenals of highly 
powerful, sophisticated weaponry. Some authors are concerned that it might facilitate the production 
of nuclear bombs or chemical weapons to unsustainable levels.106  
 Concerns relating to developments in artificial intelligence, the science of engineering 
intelligent machines, usually focus on the hypothetical moment when so called superintelligence is 
developed. Very broadly put, superintelligence is defined as an artificial intelligence that supersedes 
human intelligence in all domains, i.e. in every instrumentally relevant respect. It is envisioned to be 
better not only at solving specific, well-defined, problems (such as playing chess, driving a car, or 
diagnosing cancer), but at the very capacity to autonomously identify and specify problems as well as 
to devise and implement strategies to solve them. For our immediate purpose, let us consider 
superintelligence simply as superhuman instrumental rationality. The fears surrounding 
superintelligence, concern the precise instance when such a superintelligent agent is first switched on 
or emerges. The fear is that once such a superhuman instrumental rationality is unleashed onto the 
world it can no longer be contained, precisely because it exceeds human intelligence and thus must 
be expected to be able to behave and strategise in ways that humanity cannot predict and prevent. 
Humanity would then find itself at the mercy of that superhuman will. The existential risk is 
generally associated with the possibility that the superintelligent agent might pursue goals 
detrimental to humanity’s interests. According to the literature, this could be happening for a variety 
of reasons and in a variety of forms, either because the AI starts pursuing its own, unforeseen ends, 
or simply because it was equipped with a set of poorly defined ends and value functions to begin 
with. 107 Some authors argue that an existential catastrophe might be the default outcome of the 
development of superintelligence, and therefore consider the existential risk associated with the rapid 
progress we are presently witnessing in the field of AI to be high.108 The account of the existential 
risk associated with AI will be refined in chapter 4, but the above discussion should suffice as a 
working basis.  
 Finally, geoengineering, typically defined as the deliberate use of technology to alter the 
world’s climate, might pose existential risks because its application could have severe unintended 
consequences such as draughts, ozone depletion, or acid rain which could, according to some 
authors, turn out to be so severe that the Earth becomes uninhabitable for humans.109  
                                               
105 See for instance Phoenix, C. & Drexler, E. (2004); Rees, M. (2004), p.132. 
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107 See for instance Müller, V. (2014), p. 297, or Price, H. & Tallinn, J. (2012). 
108 Soares, N. & Fallenstein, B. (2014, 2017). 




 Existential risk researchers are of course aware that the attempt to assign quantifiable 
probabilities to any single of these scenarios is a highly controversial enterprise, to say the least. 
Predictions about future risks associated with potential future technological capabilities hinge to a 
large extent on the informed but subjective judgment of individual experts. As opposed to natural 
existential risks, the assessment of which draws on a wealth of geological and astrological data, 
direct estimates of the total level of anthropogenic risk humanity, i.e. the attempt to analyse 
“individual failure-modes, assign them probabilities, and then subtract the sum of these disaster-
probabilities”,110 thus faces severe epistemological limitations, a situation further compounded by the 
multidisciplinary nature of the project.111  
 This is where indirect risk estimators come into play. Indirect existential risk estimates 
typically rely on thought experiments and abstract, probabilistic theorising as opposed to predictions 
about specific future technological developments. They rely on reference points external to humanity 
itself to logically constrain what can be coherently believed about the potential duration of the future 
of humanity.112 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to summarise these debates in detail and I will 
therefore limit myself to one example. The most frequently discussed indirect estimator in the 
literature is the so called Fermi Paradox.113 On the one hand, we have reason to assume that there is a 
non-negligible probability for life to have emerged somewhere else in the universe (given that the 
universe has existed for billions of years and it is believed that there are millions of planets with 
broadly earth-like conditions). On the other, hypothetically, the universe could be colonised with 
relative ease once a civilisation has passed a certain technological threshold.114 However, there are no 
signs of it.115 There are several interesting explanations for this perceived paradox, including one 
which concludes that we are more likely to live in a simulation than not.116 The one most widely 
discussed in the context of existential risk, however, is that intelligent life could face a ‘Great Filter’ 
at some point in its evolution which prevents it from spacefaring. It may be either, that it is hard for 
intelligent life to emerge in the first place, in which case the Great Filter could lie in our past, or it 
could be the case that almost every intelligent species destroys itself once it has reached a certain 
level of technological development, in which case the Great Filter could be ahead of us.117  There is a 
long-standing debate about what to make of the Fermi Paradox,118 whether it is logically valid to 
begin with and, if it is valid, whether it can tell us anything about the likelihood of human extinction 
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events.119 In addition to the Fermi Paradox, there are other indirect estimators of human extinction 
risk, such as observation selection effects, which are central to John Leslie’s Doomsday Argument,120 
as well as indirect estimators that try to correct for psychological biases in the way people (including 
researchers) judge the likelihood of large scale disasters and draw inferences about the plausibility of 
direct existential risk estimates.121  
 Based on direct and indirect estimates, several of the leading voices in existential risk theory 
arrive at rather gloomy predictions about the chances of humanity surviving the decades and 
centuries to come. Martin Rees believes that there is a 50 percent chance that humanity will not 
survive the 21st century,122 Nick Bostrom believes that “setting this probability lower than 25% 
would be misguided” and “that the best estimate may be considerably higher”,123 the ‘Stern Review’ 
estimated the risk of extinction at 10 per cent for this century,124 and philosopher John Leslie at 30 
per cent.125 In an informal survey, conducted with participants of the 2008 Global Catastrophic Risk 
Conference, the median respondent assigned a 19 per cent probability for humanity going extinct in 
this century.126  
Of course, these estimates should be taken with a pinch of salt. As indicated above, they rely 
entirely on the informed but ultimately speculative guesses of individual experts about future 
technological capabilities, complemented by their own indirect risk estimators. However, these 
limitations are effectively inconsequential for existential risk researchers. Given the stakes involved, 
what matters for existential risk research is solely that existential catastrophe is a non-negligible 
possibility, even if reliable judgements about its probability are impossible to provide. Per Bostrom, 
“even if the probability were much smaller (say, ~1%) the subject matter would still merit very 
serious attention because of how much is at stake”.127 What is more, as Ord et al. (2011) show, the 
chance of getting our estimates of existential risk probabilities wrong itself is considered to be a 
source of existential risk.128  
 
The ethics of existential risk 
 
Existential risk researchers, writing in the tradition of Derek Parfit and Carl Sagan, approach the 
problem of human extinction from a strictly pan-generational, utilitarian ethical framework, 
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assigning a stable, positive and aggregate value to every individual human life, independent of when 
such a life might be led.129 From this point of view, an existential risk not only threatens the lives of 
the billions of people alive at any given point in time, but of potentially trillions more. Translated 
into a simple expected value calculation this means that, no matter how small the probability of an 
existential threat might be, the expected value of the negative impact will nevertheless remain 
astronomically high if it is assumed that humanity could otherwise expect to exist for several 
thousands, millions, or even trillions of years more.130 By implication, the expected value of even the 
smallest reduction in existential risk exposure turns out to be extraordinarily high: Bostrom calculates 
that under ‘conservative assumptions’ “reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one 
percentage point is at least a hundred times the value of a million human lives”.131 Martin Rees 
similarly argues that the stakes are so high that “those involved in this effort [to reduce existential 
risk levels] will have earned their keep even if they reduce the probability of a catastrophe by one in 
the sixth decimal place”.132 In sum, these authors argue that even the smallest probability of 
existential catastrophe is highly practically significant.133 This is what distinguishes the category of 
existential risk, as used by the FHI, the CSER, or the FLI, from even the worst global catastrophes 
mankind has experienced so far, from famines to plagues, world wars, pandemics and pestilence. 
Judged from within the ethical framework of existential risk, such catastrophes appear as mere 
“setbacks” when compared to human extinction.134  
 Within this pan-generational utilitarian framework, existential risk reduction becomes 
morally paramount.135 According to Bostrom, existential risk reduction is the most important global 
public good and he argues that it should become a global priority, serving as a focus for long-term 
global political efforts.136 Generally he argues that our political efforts should be guided by a moral 
principle he refers to as the ‘Maxipok rule’: “Maximise the probability of an ‘OK outcome’, where 
an OK outcome is any outcome that avoids existential catastrophe”.137 This rule of thumb, might 
seem entirely non-controversial and common-sensical, but existential risk researchers point out that 
in reality it is rarely followed. According to them, researchers and policy makers tend ignore or 
underestimate the significance of low-probability, high-impact risks, particularly in the case of 
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technological risks.138 Rees laments the fact that most people tend to worry disproportionally about 
minor risks, such as carcinogens in food, or air crashes, while global catastrophic risks are largely 
ignored, including by industry and politicians.139 This diagnosis is supported by several prominent 
legal and economic scholars such as Weitzman, Posner, or Sunstein, who similarly identify low-
probability, high-impact risks, or ‘fat-tail risks’, as a  systematically neglected and ignored category 
of problem and list a variety of psychological heuristics and politicial forces that underly the neglect 
of such risks.140 Wiener (2016) refers to this problem as the “tragedy of the uncommons” and argues 
that in the case of existential risks precautionary action should be taken not because of the 
uncertainty involved, but because of the inability to learn from the catastrophe, should it materialise. 
At the heart of the failure to take catastrophic events seriously and implement precautionary 
measures, Bostrom identifies a psychological bias he terms, (referencing Voltaire’s Candide), the 
‘Panglossian view’: the idea that “the past record of success gives us grounds for thinking that 
evolution (whether biological, memetic, or technological) will continue to lead in desirable 
directions”.141 
 
Existential Risk Policy  
 
Based on these ethical considerations, existential risk researchers and institutes formulate policy 
recommendations. Given that they expect most existential risks to originate from emerging 
technologies rather than from natural events or environmental degradation, most of their policy 
recommendations, too, focus on technological developments and on providing policy makers with 
guidelines on how to increase the chances that these developments lead to ‘OK’ outcomes. I will not 
attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of these recommendations at this point, but limit my 
analysis to the presentation of a few representative examples and brief summary of their core ideas.  
The distinction between macro-strategic existential risk research and domain-specific 
existential risk research unsurprisingly permeates the policy recommendations, which also fit these 
categories. On a macro-strategic level, the key public policy we should adopt is to turn our default 
approach to managing technological change upside down, from a reactive approach to a proactive, 
precautionary approach.142 The dominant approach to regulating scientific and technological 
developments, at least in sensitive areas of research, can no longer be based on ‘learning by doing’, 
or ‘trial and error’, because, as Bostrom puts it, one cannot learn from errors if there is no ex post.143 
Historically, a ‘learning by doing’ approach was a feasible and even a highly effective way to handle 
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technological progress because the downsides of new technologies were not only compensable but 
usually “small compared to their benefits”.144 However, in a situation, where the adverse effects of 
technology, whether caused by error or terror, pose an existential threat, this ratio surely is inverted 
and a reactive approach rendered unsustainable. 
 This is why, according to existential risk research, humanity is entering a new era where our 
relationship to technological change must be fundamentally rethought. Rees claims that “there is too 
little planning, too little horizon-scanning, too little awareness of long-term risks” and that “the 
balance of effort in technology needs redirection – and to be guided by values that science itself can’t 
provide”.145 Bostrom similarly argues that contemporary policies and attitudes are ill prepared for 
technological existential risks in that “we have no evolved mechanisms, either biologically or 
culturally, for managing such risks”.146  
 Existential risk theorists therefore call for global stewardship, a new approach of regulating 
technological developments, based on foresight and precautionary action. As a general guideline 
Bostrom suggests the adoption of a ‘principle of differential technological development’. This 
principle holds that society should “retard the development of dangerous and harmful technologies, 
especially ones that raise the level of existential risk, and accelerate the development of beneficial 
technologies, especially those that reduce the existential risks posed by nature or by other 
technologies”. The principle of differential technological development will be discussed at greater 
length below.147  
More specific policy recommendations can be found in the institutes’ policy briefs. One such 
report, published jointly by CSER and the FHI, proposes that present day policy should focus on two 
sub-categories of policies. Firstly, on policies aimed at improving the state of knowledge about 
existential risk by funding and initiating more private and public research projects on both levels of 
existential risk research (macro-strategy and domain-specific). This is to help identify potentially 
beneficial and/or hazardous technologies as well as priority areas for precautionary governmental 
action. Secondly, policies should be put in place that help building safety into institutions, for 
instance by creating governance structures with decision-making processes that explicitly take into 
account future generations. In the long run, furthermore, policies should be adopted, which reduce 
the risk that dangerous technologies will be misapplied. Such policies could include for instance 
government oversight over the total amount of funding spent on research in high risk areas, 
regulations that require all researchers to register on a central database in such areas, setting “up an 
initiative to give developing countries access to safe technologies in exchange for setting up safety 
and monitoring systems to protect against accidents and terrorism”, etc.148 In a contribution to the 
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2014 annual report of the UK government’s chief scientific adviser a researcher of the FHI 
recommends institutionalising “horizon-scanning efforts, foresight programs, risk and uncertainty 
assessments and policy-oriented research” as well as putting in place a “special intelligence service 
to ensure that we know what misuse some technologies are being put to”.149 As a final example, a 
recent report on ‘Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance’ was published jointly by the Global 
Priorities Project (GPP), the FHI and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Policy 
recommendations ranged from institutionalising the political representation of future generations, to 
making ‘existential risk negligence’ a crime against humanity, to the foundation of a UN Office of 
Existential Risk Reduction.150 Pamlin and Armstrong (2015) suggest the foundation of a Global Risk 
Organisation (GRO), of a ‘Global Risk and Opportunity Indicator’, of global ‘early warning 
systems’, and systematically representing future generations in existing policy-making structures.151  
Currently, there is little evidence to suggest that the existential risk movement has succeeded 
in raising awareness for such far-reaching, macro-strategic considerations, either in government or 
amongst prominent non-governmental organisations.152 The story is very different on the domain-
specific levels, however, where the existential risk movement has been remarkably successful in 
raising awareness for their concerns and focusing the attention of policy makers, industry leaders, 
and civil society, on potential black swan events. 
The GPP’s report on ‘Unprecedented Technological Risks’ was widely shared in the UK 
government: a section by Séan Ó hÉigeartaigh and Huw Price of CSER on risks associated with geo-
engineering technologies eventually became a chapter of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser’s 
2014 annual report.153 Martin Rees and Partha Dasgupta, also of CSER, wrote a joint statement with 
the Pontifical Academy of the Sciences and Social Sciences on ‘Climate Change and the Common 
Good’, in which the Catholic Church is urged to take a leading role in combating climate change by 
leveraging its unique influence on public opinion and mobilising public funds.154 The area in which 
existential risk considerations are featuring most prominently, however, is undoubtedly artificial 
intelligence, to which we return in chapter 4. 
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In none of these instances can the material effects, if any, of the contribution of existential 
risk researchers be positively established. But the fact that the existential risk research community 
seeks and finds a governmental audience shows that it is not an ivory tower community, but one with 
the ambition to inform government policy and regulation and that its concerns are, to some extent, 
being taken seriously.  
 
1.6 Existential risk theory – an analysis 
 
My aim in the first section of this chapter was to tease out the common foundations of the emerging 
genre of existential risk theory. What I have established so far is that existential risk research appears 
to be onto something new with its integrative take on human extinction scenarios. Macro-strategic 
existential risk research presents us with a distinctive perspective on the future of humanity. By 
making potential end-time scenarios its reference point for reflecting about human affairs, present 
and future, it manages to assume a singularly detached and ostensibly objective standpoint on the 
topic. In a curious way, by making potential endpoints of humanity its reference point for thinking 
about the future, the future opens up as a field of scientific inquiry and emerges as an open-ended 
“obstacle-course”,155 or mine-field, which humanity must navigate.156 Beyond that I have set out to 
provide a brief overview of propositions that appear to be associated with and/or follow from this 
form of theorising. The three main propositions can be summarised as follows: 
 
P(1) That the issue of existential risk is widely ignored and neglected by policy makers, 
academics, and the wider public, leading to a situation whereby the severe challenges 
humanity is facing are largely neglected, and existential risks not only underestimated, but 
poorly understood.  
 
P(2) That mankind has entered a new era in which it is exposed to unprecedented 
technological risks on ever more frontiers. Torres (2016) summarises this conviction thus: 
“existential risks are more likely to kill you than terrorism”.157 This, according to Bostrom, 
Hawking, Ord, Rees, Baum, et al. marks the beginning of a critical phase, perhaps the most 
critical phase in human history, whereby it is the actions of whatever generation that happens 
to be alive that determine whether humanity has a future or not.158 Since existential risks 
have a virtually infinite negative expected value, technological existential risk mitigation is 
morally paramount and should become a global priority issue. 
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P(3) That the realities of this new era fundamentally challenge traditional ethical and political 
approaches to dealing with technological change, i.e. the ways in which technological 
developments are traditionally managed by public authorities and private actors. In order to 
live up to the challenges posed by the emergence of technological existential risks, public 
authorities must invest heavily in research on the subject, and support the development of a 
new ‘science of existential risk’. Furthermore, it is recommended that policies should be 
adopted which will facilitate horizon-scanning, the identification, monitoring and regulation 
of high-risk areas of technological developments, and the taking of necessary precautionary 
action. Taken together, it is hoped these measures will help to better understand, evaluate, 
and manage technological progress and to steer humanity safely through the dangerous 
waters of the future. 
 
In this section my focus shifts from the descriptive to the interpretive, from the question what 
existential risk theory is to the question what the new conceptual toolkit it provides us with implies 
from a critical perspective. As it stands, existential risk research appears to be rather straightforward 
and uncontroversial, perhaps due to the intuitive appeal and plausibility of the generalised outlook on 
existential risk.  
However, if one takes a closer look at the literature, it becomes clear that existential risk 
research is predicated on a set of tacit, more problematic assumptions. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I discuss some of these complications and tease out underlying assumptions. My aim is to 
spell out more clearly what existential risk research implies if one looks beyond the technical 
language. My main argument here is that existential risk theory, though ostensibly concerned with 
the study of threats to the survival of the human species, quickly turns into a story about the 
relationship between technology and humanity; that frames technology as humanity’s destiny. I argue 
that this appears to be a direct consequence of existential risk research’s quest to make the problem 
of human extinction the benchmark for thinking about the future of humanity. Albeit new in the 
narrow sense described above, existential risk theory, in a more substantive reading, therefore 
resonates with a rich tradition of thought in philosophy and political theory, echoing both the high 
hopes and deeply rooted anxieties about modern science and technology’s role in human affairs. How 
the perspectives on that relationship relate to such older questionings will be discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
Defining existential risk 
 
In order to develop a better understanding of the complications and assumptions characteristic for 
existential risk research one need not look far. Complications in fact begin to emerge with the search 
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for a suitable definition of ‘existential risk’ and ‘existential catastrophe’. Cotton-Barrat and Ord 
(2015) of the FHI argue that, to begin with, it might seem most straightforward to use the following 
definition of ‘existential catastrophe’: 
 
Definition 1: "An existential catastrophe is an event which causes the end of existence of our 
descendants".159  
 
This definition is essentially equivalent to Definition 1 of existential risk  (p. 17), and according to 
which existential risks are ‘all threats that could cause our extinction’. Under this definition, an 
existential catastrophe is simply the materialisation of a thus defined existential risk, i.e. an event 
which causes the human species to go extinct. However, as Cotton-Barratt and Ord point out, 
limiting the use of the category of existential catastrophe to human extinction events would mean to 
exclude events that might indirectly lead to human extinction, in which case it ''would seem sensible 
to refer to these events as existential catastrophes too, rather than only the event that ultimately 
triggers extinction physically''.160 
 To illustrate this point, the authors ask the reader to consider the following thought 
experiment: "A totalitarian regime takes control of Earth. It uses mass surveillance to prevent any 
rebellion, and there is no chance for escape. This regime persists for thousands of years, eventually 
collapsing when a super-volcano throws up enough ash that agriculture is prevented for decades, and 
no humans survive".161 Cotton-Barratt and Ord claim that it would be misleading to conceive only of 
the volcano eruption as an existential catastrophe because "the worst of the damage was done 
earlier", namely when the totalitarian regime rose to power. After this point they argue it was only a 
question of time "until something or other would finish things off", whether it is the eruption of a 
super volcano, a meteor strike or the implosion of the sun, and therefore Cotton-Barratt and Ord 
argue that one should be "able to talk about entering this regime as the existential catastrophe, rather 
than whatever event happens to end it".162 For this reason Bostrom suggests the adoption of the 
following definition of existential risk: 
 
Definition 2: "An existential risk is one that threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating 
intelligent life or the permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for desirable future 
development".163 
 
Under Bostrom's definition, threats, such as entering a state of permanent totalitarian control 
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resulting in the stagnation of scientific and technological progress, would count as an existential risk 
because it would imply the destruction of our potential for ‘desirable’ future development and thus 
constitute the cause for humanity’s eventual extinction. This definition is now the most widely used 
definition across the field.164  
 Cotton-Barratt and Ord, however, argue that this definition too has limitations because, as the 
authors point out, ‘potential’, as opposed to ‘extinction’, is not a binary term. That is to say, it is hard 
to determine in advance at what point our potential for desirable future development would be 
destroyed. The definition makes it necessary to determine ex ante whether or not to include a risk 
under that category, a difficult task. According to Cotton-Barratt and Ord, it is for instance not clear 
whether an event that severely curtails the potential for desirable future development, but where there 
is still a slight chance that humanity may regain that potential, should be considered an existential 
catastrophe or not. On the one hand, if desirable future development is indeed prevented, we would 
have to retrospectively conceive of the event as an existential catastrophe, on the other hand if the 
loss of potential turns out not to be permanent, it would make little sense to consider it an existential 
catastrophe. It would thus not be entirely clear whether the risk of such an event should be seen as an 
existential risk or not. Cotton-Barratt and Ord argue that it should be regarded as an existential risk 
because it includes the possibility of leading to extinction and therefore suggest an even more 
inclusive definition: 
 
Definition 3: "An existential catastrophe is an event which causes the loss of a large fraction of 
expected value".165 
 
 This definition works better for Cotton-Barratt and Ord. If, for instance, "we enter into the 
totalitarian regime [with a slight chance of escape] and then at a later date the hope of escape is 
snuffed out, that represents two existential catastrophes under this definition. We lost most of the 
expected value when we entered the regime, and then lost most of the remaining expected value 
when the chance for escape disappeared." An existential risk would thus simply be one that threatens 
to lead to "the loss of a large fraction of expected value".  
 Each step between Definition 1 and Definition 3 is obviously marked by an increased level of 
inclusivity. Definition 1 is rather narrow, limiting the use of the notion of existential risk to events 
that themselves threaten to annihilate humanity, which is helpful because it is a binary criterion 
(humanity either goes extinct as the result of a given event or it does not). In Definitions 2 and 3 the 
defining criteria become much more inclusive, stretching from the destruction of our potential for 
desirable future development to simply the loss of a large fraction of expected value. This makes it 
rather difficult to judge whether an event should be counted as an existential catastrophe, or as 
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entailing the risk thereof, or neither.  
 This difficulty in defining existential risk is reflected in much of the recent existential risk 
scholarship. Every global catastrophic risk effectively has the potential to turn into an existential risk. 
But since risk is defined as the likelihood of a possible outcome, this means that every global 
catastrophic risk is or at least harbours existential risk. As a result, we end up with highly inclusive 
definitions such as Cotton-Barratt’s and Ord’s, because ex ante it is impossible to exclude the 
possibility that humanity never recovers from such an event.  
 To an extent, however, such definitions appear to defy the very purpose of existential risk 
research. Indeed, given that the concept of existential risk is intended to clarify and focus our 
anxieties, to bring our attention on the 1% difference between the scenarios in Parfit’s thought 
experiment (cf. p. 9), such highly inclusive definitions seem unsuitable. The very purpose of the 
concept of existential risk is to raise attention to the fact that an existential catastrophe (the 
materialisation of an existential risk) is not just a massive global catastrophe; that it is not, 
figuratively speaking, about the 99% but that it is first and foremost a ‘catastrophe of time’,166 with 
almost all of its damage contained in the loss of value that is locked in the future, which in turn is 
represented by the 1%. Yet, Definition 3 defines an existential catastrophe simply as the ‘loss of a 
large fraction of expected value’.  
 
Technology in existential risk theory 
 
Underlying this struggle to define existential risk appears to be a central observation in existential 
risk research which will be discussed in subsequent chapters, specifically with reference to 
Heidegger and Arendt. The observed problem is that our increasing technological powers are 
inadvertently placing ever more parameters of our existence, across all dimensions, in our own 
hands; something that was not the case for previous generations. Concepts such as the Anthropocene 
speak of the perceived transformation in question. The problem is near complete responsibility for 
ever more aspects of human and natural life, resulting in a situation where no risk can be understood 
as fully ‘natural’ any longer. In existential risk research this observation is reflected in five premises 
that are commonly made in the field: 
 
(1) That humanity will at some point in the future be confronted with events that would, 
under normal conditions, cause its extinction – such as massive meteorite strikes, super 
volcanoes eruptions, the reversal of the poles, the implosion of the sun, etc. 
 
(2) That, in principle, none of these natural events must necessarily result in human 
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extinction. Humanity, it is argued, could develop means and policies either to prevent the 
event itself or, if it cannot be prevented, to avoid extinction by adequately preparing for its 
consequences and taking necessary precautions to survive it, such as colonizing other 
planets, building shelters on earth, or devising other schemes to keep the survivors of any 
such catastrophes alive for as long as possible. The implication is that that humanity could 
theoretically survive for an indefinite amount of time, if only it plays its cards right.  
 
(3) That today and for the foreseeable future, existing technologies, technological 
developments presently underway, and yet unknown technological developments, constitute 
the greatest source of existential risk. 
 
(4) That, “if scientific and technological development efforts do not effectively cease, then 
all important basic capabilities that could be obtained through some possible technology will 
be obtained”.167  
 
(5) That the sequence of technological and scientific discoveries can be managed and that 
there are more and less risky ways of doing this. 
 
Below, each of these premises is discussed in greater detail and specifically how their interplay 
allows us to develop a better idea of what is new and distinctive about existential risk research. 
Taken together the first two premises imply that an event such as the rise to power of a Luddite 
global totalitarian regime that would deliberately prevent humanity from 'playing its cards right' must 
be considered an existential catastrophe. In sum, any event that directly (by destroying humanity) or 
indirectly (by preventing humanity from developing the means to prevent existential catastrophes) 
prevents humanity from existing for an indefinite amount of time would have to be considered an 
existential catastrophe. This can be seen as the macro-strategic core insight of existential risk 
research. It presents us with a thoroughly new perspective on the future as a technological 
optimisation problem which results seamlessly from making the generalised perspective on potential 
endpoints of the species the benchmark for thinking about human affairs, present and future. 
 Central to this argument is the distinction between natural existential risks and anthropogenic 
existential risks. Natural existential risks are risks the original cause of which is independent of 
human action, such as meteor strikes, super volcano eruptions, or the implosion of the sun. 
Anthropogenic existential risks on the other hand, have their origin in human action. The risk of 
runaway climate change, of an all-out nuclear war, or of uncontrollable artificial intelligence are 
examples. It is clear, however, that the above logic renders the distinction between natural and 
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anthropogenic existential risks obsolete: the idea is that, in principle, any existential catastrophe can 
be prevented by adequate preparation turns every natural existential risk into an anthropogenic risk. 
Any given natural existential catastrophe turns into a failure to prepare or even a failure to prepare 
for preparation in one way or another. As a result, all existential risks turn into an anthropogenic 
problem.  
 Existential risk researchers distinguish between a variety of possible classification systems for 
interventions to reduce existential risks. One classification system distinguishes between four types 
of interventions, focusing on different time points in the development of an existential risk: 
prevention, response, endurance and recovery.168 Preventative interventions reduce the likelihood that 
the event itself occurs, or at least attempt to reduce the likelihood that the risk becomes existential. 
Response interventions help improve the capacity to manage the immediate impact of an event, to 
ensure that a catastrophe does not turn into an existential one. Endurance-type interventions (making 
it easier for people to survive the aftermath) and recovery-type interventions (making it easier to 
“rebuild a flourishing civilisation” after catastrophe has struck) focus on later time points during 
which, otherwise, a chain of cause and consequence could turn result in an existential catastrophe. 169 
Other authors distinguish between cross-cutting and risk-specific, or between direct and capacity-
building types of intervention.170  
 What these different ways of thinking about existential risk imply is that all existential risks 
effectively turn into technological management problems. In technology, humanity finds the means 
to avert and prepare for what might otherwise turn into natural or anthropogenic existential 
catastrophes (building meteor shields and refuges on Earth, colonising other planets, etc., all require 
the further development of our technological capabilities). The potential failure to adequately prepare 
for any given natural doomsday scenario is therefore equivalent to a failure to develop the 
technological capacities necessary to avoid extinction. Technological progress or development hence 
assumes an eschatological quality. Without it, natural existential catastrophes cannot be averted - we 
must progress or perish. 
 As we have seen above, however, existential risk researchers typically hold that technology 
also is the greatest source of existential risk.171 Natural existential threats, they argue, need not overly 
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concern us because the probability of their occurring in any given century is exceedingly small.172 
When Rees puts the chances of existential catastrophe for this century at 50 per cent, Bostrom at 30 
per cent and Musk at 20 per cent, the great bulk of risk must therefore come from technology or other 
anthropogenic sources. It is commonly argued in the literature that we need to focus on reducing 
technological existential risk before committing resources to reducing the level of natural existential 
risk we are exposed to.173 Existential risk researchers today are predominantly worried about the 
potential effects of nano-technology, synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and geo-engineering. 
However, they also argue that risks associated with these technologies might merely be the tip of the 
iceberg of risks yet to come. As Bostrom puts it, “as our powers expand, so will the scale of their 
potential consequences—intended and unintended, positive and negative”.174 We can therefore 
identify the above introduced third premise: 
 
(3) That today and for the foreseeable future, existing technologies, technological 
developments presently underway, and yet unknown technological developments, will 
constitute the greatest source of existential risk. 
 
Combined, premises one to three create what we might consider the central problem of existential 
risk: On the one hand, they imply that we need to keep developing our technological capacities in 
order to be able to mitigate natural existential risk, particularly in the long term. On the other hand, 
they imply that the very development of our technological capacities constitutes the greatest source 
of existential risk in the short term and for the foreseeable future, likely even beyond that.  
 The situation is further complicated when we consider that many, perhaps all, technologies 
have an ambivalent status regarding their effect on the overall level of existential risk. Geo-
engineering technologies might for instance allow us to counteract catastrophic climate change, 
which we otherwise might fail to prevent. At the same time geo-engineering technologies entail 
existential risks of their own.175 Seth Baum and Anthony Barrett of the GCRI summarise the 
ambivalence problem in two dilemmas: “One dilemma occurs when actions to reduce global 
catastrophic risk could harm society in other ways, as in the case of geoengineering to reduce 
catastrophic climate change risk. Another dilemma occurs when reducing one global catastrophic risk 
could increase another, as in the case of nuclear power reducing climate change risk while increasing 
risks from nuclear weapons”.176 
 An especially ambivalent and interesting case is artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is 
generally conceived of as an aid to our problem-solving capacities, and progress in the development 
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of artificial intelligence is expected to help humanity in all sorts of ways – no problem, not even the 
one of existential risk, is believed to be beyond the help of AI. Progress in narrow AI  (i.e. domain-
specific AI systems) is therefore generally welcomed and expected to help humanity improve its task 
by task problem solving. At the same time, some researchers claim that severe risks, perhaps even 
catastrophic risks, are posed by progress in narrow artificial intelligence, for instance by increasingly 
powerful and independent autonomous weapons systems, warning against the risks associated with 
global arms races.177  
 The ambivalence, however, of course is particularly pronounced where so-called 
superintelligence is concerned. As we have seen, the prospect of the introduction of such an 
intelligence is tied up with fears regarding existential risk. This is why many existential risk 
researchers caution against rapid, undiscriminating, across-the-board progress in artificial 
intelligence, including developments which are not explicitly about building artificial general 
intelligence but merely about building more capable narrow AIs. On the flipside, superintelligence is 
believed to have the potential to free humanity from most Earthly burdens, including existential 
catastrophe prevention. Demis Hassabis, the founder of Google DeepMind, encapsulates the 
underlying mindset neatly when he argues that Google DeepMind’s efforts are aimed at “solving 
intelligence, and then using that to solve everything else”.178 But ‘solving intelligence’ means that we 
need to get it exactly right in order to prevent a ‘rogue AI’ from coming into existence. It is therefore 
not entirely clear whether we should hasten our quest to find a solution or delay it.179 These issues are 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 4 (see specifically section 4.1). 
 From the perspective of existential risk theory, therefore, the question is not whether we ought 
to further develop our technological capabilities or not. The problem is framed in terms of progress 
or perish. The question is how we should progress so that we can ensure that technological progress 
unfolds as safely as possible and the overall amount of existential risk we are exposed to at any given 
point in time is minimised. The question how to think about and deal with the problem of existential 
risk thus turns into the question how to think about and deal with the problem of technological 
progress. Taking existential risk theory seriously implies that mastering and controlling technological 
progress, making it safe, becomes the ultimate imperative for humanity.  
 However, if ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, then before asking how best to steer technological progress, 
we must ask whether humanity can steer technological progress. Nick Bostrom has a rather 
ambiguous position on the question. On the one hand, he introduces another premise, referred to as 
the technological completion conjecture, which holds that 
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(4) “if scientific and technological development efforts do not effectively cease, then all 
important basic capabilities that could be obtained through some possible technology will be 
obtained”.180  
  
The technological completion conjecture posits that there are certain given basic technological 
capabilities and thus implies that the kinds of technologies we are going to develop are to some 
extent predetermined. It is a perspective on technology that is based on the concept of ‘discovery’, 
which assumes that there is an objective realm of capabilities that can be technologically realised 
which merely needs to be uncovered, independent from the particularities of human activities. Of 
course, technological progress is ultimately propelled by humans, and therefore remains dependent 
on some form of human agency – this is why Bostrom must allow for the possibility that 
technological developments cease entirely. But the completion conjecture implies two things.  
 First, that it is ultimately a matter of either or: either technological development will be 
‘complete’ at some point, i.e. humanity’s technological capabilities will be developed to their fullest 
possible extent, or technological development comes to a complete halt. There is no middle-ground. 
Bostrom underpins that point when he argues that “It [the technological completion conjecture] 
would be false if some important capability can only be achieved through some possible technology 
which, while it could have been developed, will not in fact ever be developed even though scientific 
and technological development efforts continue”.181 In other words, the completion conjecture holds 
that humanity cannot decide not to realise a specific technological capability if the means for doing 
so are, in principle, at hand. 
 Second, the completion conjecture implies that, if humans do act in ways broadly conducive to 
technological development, technology will develop along lines that are in the grand scheme of 
things independent from the contingencies of economics, history, culture, politics, etc. If all 
important basic capabilities are going to be developed, this means that, independent of actual choices 
made by humans, the same range of important basic capabilities will be realised. To put it 
differently, Bostrom’s argument implies that the range of capabilities that can be obtained by 
technology is predetermined – that there is a bandwidth of technological capabilities that exists 
independently from the actual technologies in the form of tools, machines, know-how, etc., which 
factually materialise as time progresses. Technologies are seen as material realisations of a range of 
capabilities that have an independent, abstract reality of their own, best understood perhaps as 
analogous to Plato's realm of ideas. 
 On the other hand, Bostrom argues that whilst in the long run we have no leverage over 
whether a technological capability will be developed or not, we can affect “when it is developed, by 
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whom, and in what context”.182 His 'principle for differential technological development' suggests 
that humanity should “retard the development of dangerous and harmful technologies, especially 
ones that raise the level of existential risk; and accelerate the development of beneficial technologies, 
especially those that reduce the existential risks posed by nature or by other technologies”.183 As we 
have seen, one discussion point is how advancing the pace in progress toward advanced artificial 
intelligence would affect total global existential risk levels. Yudkowsky (2008) argues that ‘friendly’ 
superintelligence should be developed before advanced nanotechnology because the former could 
help reducing the risks associated with the later but not the other way around.184  
 If ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, Bostrom thus assumes that technological progress can be controlled in 
the sense that we can influence the order of arrival of technological innovations. He claims that we 
should “think of a discovery as an act that moves the arrival of information from a later point in time 
to an earlier point".185 In fact, he likens the process of technological innovation to progress in 
mathematics: “A scientist or a mathematician may show great skill by being the first to find a 
solution that has eluded many others; yet if the problem would soon have been solved anyway, then 
the work probably has not much benefited the world”.186 This leaves us with a fifth central claim of 
existential risk theory regarding technology: 
  
(5) The sequence of technological and scientific discoveries can be managed and there are 
more and less risky ways of doing this. 
 
Bostrom, as well as other existential risk researchers, often writes in the future perfect tense. That is, 
he projects himself into an arbitrarily distant point in the future and asks what conditions would have 
to have been met should humanity still exist at this future reference point in time. Looking back from 
such a distant point in the future, he conjectures that, if humanity still exists, technological progress 
cannot have stopped in the meantime because otherwise humanity would necessarily have perished at 
some point along the way. Crudely put, there are only two categories of events that can put a halt to 
technological progress: natural existential catastrophes or anthropogenic existential catastrophes, 
which include events that end technological progress. Either a natural or an anthropogenic existential 
catastrophe happens to destroy humanity and therefore technological progress with it. Or humanity 
stops technological progress, which would merely move the existential catastrophe to an earlier point 
in time, because it would leave humanity defenceless vis-à-vis natural existential threats. Viewed 
from a sufficiently distant point in the future, then, there are broadly two options. Either humanity 
still exists, in which case it must have developed its technological capacities significantly, beyond 
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anything conceivable today. Or humanity no longer exists, in which case it has either been destroyed 
by a catastrophe which technology has caused or which technology has been powerless to prevent 
because it was not sufficiently far advanced at that point in time.  As a result, the notion ‘end of 
technological development’ and the notion ‘existential catastrophe’ appear to be synonymous in 
existential risk theory. 
 Given that, from this perspective, all significant technological and scientific discoveries will be 
made eventually, Bostrom claims that the value of any such discovery does not equal the value of the 
information discovered but rather the value of having the information available “earlier than it 
otherwise would have been”.187 The ‘principle of differential technological development’ accordingly 
states that we should organise the sequence of discoveries in such a manner that the level of 
existential risk we are exposed to at any given point in time is minimised.  In the very long run, 
Bostrom and other existential risk researchers hope to reach a state referred to as ‘technological 
maturity’. Technological maturity is understood as “the attainment of capabilities affording a level of 
economic productivity and control over nature close to the maximum that could be feasibly 
achieved”.188 As Torres (2017) points out, a risk counts as ‘existential’ if and only if it prevents our 
species from realising the hypothetical safe state of technological maturity.189 
 This leaves us in an odd and seemingly contradictory position, which Bostrom’s theory tries to 
resolve. On the one hand, under the condition that we manage to stay clear of existential 
catastrophes, technological progress and indeed ‘technological completion’ are considered inevitable. 
A predetermined range of technological capabilities is expected to be realised as time progresses. On 
the other hand, there is room for human agency because the sequence of technological and scientific 
‘discoveries’ as well as the design of technologies can be manipulated. This allows Bostrom to 
remain optimistic regarding technological futures whilst acknowledging the seemingly unstoppable 
surge of technological power. To an extent this position is reminiscent of Marxism, the “scientificity” 
of which, as Carl Schmitt once put it, resides precisely in the “aspiration to change the world without 
jumping out of history”.190 
 A brief detour to one of the more prominent political theorists of technology of the 20th 
century might help to clarify that point. In his 1979 book Autonomous Technology, Langdon Winner 
argues that discussions of technology are plagued by a deep-seated tension between two seemingly 
unreconcilable and yet equally widely held conceptions of the nature of technological change. On the 
one hand, he argues, technology is commonly conceived of as a tool or a means which caters to our 
needs and allows us to gain increasingly refined control over the environment and its resources - to 
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‘make ends meet’, as it were. Winner calls this conception of technology the ‘mastery tradition’, 
which essentially holds that “technical tools are, by their very nature, mere tools subject to the will of 
whomever employs them”.191 Tracing back its roots to philosophers such as Bacon or Aristotle, 
Winner claims that, implicitly or explicitly, the ‘mastery’ conception is the most commonplace 
conception of technology. This idea is closely related to what Winner later refers to as the position of 
‘voluntarism’ -  a position which holds that human beings “have full, conscious choice when it comes 
to technologies and technological inventions and that they are thus responsible for choices made at 
each step in the sequence of technological change”.192 Voluntarists contend that “behind the massive 
process of [technological] transformation one always finds a realm of human motives and conscious 
decisions in which actors at various levels determine which kinds of apparatus, technique, and 
organization are going to be developed and applied”.193  
 On the other hand, Winner argues, there are accounts of technology that point to the exact 
opposite direction. These accounts hold that people have lost their ability to make choices or exercise 
control over the course of technological change. According to that view technological development 
goes forward virtually of its own volition, resists any limitations, and has the character of a self-
propelling, self-sustaining, self-determining force. Winner's main point of reference in that regard is 
French philosopher Jacques Ellul, whose philosophy of technology draws an infamously bleak, 
fatalistic picture of technological change. Ellul is convinced that technological progress since long 
has escaped human control and has itself become the dominant force in history: “man participates 
less and less actively in technical creation, which, by the automatic combination of prior elements, 
becomes a kind of fate. Man is reduced to the level of a catalyst”, 194 since, Ellul continues, “when all 
the conditions concur, only minimal human intervention is needed to produce important advances it 
might almost be maintained that, at this stage of evolution of a technical problem, whoever attacked 
the problem would find the solution”.195  
 Bostrom’s account of technological change is characterised by the very tension Winner 
identifies, but attempts to somehow blend the two poles, that of ‘voluntarism’ and that of 
determinism, into one account. On the one hand he entertains a teleological perspective on 
technological change, where the path of technological development is in significant respects 
predetermined and the role of the individual researcher or engineer is reduced to that of the 
messenger rather than that of the conqueror. Bostrom’s likening of technological innovation to that of 
progress in mathematics is highly reminiscent of Ellul’s account of the ‘evolution of a technological 
problem’ where ‘only minimal human intervention is needed’. On the other hand, the entire point of 
existential risk research is not to succumb to fatalism, to raise awareness for the potentially 
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catastrophic effects of technological progress in the hope that the global community will manage to 
assume mastery and control over that process. This presupposes, at least on some level, scope for 
human agency and the possibility of human stewardship.  
 
 
Conclusion - technology as destiny 
 
I have argued in the introduction to this chapter that it should be understood as an exploratory 
exercise. Existential risk research is still a young genre and, in my research, I have not encountered 
any publications that have tried to systematically embed it in a humanities context, or reflect about its 
philosophical and political significance, or its core concepts, from an outside perspective. Most, if 
not all, of the literature on existential risk is produced by authors who are part of the movement 
themselves and, as a result, the genre is largely self-referential. The task I set myself is to uncover the 
deeper philosophical themes that underpin existential risk theory and to establish to what extent the 
perspectives it opens up might be new by connecting existential risk theory to older debates in 
political theory. This is of course a rather wide question that needs some calibration. At first sight it 
may be unclear what debates in political theory this emerging genre may best be connected to, in 
order to then establish where it can add something to these debates, and, vice versa, what the 
respective debates can tell us about existential risk. To provide the basis for this was the purpose of 
this chapter, in which I have sought to tease out central underlying themes and puzzles in existential 
risk research. 
 In a superficial reading, existential risk theory tells a story about the precariousness of modern 
human existence. It highlights the fact that the existence of our species can not only no longer be 
taken for granted but, on the contrary, should be seen as more vulnerable than perhaps ever before 
and that it should become a global priority to mitigate existential risk. Beneath that, however, 
existential risk theory, I argue, should first and foremost be seen as a story about technology, or to be 
more precise, about the existential role technology is beginning to assume in human life and in 
contemporary visions of the future. Based on a mixture of empirical and normative arguments, 
existential risk theory presents us with a case in which prudently managed technological progress – 
not regress, not stalemate, both of which would have to be considered as existential catastrophes – 
becomes imperative. In other words, ‘taking human extinction’ seriously along the lines in which 
existential risk researchers do appears to translate seamlessly into a call for the perfection of 
technological mastery culminating in a hypothetical state of ‘technological maturity’. It thereby 
renders the continued extension of technological civilisation, of technological control over ever more 
aspects of human life and natural processes a matter of necessity. Existential risk theory therefore 
presents us with a rather distinctive outlook on the future of humanity, where the problems of the 
future of humanity and the future of technology become in effect indistinguishable. Human destiny 
 
 49 
becomes a technological optimisation problem and the role of politics and ethics is reduced to a 
purely instrumental, auxiliary one in this wider endeavour.  
 It is this perspective on technology that I am interested in and that, I argue, can be 
meaningfully connected to long-standing debates in political theory. Initially, existential risk theory 
could be seen as a critical, a cautioning voice in the face of the seemingly overpowering forces of 
exponentially accelerating technological progress, highlighting its potentially disastrous 
consequences. At one point, Bostrom for instance claims that speaking of ‘technological progress’ 
should best be avoided because ‘progress’ has an evaluative connotation “of things getting better”, 
which according to him cannot be regarded a ‘conceptual truth’, given the potentially catastrophic 
downsides of present and future technologies. Bostrom instead advises to use the less value-laden 
notion ‘technological development’.196 In that light, one might be inclined to see existential risk 
research as a criticism of uncritical tech-optimism and a wake-up call vis-à-vis a condition Langdon 
Winner refers to as “technological somnambulism”, according to which humanity is being dragged 
along by technological change, perhaps not against its will, but also without consciously trying to 
resist, shape, transform or steer it.197  
 I believe it is in debates such as these that existential risk theory can be embedded in most 
meaningfully and in the context of which we can further develop our enquiries into what might be 
new about it. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the perspective on technology presented by 
existential risk theory opens up interesting new perspectives on old questions in political theory and 
philosophy of technology, resonating with deeply rooted anxieties and hopes about modern science 
and technology’s role in human life. Given the increasing prominence of existential risk research, it 
is interesting to see that this emerging genre has so far remained unconnected to such older debates. 
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In the preceding chapter I have argued that the central topic in existential risk theory is technology, 
or, rather, the inexorable intertwining of human destiny and technology. Based on a mixture of 
empirical and normative arguments, existential risk theory presents us with a case in which prudently 
managed technological progress - not regress, not stalemate, both of which would have to be 
considered existential catastrophes - becomes imperative. In other words, ‘taking human extinction’ 
seriously along the lines of existential risk research and the resulting macro-strategic outlook results 
in a binary perspective on the future of humanity, where humanity either perishes or perfects its 
technological capabilities. In a strict interpretation of that logic, technology turns into destiny in the 
sense that the extension of technological control over ever more natural processes and ever more 
aspects of human life becomes morally imperative.  
Perhaps self-evidently, given its name, existential risk theory draws our thinking about 
technology into what we might call an existential space. With ‘existential’ I mean to denote first and 
foremost that the brute fact of our existence, the ‘whether’ of human existence, is at stake and the 
circumstance that, in existential risk theory, this fact is now understood to be entirely dependent on 
technology. But technology is of course part of the ‘how’ of life. The logic of existential risk theory 
hence entails that the ‘how’, i.e. the terms of human existence, also are drawn into that existential 
space. In fact, it can be seen as existential risk theory’s core point to demonstrate that the ‘whether’ 
and the ‘how’’ of human existence can no longer be meaningfully distinguished, since it now 
depends entirely on how we live, on how ‘we play our cards’, as it were, whether there will be a 
future.  
Whilst existential risk theory might start out with a basic concern for existence as such, its 
logic implies that through technology, as arbitrator over life and death, it begins to swamp the spaces 
in-between too. However, this discussion is largely anticipatory. The exact mechanisms by which 
technology appears to emerge as the arbitrator over not only the ‘whether’ but also the ‘how’ of 
human existence in existential risk theory will form an integral part of my discussion throughout the 
following chapters. 
Suffice to say, for the moment, that existential risk theory encourages us to think about 
technology along such existential lines. This space, however, is not unpopulated. In fact, technology 
has been discussed as an existential question for a long time and there is a large, temporally 
extended, community of thinkers who, for varying reasons, have been arguing that the existential 
space is the only appropriate space for discussing modern technology. Since my aim is to develop a 
better understanding of what might be new about existential risk theory, my attention now turns 
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towards a closer inspection of its conception of technology. Having established that the generalised 
perspective on human extinction scenarios indeed appears to present us with a new and distinctive 
framework for thinking about the future of humanity, transforming the future into a technological 
optimisation problem, my question now becomes whether the resulting perspective on the role of 
technology in human affairs also is new and, if so, in what respects. 
 I will commence this discussion by connecting existential risk theory to Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophy of technology. Heidegger is a notoriously elusive and controversial thinker. Heralded by 
some as one of the most important philosophers of 20th century continental Europe (e.g. Hans Jonas, 
Hannah Arendt, Hubert Dreyfus or Mark Wrathall), and denounced by others as a charlatan or a 
‘self-infatuated blowhard’ (Richard Rorty),198 his philosophy has come under additional suspicion 
due to his membership in the Nazi party, which casts his moral and political judgement in a dubious 
light, to say the least.199 As a consequence, invoking Heidegger in any context appear to be a 
controversial step and requires at least some clarification. 
 My first reason for drawing on Heidegger is that he is indispensable if one is interested in the 
history of philosophy of technology, i.e. in the history of philosophical reflection on technology as a 
subject for serious and systematic consideration in its own right. Heidegger often is regarded as one 
of the founding fathers of the philosophy of technology and to this day is frequently drawn on and 
invoked by authors in the field.200 Of course, as Petrina (2017), or Franssen, Lokhorst, et al. (2018) 
argue, philosophical reflection on technology is perhaps as old as philosophy itself, listing (in 
chronological order) for instance thinkers such as Aristotle, Vitruvius, as well as Roger and Francis 
Bacon.201 However, as historian of philosophy of technology Mitcham (1994) argues, until the 19th 
century reflection on technology tended to be subsumed under other aspects of philosophy (for 
instance in the cases of the above listed authors: causation, architecture, the arts and alchemy, and 
science and experimentation). Only relatively recently, Mitcham argues, has philosophy of 
technology emerged as a veritable, cooperative, self-declared genre of its own. The first time the 
term appeared was in as late as 1877, in Ernst Kapp’s book Grundlinien einer Philosophie der 
Technik, and it was not until the 20th century that the genre developed traction.202 Mitcham claims 
that one historical complication in the birth of philosophy of technology was that it can mean two 
very different things. If ‘of technology’ is understood as a subjective genitive it is “an attempt by 
technologists or engineers to elaborate a technological philosophy”. 203 On the other hand, if ‘of 
technology’ is understood as an objective genitive, Mitcham argues, “then philosophy of technology 
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refers to an effort by scholars from the humanities, especially philosophers, to take technology 
seriously as a theme for disciplined reflection”.204 It is in that second sense that Heidegger can be 
located at the origins of philosophy of technology. 
My second reason for drawing on Heidegger is that he is even less dispensable if one is 
interested in the intermingling of technology and human destiny, i.e. in thinking about technology as 
an existential question. For Heidegger, technology is a ‘Geschick’, which William Lovitt translates 
as ‘destining’ in his seminal 1977 translation of the ‘Question Concerning Technology’, which I am 
using here. I will discuss this concept in further detail below. However, what Heidegger meant to 
convey with it is that technology has an inherently ‘pulling’ quality - that it pulls individuals and 
mankind at large into a specific direction, in thought and action. Therefore, when in existential risk 
theory the question of human destiny and the question of technology become in effect 
indistinguishable, this, from a Heideggerian perspective, is no surprise at all. Heidegger’s philosophy 
of technology, as a result, provides us with a counterpoint for reflecting upon existential risk theory 
since both discuss technology as an existential question, but from very different angles. 
 Clearly, there are many other authors whose work also may have served as a starting point 
for this chapter’s purpose – to begin carving out what might be the deeper philosophical and political 
significance of existential risk theory in relation to older discussions surrounding technology. One 
could for instance have drawn on several other early ‘humanities philosophers of technology’, such 
as Jacques Ellul (1912 – 1994), Lewis Mumford (1895 - 1990), or José Ortega y Gasset (1883 - 
1955), who were of Heidegger’s generation and are often included in the canon of founding fathers 
of philosophy of technology.205 Their work, like Heidegger’s, had enormous influence on later 
generations of philosophers of technology, such as Herbert Marcuse, Langdon Winner, Andrew 
Feenberg, Don Ihde, or Albert Borgman, who rose to prominence in the 1980s and 1990s and on 
whose work I will draw repeatedly throughout this thesis.  
The works of Ellul, Mumford, or Ortega y Gasset, can be considered, like Heidegger’s, as 
critiques of a specific type of Enlightenment optimism and the “idea that scientific and technological 
progress automatically contributes to the advancement of society by bringing about a unification of 
wealth and virtue”.206 Their main target of critique was a modernist spirit, often traced back to 
authors such as René Descartes and Francis Bacon, according to which humankind should strive to 
become the ‘master and possessor of nature’. Part of what Heidegger set out to do, like the other 
authors, indeed was to show that this undertaking not only cannot be successful but, in dialectical 
fashion, is bound to undermine the very values it purports to serve. However, apart from the fact that 
the scope of this thesis would not allow for a comprehensive and systematic inclusion of all of these 
                                               
204 Ibid. 
205 Cf. Franssen, M., Lokhorst, G., et al. (2018), Mitcham, C. (1994). 
206 C. Mitcham (1994), p. 40. 
 
 53 
writers, there are interrelated historical and conceptual considerations which suggest that Heidegger’s 
philosophy is a particularly suitable touchstone for this project.   
First, Heidegger clearly stands out amongst the above-named group of authors in terms of 
historical importance both within the field of philosophy of technology and beyond. His 1954 essay 
‘The Question Concerning Technology’, which forms the backbone of my discussion of his 
philosophy of technology, is often referred to as the single most important text in the history of 
philosophy of technology in general.207 Furthermore, Heidegger’s philosophy had a lasting influence 
not only on later developments in continental philosophy but on a wide variety of fields of inquiry, 
from history, to literature, the visual arts, architecture and ecology.208 This clearly positions him as a 
particularly important thinker amongst the first generation of philosophers of technology. 
The second, related though perhaps more important reason relates to his role as a teacher 
during his time as a professor at the universities of Marburg and Freiburg in the 1920s and early 
1930s. In that period Heidegger taught a number of students who later were to become eminent 
philosophers in their own right, including for instance Hannah Arendt, Hans Georg Gadamer, Leo 
Strauss, Hans Jonas, Herbert Marcuse, Günther Anders, and Karl Löwith. Amongst them, even those 
who broke with him following his support of the NSDAP and his unequivocal, public endorsement of 
Nazi ideology in the so-called ‘Rektoratsrede’ and ‘The Introduction to Metaphysics’,209 understood 
him to be amongst the deepest thinkers of his time,210 and the influence of his teachings on their work 
remains, on many dimensions, undeniable, if complicated.211 My focus in Chapter 3 will come to rest 
on Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders, whose work is particularly illuminating in the context of 
existential risk. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, it is undeniable that Arendt’s and Anders’ 
thought was strongly influenced by Heidegger’s philosophy.212 Most importantly for the purposes of 
this thesis, their thought about modern science and technology and its pivotal role in modern human 
existence, from politics in Arendt to psychology in Anders, gains clarity and resonance when read 
against the background of Heidegger’s phenomenologically rooted critique of technological 
modernity.213 If one is interested in Arendt’s and Anders’ thought about science and technology, a 
rudimentary understanding of Heidegger’s philosophy is therefore essential.  
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In sum, there are historical and conceptual reasons for beginning the historical and 
theoretical anchoring of existential risk theory with Heidegger. Heidegger is at the origin of a 
tradition of thinking about technology in thoroughly existential terms and his work provides us with a 
set of concepts which can be meaningfully related to existential risk theory. Furthermore, it provides 
us with a historical basis for weaving in the thought of scholars who studied related questions 
throughout the following decades. I am nevertheless fully aware that other routes could have been 
chosen and other connections established. However, since the recently emerging genre of existential 
risk theory, to the best of my knowledge, has not been systematically connected to philosophy of 
technology before (nor to any other strand in philosophy or political theory for that matter) my goal 
is modestly to begin this conversation and Heidegger, I believe, is one sensible starting point. 
My subsequent connection of existential risk theory to Heidegger’s philosophy of technology 
will lead me to make two main points, which in turn rest on a range of observations I will discuss as 
the chapter progresses. First, that existential risk theory can be seen as a rather old-fashioned 
response to an old fear – the fear of losing control over technological progress resulting in an even 
more pronounced quest for technological mastery – but in a new context, comprising of new 
technologies, and under ostensibly escalating conditions. Second, that existential risk theory 
resonates closely with several of Heidegger’s deepest fears regarding non-physical effects of modern 
technology. However, since it rests on the previously discussed new approach to study human 
extinction scenarios in an integrated manner and thus presents us with a distinctive perspective on the 
future it complicates Heidegger’s story and his criticism of ‘technological behaviour’, with 
implications that will be discussed in chapter 3, by drawing on ‘Heidegger’s children’.214 
The chapter is organised in two parts. First, an overview of Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology is provided. Here, key terms of Heideggerian ontology and his philosophy of technology 
are introduced, most importantly the concept of ‘Enframing’. With Enframing Heidegger seeks to 
circumscribe the essence of technology, which he understands as a ‘destining’ of Being, a disposing 
power that challenges humanity to think, be and relate to all that is in a technological fashion. 
Further, his criticism of the everyday conception of technology is discussed, as well as what 
Heidegger considers to be the greatest dangers associated with technology – that beings will 
eventually disclose themselves exclusively as ‘standing reserve’, with which he describes a nihilistic 
world in the making and which we can understand as Heidegger’s vision of humanity’s technological 
destiny. This overview provides the historical and conceptual backdrop for the second part of the 
chapter. In the second part Heidegger’s thus sketched out philosophy of technology is brought to bear 
on existential risk theory, constituting the first step in the endeavour to embed and situate existential 
risk theory in philosophy of technology. 
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2.1 Technology in Heidegger’s philosophy 
 
In the following three aspects of Heidegger's philosophy of technology are introduced and discussed. 
First, his claim that the essence of technology is a form of ‘revealing’, which means that he 
understands it as Dreyfus (1993) calls it, as an ‘ontological condition’ that governs the very way we 
see, understand, and act in the world.215 Second, his argument that, as a form of revealing, technology 
is a 'challenging revealing’ because it has an inherently forward-leaping dynamic, which compels 
humanity to conceive of ever more aspects of life and nature in an instrumental and calculative 
manner. Heidegger describes this as ‘a destining’. Third, the normative dimension of Heidegger's 
philosophy of technology and what he considers to be the 'greatest dangers' of technological 
destining.  
Before beginning to sketch out this overview of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, 
however, we must introduce a range of key distinctions in his fundamental ontology because 
otherwise his philosophy of technology would likely remain unintelligible. Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology is structured around three concepts. He distinguishes ‘Dasein’, ‘Sein’ and ‘das Seiende’. 
Depending on the translator, Dasein is either left untranslated or it is translated as ‘Being’ (with 
capital B). Following Lovitt (1977), in this thesis Dasein will be translated as Being. With Being 
Hedeigger denotes the different modes in which humans ‘are in the world’ and experience it. 
Oftentimes and controversially Being is loosely equated with consciousness. But Being denotes not 
only the simple experience of ‘being there’ in the sense of the Cartesian cogito.216 Being defines the 
way in which we are in the world and that includes the way in which we habitually conceive of the 
relationship between ourselves and our surroundings. ‘Cogito’, the reduction of our sense of reality 
onto our own immediate experience of selfhood in any given moment and, by extension, the subject-
object distinction, can be seen as expressive of one mode of Being. Indeed, for Heidegger it is a mode 
of Being, namely the modern, but the two are not to be equated. On the contrary, for Heidegger, the 
Cartesian dualisms between mind and body and between subject and object, were a dangerous and 
ultimately self-defeating misrepresentation of Being. ‘Sein’, usually translated as being (lower-case 
b), denotes both the sheer fact of existence as such, i.e. that something exists rather than nothing, as 
well as the totality of all that exists.217 ‘Das Seiende’, usually translated as ‘beings’, refers to all 
things that exist, either individually or collectively, i.e. it is employed either to refer to all things that 
exist (but not to be confused with ‘being’, as defined above) or to individual things that exist. 
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Another preliminary remark should be made concerning the position of the topic of modern 
technology within Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s work is often divided into an early phase, 
gravitating heavily around Being and Time, which was published in 1927, and a late phase, following 
what Heidegger himself christened ‘die Kehre’ (typically translated as The Turn or The Turning) in 
an eponymous lecture he gave in 1949.218 The scope of this chapter does not allow for an in-depth 
discussion of The Turn and the precise nature of the shift in thinking it involved, not least because its 
intricacies are a matter of ongoing scholarly debate.219 However, there appears to be wide agreement 
that the topic of modern technology began to occupy a central position in Heidegger’s thought only 
in his later works. 220 This, however, appears to be no coincidence. Generally speaking, it is argued, 
that the The Turn was marked by Heidegger’s attempt to break with what he himself considered to be 
remnants of subjectivism in Being and Time.221 Wheeler (2011), for instance, argues that Heidegger’s 
later philosophy “shares the deep concerns of Being and Time, in that it is driven by the same 
preoccupation with Being and our relationship with it that propelled the earlier work. In a 
fundamental sense, then, the question of Being remains the question. However, Being and Time 
addresses the question of Being via an investigation of Dasein […] the later Heidegger does seem to 
think that his earlier focus on Dasein bears the stain of a subjectivity that ultimately blocks the path 
to an understanding of Being“.222 In other words, whilst in Being and Time the subjective experience 
of the individual human being still assumed centre-stage, in his later works Heidegger seeks to 
address the problem of being head-on. Technology, it turns out, plays a central role in this enterprise. 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, for the late Heidegger, technology, in its essence, is 
nothing humans make but a way in which being reveals itself. The theme of modern technology 
hence provides him with another route into the investigation of being, a route outside of Being. It is 
in that vein that Borgmann (2005) argues that “technology is the most important topic of Heidegger’s 
thought” because it became the converging ground of Heidegger’s, previously separate, efforts to 
understand reality “in its deepest and most crucial dimensions”.223 According to Borgmann these 
efforts were tripartite, consisting of a) the exploration of the nature of being, b) the exploration of 
ancient Greek philosophy as well as German philosophy and c) the analysis of the modern human 
condition. These efforts, Borgmann claims, proceeded unevenly and side-by-side until they 
converged on Heidegger’s understanding of modern technology.224  
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It is not my aim in this chapter, however, to develop a detailed account of the evolution of 
Heidegger’s thinking about technology, nor to provide an account of this topic’s role and status in 
Heidegger’s oeuvre. The previous paragraphs’ main purpose was to qualify why Being and Time is 
bracketed in my subsequent discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology which instead draws 
on a range of texts that were published throughout the late 1940s, -50s and -60s, most importantly the 
Question Concerning Technology.225 The fact that Being and Time is bracketed here, however, does 
not mean, that it is not relevant in the context of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. As Blitz 
(2014) points out, “the most important argument in Being and Time that is relevant for Heidegger’s 
later thinking about technology is that theoretical activities such as the natural sciences depend on 
views of time and space that narrow the understanding implicit in how we deal with the ordinary 
world of action and concern”, that “science flattens the richness of ordinary concern”. 226 We will 
indeed see that the clash between scientific and technological knowledge on the one hand and our 
‘ordinary’ understanding of reality on the other hand is a core theme in Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology and that therefore one of Being and Time’s main themes assumes a central role in 
Heidegger’s later philosophy. Nonetheless, this chapter focuses exclusively on Heidegger’s 
philosophy of technology and therefore his later work. 
The fact that substantial continuities between the early and the late Heidegger’s philosophy 
of technology do exist, however, is important to remember for historical reasons. It explains the 
partially substantial parallels between his philosophy of technology and Hannah Arendt’s and 
Günther Anders’ perspectives on that topic. Both these thinkers were taught by the ‘early Heidegger’, 
the Heidegger of Being and Time, during their student years at the Universities of Marburg and 
Freiburg in the 1920s and both entertained life-long, if complicated, relationships to Heidegger.227 As 
we will see in the next chapter, both adopted Heidegger’s phenomenologically grounded critique of 
modern technology and science, which is the common ground of Being and Time and his later works, 
but they diverged significantly from the deep fatalism that is characteristic for the late Heidegger’s 




'Gestell', often translated as 'Enframing', is the term Heidegger employs to denote what he considers 
to be the essence of technology. In asking for its essence, Heidegger is asking for technology’s 
‘whatness', i.e. that through which something is what it is, or which makes something what it is and 
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lets it endure as such through time. Heidegger here places particular emphasis on the temporal 
dimension of ‘essence’. As William Lovitt, who translated and published the first English version of 
the Question Concerning Technology, which I am using here, argues “essence does not simply mean 
what something is, but it means, farther, the way in which something pursues its course, the way in 
which it remains through time as what it is”. 228 Technology in Heidegger's view, if looked at in that 
sense, is not simply a neutral tool, a means to an end, or a human activity, a conception which he 
refers to as the "instrumental and anthropological definition of technology". For him, although being 
that too, technology is something much more powerful and much more fundamental than that, 
namely the basic ontological condition of modernity. 
 Heidegger's initial concern and the starting point of his discussion is that the anthropological 
and instrumental definition of technology cannot adequately capture what modern technology really 
is. He does not deny that the instrumental and anthropological definition is correct. However, 
Heidegger employs the term 'correct' in a particular way, which needs to be understood in connection 
to his phenomenological conception of Being. Under this conception the correct "is not yet the true". 
A correct statement is not untrue but it merely uncovers a partial truth and "fixes upon something 
pertinent in whatever is under consideration".229 It is for instance correct to say that the moon is a 
shiny object in the night's sky. This observation, however, does of course not reveal the ‘true’, full 
nature of the moon, which must be considered to be much more than that. Accordingly, Heidegger 
holds that the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology correctly uncover a 
"fundamental characteristic of technology",230 but that they do not yet uncover its essential nature. 
Focusing on an understanding of technology along these lines would thus mean to remain oblivious 
to the real nature of technology and thus its power. It is only when we uncover the essence of 
technology, Heidegger argues, that we can gain a free relation to it.231 
 What then is the essence of technology? The instrumental and anthropological definition of 
technology does, according to Heidegger, at least tell us what the central quality of technology is, 
namely instrumentality, which means that it is a way of attaining one's ends. Heidegger therefore 
begins his investigation into what the essence of technology is by asking "within what such things as 
means and ends belong"232 and he observes that "wherever ends are pursued and means are employed 
wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality".233 Heidegger infers from this that modern 
technology is a specific form of causation and embarks on an in-depth investigation of the notion of 
causation, trying to uncover the way in which the modern technological way of causing something 
might differ from other forms of causation. The main reason why Heidegger characterises technology 
as a form of causation seems to be that in his search for the essence of technology he seeks to 
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understand where modern technology, i.e. machines and modern production processes, really 'come 
from'. His observation is that modern technology brings things into existence and encompasses a 
range of activities that are qualitatively different from what nature brings into existence but also from 
what traditional forms of craftsmanship bring into existence. Understanding modern technology 
simply as a means to an end, which would put a modern hydro-electric power plant into the same 
category as for instance an ancient rake, is, for Heidegger, deeply mistaken. Heidegger wants to 
uncover the ultimate "from whence" from which the things and actions that are characteristic for 
modern technology "take(s) and retain(s) their (its) first departure".234 
 Heidegger arrives at the conclusion that modern technology can only be understood as the 
outgrowth of a revolution in concepts, in our relation to being, whereby nature has come to be 
understood no longer in ways in which it ordinarily occurs to us, i.e. in form of things, such as trees, 
or tables, or human beings, that have their own immediate reality, but in form of calculable, causal 
processes and functions which lend themselves to productive exploitation. The essence of technology 
is the ontological force which has us conceive of nature in such a way. Heidegger calls this 
ontological force 'Gestell', often translated as 'Enframing'. Enframing is the technological 
understanding of being as such, a paradigmatic ontological condition which "sets upon" natural 
entities, providing a framework for their analysis which lies outside of them, breaking them down 
into their smallest constituent parts and processes. Heidegger calls the process by which this happens 
'ordering revealing'. Ordering revealing of nature from the outset is driven by the quest for ever more 
efficiency and the “demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such".235  
 Nature in the process is reduced to what Heidegger calls "standing reserve", an assemblage 
of intrinsically meaningless knobs of matter and functions standing by for endless optimisation: 
"Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just 
so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own 
standing. We call it the standing-reserve".236 The essence of modern technology thus translates into 
the quest to seek more and more flexibility and efficiency simply for its own sake.237 “This setting-
upon that challenges forth the energies of nature is an expediting […] yet that expediting is always 
itself directed from the beginning . . . towards driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum 
expense”.238 
 The Heideggerian ontological landscape of technology can thus be tentatively organised in 
four concepts, which I will use throughout this chapter. First, the concept of Enframing. Through the 
concept of Enframing, Heidegger leads us through three additional key terms in his understanding of 
technology: ‘Ordering revealing’, which is the active, "challenging", component of Enframing. It has 
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us conceive of nature in terms of cause-effect coherence. ‘Calculative thinking’, which is the 
cognitive faculty of human beings that allows us to conceive of nature in accordance with the 
technological understanding of being. We may understand it as the part of human nature which is 
called upon by Enframing. Finally, the term ‘standing reserve’. Standing reserve is the way in which 
beings come to be perceived by us once they have been "enframed", namely no longer even as an 
object but only as a set of functions within a frame of instrumental ends external to them.  
 For Heidegger, the roots of this revolution, whereby being has come to be understood along 
these lines, lie in modern philosophy: "What is the ground that enabled modern technology to 
discover and set free new energies in nature?", Heidegger asks, and responds: "This is due to a 
revolution in leading concepts which has been going on for the past several centuries, and by which 
man is placed in a different world … This radical revolution in outlook has come about in modern 
philosophy. From this arises a completely new relation of man to the world and his place in it … This 
relation of man to the world as such, in principle a technical one, developed in the seventeenth 
century first and only in Europe. It long remained unknown in other continents, and it was altogether 
alien to former ages and histories. The power concealed in modern technology determines the 
relation of man to that which exists".239 
 The essence of technology, it turns out, is the paradigmatic ontological condition of 
modernity which governs (Western) humanity's relation to existence (being) and everything that 
exists (beings) and it is only against that ontological background that, for Heidegger, the functioning 
of both modern science and modern technology can become intelligible. As I will discuss below, 
Heidegger is convinced that for as long as we remain oblivious to this metaphysical essence of 
technology we also remain oblivious to its dangers and misconceive of it as something that we can 
get under our control. If technology is understood as a means to an end that implies that we are in 
charge, that we are its masters. However, as we have seen above, we are by no means the masters of 
the essence of technology. Rather, in Heidegger’s terminology, we are the ones being spoken to, 
being challenged by Enframing. Enframing determines what we perceive as real and it thus controls 
us, not the other way around, at least for as long as we do not open up to this fact and actively 
challenge the way we relate to being. 
 The technological understanding of being may have come about in a philosophical 
revolution, but the very fact that being allows for the possibility to be revealed to humanity in the 
associated technological manner, Heidegger claims, can itself not be the result of a philosophical 
revolution in concepts: "Only to the extent that man for his part is already challenged to exploit the 
energies of nature can this ordering revealing happen".240 In order to understand what he means by 
that we need to briefly return to the shift in Heidegger’s thinking, i.e. to ‘The Turn’ that took place 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s and which separates the early Heidegger of Being and Time from the 
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late Heidegger of the ‘Questioning Concerning Technology’. This shift in Heidegger’s thought is 
associated with a complete departure from subjectivism, that still characterised Being and Time.  As 
Dreyfus and Spinosa (1997), Loscerbo (1981), Wolin (1990) and many others have pointed out, 
Heidegger’s understanding of technology has changed with this major shift in his metaphysics, or 
perhaps it was even his changed understanding of technology that led to the Turn’.241 In Being and 
Time, in any case, Heidegger still considered modern technology to be the expression of the 
Cartesian subject’s will to mastery.242 As Dreyfus and Spinosa (1997) point out, in as late as 1940 he 
wrote that “Man is what lies at the bottom of all beings; and that is, in modern terms, at the bottom of 
all objectification and representability”.243 This suggests that, at this point, he still located the 
problem of technology in humanity, in the modern subjects’ desire to objectify, exploit and dominate 
all other beings for their own satisfaction.244 Only in his later works, he came to think about 
technology along the lines sketched out above, namely as part of the ‘history of Being’, as an epoch 
in the understanding of being.245 The notion of ‘Enframing’ is indicative of what has changed. No 
longer is it humanity that objectifies but it is being that objectifies itself through humanity (Being) 
and ultimately humanity itself. Humans are recipients of how being reveals itself to and through 
them: “Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call the real is 
revealed as standing-reserve? Obviously, man. To what extent is man capable of such a revealing? 
Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man 
does not have control over un-concealment itself, in which at any given time the real shows itself or 
withdraws“.246 In other words, the later Heidegger’s perspective on technology as a stage in the 
history of being meant that he was concerned that humanity was relentlessly being dragged into an 
ever more technologically determined world without being able to resist or shape this course. 
Superficially, this position resonates with Bostrom’s technological completion conjecture. But where 
existential risk researchers retain a certain level optimism, Heidegger was deeply fatalistic, focusing 
almost exclusively on the dangers he associated with this process. 
 
2.3 The dangers 
 
Heidegger saw, broadly speaking, two categories of danger in modern technology. The first category 
entails conventional, physical technological threats to the environment and to people - i.e. potentially 
harmful environmental and social impacts of technologies such as ecological destruction, nuclear 
pollution, unemployment or the increasing destructiveness of modern weaponry. The second 
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category of danger has its roots in metaphysics. It encompasses dangers originating from the 
transformation process which technology forces upon our understanding of being and the 
consequences of this process for our relationship to the world which surrounds us and our actions 
within it. Heidegger was more concerned about dangers of this second type than about dangers of the 
first type arguing that "the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal 
machines and apparatus of technology […] The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility 
that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call 
of a more primal truth”.247 And at a different point: "The danger consists in the threat that assaults 
man's nature in his relation to being itself, and not in accidental perils".248 To put it Dreyfus’ (1993) 
words, Heidegger appears to have been less concerned with the physical havoc technology can 
wreak, than with the "devastation that would result if technology solved all our problems".249 
  According to Heidegger the danger associated with modern technology “attests itself to us in 
two ways”: 250  
 
“As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as an object but does so, rather, 
exclusively as standing reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer 
of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall: that is, he comes to 
the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve".251  
 
In the following, I will elaborate on both these stages of what Heidegger considers the dangerous 
tendency inherent to modern technology. Taken together they provide a promising entry point for a 
discussion of what it might mean to be at existential risk or under 'existential pressure'. Before I do 
so, however, two clarifying remarks need to be made.  
 First, it is important to understand that these two stages should be understood as successive 
steps within a 'dangerous' process, which is that all beings will eventually turn into standing reserve, 
resulting in what Heidegger calls ‘the oblivion of Being’.252 To begin with, humanity's relation to the 
world is lastingly impoverished and constricted because we begin to perceive of nature only in 
functional ways and thereby to mistake the merely correct for the true. 253 Further, in mistaking the 
correct for the true, we are misled to conceive of ourselves as masters of the universe, not noticing 
that the logic of instrumentality has no Archimedean point of mastery but ultimately has a nihilistic, 
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inherently forward leaping dynamic that is poised to turn everything into standing reserve, including 
ultimately ourselves.  
 The second preliminary remark pertains to the position of Heidegger's work within long-
standing debates surrounding inherently self-contradictory characteristics of enlightenment 
philosophy in so far as it is understood as the philosophy of human emancipation. Heidegger's 
criticism of ordering revealing and 'calculative thought' certainly can be located in a continuum of 
romantic, anti-modernist, anti-enlightenment philosophy that has accompanied modern philosophy, 
and science and technology from their very beginnings. Heidegger's concept of the Gestell, i.e. 
Enframing, in both wording and meaning, for instance, is clearly reminiscent of Max Weber's ‘iron 
cage’ - the straightjacket of necessities, of standardisation, uniformisation, rationalisation and 
bureaucratisation Weber feared was being erected around private and public life under the ascetic 
spirit of efficiency.254 Similarly, Heidegger's fears surrounding the oblivion of meaning, resulting 
from the loss of a deeper, non-instrumental relation to being clearly echoes old fears of the 
"disenchantment of the world" characteristic for romantic philosophy and literature since at least 
Rousseau.255 It is no coincidence that Heidegger, particularly in his later works, frequently cites 
romantic German poetry, in particular Hölderlin and Rilke.256 Finally, if one were to embark on the 
quest to extract some form of final take-away point from his philosophy of technology, it certainly 
would not be wholly mistaken to quote the arguably most influential publication of Frankfurt School 
critical theory for that purpose, i.e. Horkheimer and Adorno’s 1944 work the Dialectic of the 
Enlightenment. Enlightenment, they claim, “understood in the widest sense as the advance of 
thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet 
the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity”.257 The underlying idea that there is 
a tendency in the enlightenment project to undermine its own cause, clearly can be identified as a 
central motif in Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, although, of course, Heidegger’s critique 
goes beyond the Enlightenment, addressing the entire Western philosophical tradition since Plato.258 
However, what makes Heidegger particularly interesting for the purposes of this thesis is that 
he puts modern technology, specifically the everyday perception and understanding of technology, at 
the centre of his reflections about the modern human condition. This is what makes his thought a 
particularly interesting starting point for a discussion of existential risk. As we will see below, 
existential risk theory hinges on exactly the kind of understanding of technology, both in the way in 
which it conceptualises technology itself, as well as in the way in which it understands technology’s 
relationship to humanity, which Heidegger criticises.  
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The first stage – ‘the levelling of every ordo’ 
 
As discussed above, for Heidegger the essence of modern technology lies in Enframing. Enframing is 
the defining ontological force of modernity, which challenges man to conceive of the world in an 
ordering way, as an "object open to the attacks of calculative thought".259 For Heidegger modern 
technology, in form of machines and know-how, is merely an ‘outgrowth’ of this challenging essence 
of technology, and so is modern science.260 Heidegger refers to the form of revealing, which is 
challenged forth by Enframing, as an 'ordering' revealing’. The first metaphysical danger Heidegger 
saw was that with accelerating technological and scientific progress, humanity might become 
increasingly unable to see the world in non-calculative ways and as something other than stockpiles 
of resources and exploitable processes: "The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, 
threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering […] ".261 The danger 
thus is that we mistake ordering revealing for the sole truth, so that everything "exhibits itself only in 
the light of a cause-effect coherence",262 and to the effect that we will eventually not only forget the 
deeper essence of being but might even reach a state at which we have forgotten that we have 
forgotten it.263 Heidegger's phenomenological distinction between the correct and the true implies 
that the correct, albeit not being false, captures only a partial version of the truth because it does not 
uncover a thing in its essence, which can never be fully grasped. In that phenomenological 
understanding, ordering revealing thus reveals correct but only partial information about the world. It 
reveals instrumental truths and the danger is that "through these successes [of technological and 
scientific progress] … in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw".264 Heidegger thus 
was concerned that Enframing might eventually come to entirely supplant "original revealing and … 
the call of a more primal truth".265  
 For Heidegger this is not only a dangerous tendency because it threatens to permanently 
impoverish modern humanity's relation to being, rendering it purely superficial and functional. For 
Heidegger the technological understanding of being is above all dangerous because it threatens to 
supplant the very call of a more ‘primal truth’, which is to say that he is concerned that we might 
forget that there is an independent reality of things as things. It is Heidegger’s conviction that one 
can never uncover a thing in its essence, i.e. understand its ‘truth’ in full, because it always only 
reveals itself partially to the human mind. Heidegger calls this the ‘concealing unconcealing’ 
property of revealing.266 Whenever we encounter beings, they both show themselves (they are 
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unconcealed) and simultaneously other properties of them withdraw (remain concealed) because the 
properties that are ‘unconcealed’ to us depend on our own a priori faculties (e.g. culturally imbued 
models by which we seek to understand reality, as well as momentary intentions), thus leaving other 
properties of the beings in question concealed. Expressed in analytical terminology, we might 
understand this position as expressive of ‘epistemological humility’ and a variant of ‘metaphysical 
pluralism’.267 When Heidegger speaks of ‘things as things’, he thus seeks to invoke a sense of 
wholeness, which can be posited when we speak of ‘hammer’ or ‘tree’, a wholeness that can be 
intuitively grasped or sensed and that has its own phenomenological reality, but that can never be 
fully explained or uncovered in scientific terms. Heidegger calls the awareness of this multifaceted 
nature of truth ‘openness to the mystery’. The mystery denotes all the different fields of intelligibility 
which necessarily remain concealed to us in any given instance of revealing because we can always 
only occupy one such field at a time.268 ‘The call of a more primal truth’ is hence the call for an 
awareness of the mystery - a recognition of the independent reality of things as things and the fact 
that aspects of their reality necessarily remain concealed due to our inherently conditioned ways of 
sense-making. Dreyfus (1991) illustrates this idea based on a comparison between how the Greeks, 
the Christians and the moderns encounter objects and people, demonstrating how the understanding 
of being has changed over time:  
 
“The Greeks encountered things in their beauty and power, and people as poets, statesmen and 
heroes; the Christians encountered creatures to be catalogued and used appropriately and people 
as saints and sinners; and we moderns encounter objects to be controlled and organized by 
subjects in order to satisfy their desires. Or, most recently as we enter the final stage of 
technology, we experience everything including ourselves as resources to be enhanced, 
transformed, and ordered simply for the sake of greater and greater efficiency”.269 
 
As part of the standing reserve entities are no longer represented as things, not even as objects, but 
are defined solely with reference to their place and function within a wider system of functional 
dependencies.270 Their presence becomes fixed and ‘unfree’, as Heidegger calls it. Seen that way, the 
technological understanding of being, for Heidegger, involves an act of metaphysical violence – 
violence against the ontological integrity of things as things - which poses a danger not only to our 
ability to lead meaningful lives but to the freedom and autonomy (the 'free essences') of all things, 
including us, because it ultimately translates into acts based on such a reductionist, constricted 
worldview. First, things are reduced into functions and constituent parts on a metaphysical level and 
then on a physical level. To Heidegger the worldly destruction which modern technology can cause 
thus is merely a confirmation of the intrinsically violent nature of the essence of technology he 
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believed to have uncovered. The nuclear bomb with its physical capacity to obliterate all things is 
merely the logical outgrowth of the prior metaphysical obliteration of all things as things: "Science's 
knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, the sphere of objects, already had annihilated 
things as things long before the atom bomb exploded. The bomb's explosion is only the grossest of 
all gross confirmations of the long since accomplished annihilation of the thing: the confirmation that 
the thing as a thing remains nil".271 Heidegger also refers to factory farming, the use of the term 
'human resources', and modern power plants as illustrations for how the metaphysical violence 
associated with ordering revealing comes to be reflected in real life. In a particularly callous example 
he even states that modern agricultural techniques, the Shoah and nuclear weapons are wesensgleich, 
i.e. essentially the same thing: "Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry, essentially the 
same as the manufacturing of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the 
blockade and starvation of nations, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs".272 In Enframing 
things are metaphysically deprived of their own intrinsic reality and transformed into objectless 
heaps of functions, opening the door wide for their abuse along these lines. For Heidegger this 
danger is particularly great since the destructive essence of modern technology and science is kept 
concealed behind the impression that ordering revealing, scientific and technological knowledge, 
actually bring order and structure into the world, when in fact it is destroying the conditions upon 
which any form of normativity could arise: "What threatens man in his very nature is the view that 
technological production puts the world in order, while in fact this ordering is precisely what levels 
every ordo, every rank, down to the uniformity of production, and thus from the outset destroys the 
realm from which any rank and recognition could possibly arise".273 
Obviously, Heidegger here implicitly distinguishes between two different levels of order, a 
distinction which again rests on his phenomenological distinction between the correct and the true. 
On the one hand science correctly reveals an order in nature, the order of cause and effect, natural 
laws, cosmic forces, of matter, energy, time, space, etc. On the other hand, however, it thereby 
overwrites an order, namely the order of how beings 'naturally' reveal themselves to our 
consciousness, i.e. as things and objects in their own right, which in Heidegger’s view also speaks to 
the truth, a "primordial truth". For Heidegger this clash of modes of revealing, and thus the 
ontological effect of technology, is of enormous normative relevance because, he suggests, we 
ultimately rely on our 'natural' understanding of beings in order to be able to ‘rank’ things, to think 
normatively, at all.  
This, however, and ironically perhaps, appears to be true for ordering revealing and 
calculative thinking too. If nothing were to be simply taken as a given, arbitrarily posited to be 
intrinsically valuable in and of itself, as it appears to our consciousness, calculative thinking would 
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itself lack any orientation for its inquiry. “Calculative thinking”, Heidegger argues, “always 
reckon(s) with conditions that are given".274 Yet, calculative thinking transcends all conditions that 
are given and, as ordering revealing, turns them into processes that can be controlled at will - it turns 
givens into matters of choice, that is its very purpose. Thought to its end, this suggests that 
calculative thinking must lead into a world where the conditions from which ‘any order and 
recognition’ could arise, even for calculative purposes, have been transcended. Heidegger describes 
this vividly, in a strikingly prescient passage where he muses about the ultimate possibilities of 
global technological and economical interconnectedness:  
 
“When the farthest corner of the globe has been conquered technologically and can be exploited 
economically; when any incident you like, in any place you like, at any time you like, becomes 
accessible as fast as you like; when you can simultaneously 'experience' an assassination attempt 
against a king in France and a symphony concert in Tokyo; when time is nothing but speed, 
instantaneity, and simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from all Dasein [...] then there 
still looms like a spectre over all this uproar the question: what for? - where to? and what then?” 
275 
 
In other words, if technological mastery were to unfold in full, Being would lose its place in space 
and time, Being would lose its spatio-temporal structure. But how could one begin to make sense of 
an existence without this structure? Enframing, according to Heidegger, in turning the most basic 
conditions of our existence into negotiable state of affairs, is supplanting our natural way of Being, of 
being-in-the-world, and thus threatens to undermine the conditions under which we can think 
normatively at all.  
 Heidegger thereby connects two fields of knowledge that are often considered separate: 
normative knowledge and scientific or descriptive knowledge. He is suggesting that technology, or 
rather the ontological effect of the technological understanding of being, which he calls ‘uprooting’, 
is not distinct from normative knowledge but transcends that distinction because it undermines our 
natural, ordinary understanding of beings on which we tacitly rely in order to bring order into the 
world, to orientate us in it, including instrumentally, and attribute value and meaning to anything at 
all. When Wittgenstein describes in his 1929 Lecture on Ethics how, seen scientifically, a murder is 
just another fact, that “the murder will be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance 
the falling of a stone”,276 Heidegger would presumably respond that, therefore, if the technological 
understanding of being were to dominate our thinking to the fullest extent, murder would indeed at 
some point no longer necessarily be regarded as something wrong, granted it would serve some, no 
matter how arbitrary, instrumental purpose. This indeed is implicit to his above quoted remark about 
the ‘manufacturing of corpses’ as an illustration for the material effects of Enframing.  
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 Heidegger's philosophy would thus suggest that the distinction between scientific and 
normative knowledge is not as straightforward as intuition might suggest and that in reducing our 
perception of reality from things to manipulatable processes and functions, modern science and 
technology ultimately undermine the very possibility of normativity. Progressing technical order on 
the first, the ontological level, destroys the possibility of order on the second, the normative level. 
The fact-value dichotomy obviously belongs to the most controversial and most widely discussed 
topics in ethics and philosophy of science and I therefore cannot hope to provide a comprehensive 
discussion of Heidegger's position within it. For him, however, the attempt to draw that distinction 
itself, would have to be considered as expressive of the (Cartesian) technological understanding of 
being in its own right.277   
 
The second stage - humanity as standing-reserve 
 
As indicated above, the second stage of the technological danger is that the challenging, ordering 
force of Enframing will eventually turn onto humankind itself, transforming it into standing reserve 
as well: "everything, including man himself, becomes material for a process of self-assertive 
production, self-assertive imposition of human will on things regardless of their own essential 
natures”. As it stands, the human being is the last and ultimate given, from which ordering revealing 
takes its course. However, Heidegger believes that Enframing "threatens to sweep man away into 
ordering as the supposed single way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender 
of his free essence".278  If that were to happen, Heidegger argues "man would have denied and 
thrown away his own special nature—that he is a meditative being. Therefore, the issue is the saving 
of man's essential nature".279  
 In Heidegger's view, the technological understanding of being is inherently devious because 
it lures humankind into conceiving of itself as master of the universe when in fact humankind is 
challenged and ordered to conceive of nature that way and thus has no leverage over technological 
unconcealment as such: "If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong 
even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about human 
resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this".280 Technological and 
scientific progress in Heidegger’s view is an inherently enslaving process that does not come to a halt 
for the sake of humanity. The logic of calculation and instrumentality itself is something that is not 
only conceptually independent from truly human purposes but runs counter to them, because of its 
metaphysically nihilistic nature but also because its essence is the will to attain control over nature as 
such, to order it, to make it calculable and predictable, and since humanity is itself still part of nature 
                                               
277 Hall, H. (1993), p. 129. 
278 Heidegger, M. (2009), p. xv. 
279 Ibid, p. 55. 
280 Ibid, p. 8. 
 
 69 
there is no reason to assume that it will come to a halt for the sake of humanity's free essence. To put 
it in a nutshell, if humanity keeps believing in the idea of mastery and the associated idea that it will 
eventually attain mastery over technological mastery, it keeps acting as the 'orderer of the standing 
reserve', and is destined to turn itself into an instrument eventually because the logic of mastery itself 
has no Archimedian point: "He [‘man’] himself and his things are thereby exposed to the growing 
danger of turning into mere material and into a function of objectification. The design of self-
assertion itself extends the realm of the danger that man will lose his selfhood to unconditional 
production".281 
The irony is that the idea of technological mastery depends on the willing of the 'self', thus 
presupposing some essential ‘whatness’ of the individual, though its logic annihilates the idea of 
selfhood from the outset by reducing reality to causal processes, having no way to accommodate the 
very idea of ‘whatness’. The devious aspect of the process of ordering revealing thus is that 
humankind, as orderers of the standing-reserve, considers itself master of an undertaking that does 
not know any masters. 
 C. S. Lewis, a contemporary of Heidegger, arrived at almost the exact same conclusion about 
the idea of scientific and technological progress:  
 
"Each new power won by man is a power over man as well. Each advance leaves him weaker as 
well as stronger. In every victory, besides being the general who triumphs, he is also the prisoner 
who follows the triumphal car. I am not yet considering whether the total result of such 
ambivalent victories is a good thing or a bad. I am only making clear what Man's conquest of 
Nature really means and especially that final stage in the conquest, which, perhaps, is not far off. 
The final stage is come when Man […] has obtained full control over himself. Human nature 
will be the last part of Nature to surrender to Man. The battle will then be won […] But who, 
precisely, will have won it"?282 
 
Heidegger would presumably respond that 'Enframing' has ‘won it’ - i.e. efficiency and 
instrumentality for their own sake. Humanity, or 'Man', will not have won, because ‘he’ can only 
'win' by changing who or what he is. 
Thomson (2015) argues that one can distinguish between three phases of the technological 
understanding of being in Heidegger’s ontological historicity, the early-modern, the late-modern and 
the post-modern. 283 According to Thomson, the early-modern technological understanding of being 
was epitomised by thinkers such as Bacon and Descartes, who understood nature in terms of objects 
of mastery, that could be controlled for human purposes by means of scientific inquiry, or ‘natural 
philosophy’ as it was called at the time. This phase hence was firmly rooted in an anthropocentric 
worldview, where nature, or, in Heideggerian language, beings were objectified. However, beings 
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still retained their object-character and therefore some form of independent, albeit perhaps 
oversimplified, given reality as things. The late-modern phase then saw beings disintegrate, 
represented as meaningless stuff, standing-reserve as it were, where they were stripped even of their 
object-character, transformed into processes and particles that could be manipulated at will for 
human needs. We might visualise this as the world of Darwinism, of industrialisation, accompanied 
as it was by the compartmentalisation of production processes, the introduction of disposable 
consumer products and the advent of elementary physics. Here the worldview was still 
anthropocentric but non-human beings, humanmade or natural, were beginning to be represented no 
longer even as objects but purely in terms of objectless processes and as heaps of functions. The 
post-modern stage, finally, is characterised by a complete departure from both the anthropocentric 
and the object-character of the early-modern phase of the technological understanding of being. In 
the post-modern phase, to phrase it along C.S. Lewis’ analogous lines of reasoning, human nature, 
too, is beginning to yield and to surrender to ‘Man’s’ conquest of nature, which means that even “the 
ultimate springs of human action are no longer […] something given”, 284 but are beginning to be 
understood in terms of manipulatable processes as well. At this point one can no longer meaningfully 
speak of anthropocentrism because that which used to function as the ‘centre’ of the ‘conquest of 
nature’ has itself been revealed as a matter of technological manipulability. Hence Lewis’ question 
who, once that point is reached, ‘will have won’? In Heidegger’s view Enframing would have won - 
a world of literally ‘no-thingness’, of directionless forces, processes and particles that are organised 
and reorganised in an endless process of challenging-forth, i.e. of reconstitution and becoming for no 
clear purpose at all.285 Such is Heidegger’s vision of ‘technology as destiny’. In the following 
chapters I will come back to it as it serves as an instructive counterpoint for thinking about existential 
risk theory and its aim to reach ‘technological maturity’.  
 
2.4 Modern technology and ordering revealing 
 
According to Heidegger, within this process of ordering revealing, modern technology in form of 
physical machinery, technical systems, gadgedry etc., plays an important role. On the one hand it is 
an embodiment of ordering revealing, it gives physical form to the instrumental understanding of 
being and allows us to dominate and exploit nature. It is the physical embodiment of Enframing. 
However, it also by itself contributes to the establishment of a reductionist, instrumentalist 
understanding of being. Heidegger illustrates that property of technology by describing the effect 
which the presence of a hydroelectric power plant in the Rhine River has on his perception of the 
river: 
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"In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical 
energy, even the Rhine itself appears as something at our command. The hydroelectric plant is 
not built into the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for 
hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the power plant. What the river is now, 
namely a water power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station".286 
 
This example also serves well as an illustration of Heidegger's understanding of the notion of 
standing reserve. As discussed above, as part of the standing reserve a thing is no longer perceived in 
terms of its own 'essential nature', or even as an object ("Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-
reserve no longer stands over against us as object" 287) but only in terms of its instrumental value for 
productive purposes. The river, for example, in Heidegger’s view, once dammed up in the plant does 
no longer reveal itself to the human eye on its own terms. Rather the free essence of the river 
withdraws and remains hidden behind its function as part of something that lies outside of it, namely 
the wider system of energy generation. This is the 'setting upon', which Heidegger describes as the 
fundamental characteristic of the technological understanding of being, whereby nature is reduced to 
a standing reserve. At a different point Heidegger again illustrates this mechanism by discussing 
whether an airliner should be regarded as an object:  
 
"an airliner that stands on the runway surely is an object. Certainly. We can represent the 
machine so. But then it conceals itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi 
strip only as standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of 
transportation. For this it must be in its whole structure and in every one of its constituent parts, 
on call for duty, i.e. ready for takeoff […] Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the machine is 
completely unautonomous, for it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable".288  
 
The machine, in Heidegger's view, derives its presence solely from within the essence of technology, 
i.e. the technological understanding of being, it has no presence of itself. The airliner's presence is 
defined through its function within the wider system of transportation and has no reality independent 
from that. Nature for Heidegger is fundamentally different because, originally, it has an essence and 
thus a presence independent of the functional value attributed to it, and yet, he argues, ordering 
revealing and its expression through technology is on its way to reduce our understanding of nature 
to a technical understanding as well, i.e. we are beginning to conceive of the river in a similar manner 
as of the airliner. As part of the standing-reserve the river is turned, metaphysically, into a machine.  
 To some extent this ontological effect might come across as an old-fashioned, conservative 
romantic concern about the disenchantment of reality. However, for Heidegger it is inherently 
violent. What he wants to point out, is that ordering revealing has an effect on what we conceive of 
as real and thus ultimately also on how we come to interact with our surroundings. Technology 
shapes our "understanding of what counts as things, what counts as human beings, and ultimately 
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what counts as real, on the basis of which we can direct our actions toward particular things and 
people" as Dreyfus (2009) puts it.289 The more we are surrounded by machines such as hydroelectric 
dams, by airplanes, by cars, etc., any type of object which can only be understood as part of and in 
itself made up of a wider web of functional relationships that lie outside of ourselves, the more we 
are inclined to think in such terms and the less we are able to meet things or beings on their own 
grounds. 
Nuclear bombs and extermination camps, for Heidegger, were the most gruesome 
embodiments of this background understanding. However, modern technology in its material form 
not only embodies and enforces the technological world view, it also by itself continuously creates 
the conditions for the further extension of standing reserve and this, for the purposes of this thesis, is 
perhaps the most crucial aspect of Heidegger's philosophy of technology. Technology creates the 
conditions for a continuous extension of the standing reserve in a multitude of ways. First, new 
technological inventions typically open up routes for ever more technological inventions. Second, 
new technologies often open up novel path-ways and opportunities for theoretical scientific enquiry 
into nature (consider for instance the microscope, X-rays, the telescope, satellites etc., all of which 
facilitated scientific inquiry in uncountable ways), which in turn pave the way for new technological 
inventions and so forth. Third, and arguably most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, 
technology ushers in the ordering of ever more aspects of life precisely by potentially and actually 
leading to negative consequences, i.e. by entailing conventional physical dangers. 
 These negative, unintended or potential consequences, in Heidegger's view, lead to a further 
extension of standing reserve for as long as we do not challenge the essence of technology, which is 
the technological understanding of being. The reason is that for as long as we do not challenge that 
understanding we remain within the same metaphysical mindset, committed to the idea of attaining 
mastery over nature and thus, whenever technology leads to bad results, we are not led to question 
the undertaking as such but rather if and how we can master it better. We thus try to include and 
control ever more variables. Precisely by threatening us in a conventional sense, technology creates 
the needs for the ever further extension of its own logic.  
 
2.5 The instrumental conception of technology 
 
For Heidegger, the common understanding of technology plays a particularly important role in that 
self-reinforcing dynamic. As argued in Section 1 of this chapter, the starting point of Heidegger's 
discussion of the issue of technology is the "instrumental and anthropological definition" of 
technology, whereby technology is understood as a means to an end and a human activity. In 
philosophy of technology this conception of technology has come to be known as the 'neutrality 
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thesis', which holds that "technology is a neutral instrument that can be put to good or bad use by its 
users".290 
 For Heidegger the "instrumental and anthropological conception of technology", at least 
when applied to modern technology as opposed to ancient tekné, is not only misleading but 
dangerous. It is misleading because, as we have seen, modern technology is more than simple tool-
use. It is based on and reinforces a specific understanding of being. The neutrality thesis thus 
misleads us in that it abstracts from the, in Heidegger's view, most important property of modern 
technology, its inherently violent metaphysical essence. However, for him the neutral conception of 
technology is even more problematic than that because it "delivers us over" to technology, where 
'delivering us over' conceivably needs to be understood as 'clearing the path’ for the turning of 
humanity into standing-reserve:  
 
"Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or 
deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something 
neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us 
utterly blind to the essence of technology."291 
 
Now, there appear to be at least two reasons for that supposed effect of the neutrality thesis. First, as 
said above, by abstracting from the metaphysical essence of technology the neutrality thesis makes us 
blind to the nihilistic nature of technology and leads us to uncritically accept the world it creates. 
Secondly, the neutrality thesis delivers us over to technology because it implicitly reinforces the idea 
of mastery, i.e. the belief that we, as humanity, are in control of technology when in reality, as 
discussed, the logic of technology has no Archimedean point of mastery: "So long as we represent 
technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it. We press on past the 
essence of technology".292 Conceiving of technology as a mere tool implies that humanity is in 
control of it. The neutrality thesis hence fosters the idea that whenever we encounter a technological 
problem, we merely need to get better at using and designing the tool, to use technology in more 
efficient and more ingenious ways: "The instrumental conception of technology conditions every 
attempt to bring man into the right relation with technology. Everything depends on our manipulating 
technology in a proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, […] master it. The will to mastery 
will become all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip human control".293 In thinking 
about technology as a neutral tool we therefore pay heed to the will to mastery and inadvertently 
contribute to the ever further extension of standing reserve. Heidegger argues that all behaviour that 
is based on a neutral understanding of technology and the associated idea that we need to master the 
problems we are facing by becoming better at using tools leaves the underlying logic of mastery 
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untouched and thus is technological behaviour. Heidegger's fear hence was that, in times of growing 
conventional dangers resulting from accelerating technological progress this uncritical conception of 
technology could, rather than leading to ontological humbleness and a criticism of the will to 
mastery, translate into an ever more pronounced will for mastery, to get the world under 
technological control, and that we might become entirely forgetful about what we are doing to 
ourselves in the process: 
 
"The decisive question of science and technology today is no longer: Where do we find 
sufficient quantities of fuel? The decisive question now runs: In what way can we tame and 
direct the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the 
danger that these gigantic energies suddenly — even without military actions—break out 
somewhere, "run away" and destroy everything"?294 
 
In other words, he was afraid that the conventional dangers associated with technology would 
become a matter of such urgency that they would lead humanity to focus all energies on futile 
attempts to get these dangers under control, to master the technologies it has unleashed on the world, 
whilst wholly ignoring the deeper but no less real dangers that go along with that undertaking. 
Against the background of what we are now calling existential risk, Heidegger thus saw the real 
possibility that our quest for mastery would lead us into a situation where, under the imperative of 
control, calculative thinking would finally oust all other modes of thinking: 
 
"the approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, 
dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and 
practiced as the only way of thinking […] Then there might go hand in hand with the greatest 
ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing […] total thoughtlessness […] then man would 
have denied and thrown away his own special nature".295 
 
We can thus distinguish between three concepts with which Heidegger denotes what he saw as the 
three interlinked features of the dangerous process he saw unfolding under the reign of Enframing: 
standing reserve (the ordering of things for purposeless production), objectlessness (the clash 
between scientific knowledge and the manner in which things reveal themselves naturally to our 
consciousness) and thoughtlessness (the emptiness of calculative thinking).  
Thoughtlessness, understood along Heidegger’s lines, is the narrowing of our thinking to 
calculative thinking, i.e. the total absence of meditative thinking. The ‘greatest danger’ of 
technological progress, Heidegger says, is that humanity could entirely forget about meditative 
thinking, and therewith lost its openness to the mystery, which would mean that being forgets itself. 
296 ”Objectlessness  is the ontological effect of the process, which I have characterised previously as 
the ‘metaphysical violence’ inherent to calculative thinking: the disintegration of things as things as 
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the result of the scientific abstraction from their own particular reality as phenomena appearing 
naturally to our consciousness, from their ‘grantedness’ as it were, and their dissolution into their 
constituent elements, processes and functions. 297 Standing reserve is the new order in which the 
henceforth objectlessness world comes to ‘presence’, i.e. the mode in which things come reveal 
themselves under conditions of thoughtlessness and objectlessness, once they have been “challenged 
forth” by "Enframing", namely as sets of manipulable processes available to humanity’s command 
and defined solely in terms of their instrumental value to a purpose that is independent from them: 
”Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just 
so that it may be on call for a further ordering.” The motif of standing reserve, is not only intended to 
circumscribe a distinctly modern mode of mental representation, but seeks to explain actual material 
effects of thoughtlessness and objectlessness – i.e. how reality including ourselves, i.e. Being, is 
transformed at the hands of technology. Furthermore the concept of standing-reserve is intimately 
linked to the idea of mastery and therewith an illusion which Heidegger identifies at the heart of the 
technological project – the illusion that we can rearrange nature in a manner that suits our needs to 
the fullest extent, that we can become the masters of nature. 
 
2.6 Existential risk from a Heideggerian perspective 
 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology provides us with a rich historical and conceptual basis for 
embedding existential risk theory in a wider context of debates appropriate to its earlier distilled 
substance matter, i.e. in an environment of debates discussing technology in existential terms. 
Heidegger’s account suggests that existential risk research is a rather old-fashioned response to an 
old fear – the fear of losing control over the consequences of technological progress – by seeking to 
perfect technological mastery. The reason is, of course, that, from a Heideggerian perspective, 
existential risk research is firmly rooted in the technological mindset and thus what he calls 
‘technological behaviour’. All the criteria Heidegger introduces for identifying this mindset are 
satisfied – most importantly that it thinks about technology in terms of the instrumental and 
anthropological definition. But, more than that, the fact that the non-domain specific treatment of 
potential human extinction scenarios elevates technology into the position of arbitrator over life and 
death and thereby frames the perfection of technological mastery as an undertaking of existential 
importance ultimately fuels Heidegger’s deepest fear - that Enframing might turn onto humanity 
itself, reducing it to mere ‘standing-reserve’. Provocatively put, existential risk theory, can hence be 
seen as an embodiment of the technological spirit that, according to Heidegger, had taken hold of 
modern humanity. 
 
Technology in existential risk theory 
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In the first chapter I have argued that, initially, one might be inclined to think of existential risk 
theory as presenting a new, critical perspective on technology. Existential risk theory calls for greater 
vigilance, carefulness and, ultimately, an overhauled approach to regulating and organising 
technological developments, from a reactive approach to a proactive, precautionary approach, at least 
in research areas that are deemed particularly sensitive.298 Olle Häggström of the FHF argues that 
“the attitude that dominates research and development today, is tantamount to running blindfolded 
and at full speed into a minefield”.299 Views such as these could certainly be taken as a criticism of 
what I have referred to as ‘Enlightenment optimism’ in the introduction , i.e. of the “idea that 
scientific and technological progress automatically contributes to the advancement of society by 
bringing about a unification of wealth and virtue”.300 Existential risk research could hence be seen as 
an awakening of parts of the scientific and technological community to the kind of criticisms that 
have been voiced by philosophers of technology, critical theorists, environmentalists and authors 
from many other backgrounds for decades. However, criticism of a particular modus of technological 
progress and criticism of technology are not the same. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology allows 
us to see the difference between the two more clearly.  
 When seen against the background of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology (or any other 
strand of philosophy of technology for that matter), the first thing one notices is that existential risk 
theory actually lacks a theory of technology - it never asks what technology is. This is both surprising 
and unsurprising. It is surprising in so far as technology assumes centre stage in existential risk 
theory and it would seem only natural to ask what it actually is that one attributes such an important 
role to. If technology is our destiny should we not ‘question concerning technology’? At the same 
time, it does not come as a surprise because there is a default conception of technology which 
existential risk theory implicitly builds on. I have argued before that Bostrom for instance 
understands technology along the lines of making-and-using, as Langdon Winner puts it, i.e. as mere 
tools, and Bostrom in that regard clearly is representative for the wider field. This becomes apparent 
for instance in a joint report of the FHI and CSER on ‘Unprecedented Technological Risks’. Here, it 
is argued that “over the next few decades, the continued development of dual-use technologies will 
provide major benefits to society. They will also pose significant and unprecedented global risks, 
including risks of new weapons of mass destruction, arms races, or the accidental deaths of billions 
of people”.301 ‘Dual-use technology’ is a term which is typically employed in military contexts to 
indicate that a technology can be used both for peaceful as well as for violent purposes. The term is 
frequently used in the literature on existential risk, for instance also by Séan ó Heigeartáigh of CSER, 
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who states that the “dual-use characteristic—that the underlying science and technology could be 
applied to both destructive purposes, and peaceful ones—is common to many of the emerging 
technologies that we are most interested in” and lists as examples “bioscience and bioengineering 
such as the manipulation and modification of certain viruses and bacteria […] Geoengineering: a 
suite of proposed large-scale technological interventions that would aim to “engineer” our climate in 
an effort to slow or even reverse the most severe impacts of climate change […]” and  “Advances in 
artificial intelligence—in particular, those that relate to progress toward artificial general 
intelligence—AI systems capable of matching or surpassing human intellectual abilities across a 
broad range of domains and challenges”. In all of these cases, he argues, “progress on these sciences 
are driven in great part by a recognition of their potential for improving our quality of life, or the role 
they could play in aiding us to combat existing or emerging global challenges. However, in and of 
themselves they may also pose large risks”.302 
The tag ‘dual-use’ appears to be entirely redundant here as it signals only how technology is 
understood anyway. As Iain Golding reminds us in a recent report to the Government Chief 
Scientific Advisor, all technologies are potentially ‘dual-use’: “Even when the economic incentives 
and technological breakthroughs allow advancement, they may be ill advised […] as we highlight in 
our discussion on systemic risks, the potential abuse of these technologies to create new biological 
pathogens reminds us that all technologies are potentially dual use”.303 By adding the prefix ‘dual-
use’ existential risk researchers hence merely highlight the property to which they reduce technology 
from the outset, namely that it is a tool that can be put to good or to ill use depending on the users’ 
(or developers’) know-how and intent, implying that technology’s consequences depend on how we 
handle it rather than the technology itself. 
In other words, existential risk theory is rooted in a very traditional way of thinking about 
technology, referred to under varying labels in philosophy of technology, such as ‘instrumental 
theory’,304 ‘instrumental vision’,305 or the ‘make-and-use’ paradigm,306 which, according to most 
authors in the field, is ‘the traditional liberal view of technology’,307 and to this day the most widely 
held, or, as argued earlier, the default conception of technology.308 Andrew Feenberg for instance 
argues that it is the default view in most social sciences, from economics, to policy studies or 
international relations.309 As we have seen, this conception, or what Heidegger calls the ‘instrumental 
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and anthropological definition’ -  the idea that technology is a means-to-an-end and a human activity 
- also is the very starting point of the ‘Question Concerning Technology’. 
We can hence infer that existential risk theory does not present a new take on what we might 
call the ‘problem of technology as such’. That is, existential risk theory does not in principle present 
us with a new way of thinking about technology, despite the fact that it argues for a fundamentally 
overhauled approach to regulating technological change. Even if the particular technologies and 
dangers that are discussed in existential risk theory might be new, the manner in which they are 
discussed is not. This is also reflected in the fact that the fear underlying existential risk research, that 
technological developments might get out of control, lead to unpredictable and potentially 
catastrophic consequences, that “one species - ours - has Earth' s future in its hands and could 
jeopardise not only itself but also life's immense potential” 310 is not new. Heidegger in 1966 
discusses this kind of fear as characteristic for the scientific and technological community of his 
time, asking on their behalf: “The decisive question now runs: In what way can we tame and direct 
the unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the danger that 
these gigantic energies suddenly — even without military actions —break out somewhere, "run-
away" and destroy everything?" 311 Existential risk research amounts to the realisation that we now 
face more kinds of these risks on more frontiers, asking exactly the same question in the context of 
new technologies, such as artificial intelligence, nano-technology, geo-engineering or any other of 
the unprecedented technological risks it considers. We thus see that existential risk theory treats 
technology in a rather old-fashioned way and also that its fears are not qualitatively new.  
However, I have also discussed above why Heidegger regards the instrumental and 
anthropological definition of technology as inherently problematic and even dangerous. The problem 
of the instrumental vision of technology is that it translates directly into what philosophers of 
technology call ‘the neutrality thesis’. Since technology is viewed as a mere means to an end, it is 
considered to be only contingently related to the substantive values it serves, which means, as 
Feenberg puts it, that it has no valuative content of its own and hence is normatively neutral.312 
Individual technologies, if seen that way, become in an ethical and political sense invisible. If a given 
technology leads to negative results, these are in consequence attributed to human failure rather than 
to the technology in question, i.e. either to a lack in skill or to malicious intent. As Heidegger argues, 
this conception of technology, therefore makes it impossible to think critically about technology. 
However, the situation is even more problematic than that. As Franssen et al. (2018) argue, 
the neutrality thesis ultimately does not translate into a neutral perspective on technology (neutral in 
the sense that technology would be understood to be, on balance, neither good nor bad for humanity, 
or at least only as good or bad as the uses made of it). Rather, the instrumental view implies, prima 
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facie, a positive ethical assessment of technology. 313 The defining quality of technology, when 
understood purely instrumentally, is that it increases the capabilities of humanity and provides it with 
new options. This, however, is prima facie considered to be something desirable. Furthermore, 
technology increases the efficiency with which resources (time, energy, materials, etc.) can be 
utilised, which is in fact how technology is defined in mainstream economics,314 which is also 
generally considered to be desirable. Technology itself, under that conception, hence allows us to do 
more things, to utilise nature in more ways and with greater efficiency and wherever it does lead to 
bad outcomes these outcomes are attributed to human failure in design or application, rather than to 
technology itself. Negative outcomes therefore do not impair the generally positive view of 
technology as such. Under the assumption that humans utilise the new capabilities technology 
provides well, the default position hence is that more technology is better than less.  
As a result, and we might understand this as the central concern of the Question Concerning 
Technology, Heidegger realised that the instrumental definition of technology, if it is the only way in 
which technology is understood, makes it not only effectively impossible to assume a critical position 
toward technology, but that it is emblematic of the technological understanding of being and 
therefore can only translate into an ever more pronounced quest for technological mastery wherever 
we are confronted with any type of problem, including technological problems: "So long as we 
represent technology as an instrument”, we look ‘past its essence’, Heidegger reminds us, and 
therefore “remain held fast in the will to master it", which means that we end up in a circuit, forever 
chasing moving targets, “manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means”, i.e. 
manipulating that with which we manipulate and so forth.315 Heidegger thus calls all behaviour that is 
based on the instrumental conception of technology ‘technological behaviour’.316  
 
2.7 Existential risk research as technological behaviour 
 
Against that background, it is abundantly clear that existential risk research, from a Heideggerian 
perspective, needs to be understood as technological behaviour. Rather than presenting us with a 
critique of technology, it presents us with a quest for technological mastery. It understands 
technology in the conventional sense as a tool and an instrument and considers every natural and 
technological problem from the vantage point of its potential for further technological optimisation. 
Existential risk research can, from that perspective, be seen as a rather old-fashioned response to an 
old problem: The fear of losing control over technology and a resultant quest to learn how to 
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manipulate technology in a ‘proper’ manner as a means, i.e. to eventually master it fully.317 
Existential risk theory demonstrates what such a quest would involve. It would involve micro-
mastery, in form of ‘safely’ designed technological products, and macro-mastery, captured in notions 
such as ‘differential technological development’, ‘horizon-scanning’, ‘preferred order of arrival’, etc. 
Furthermore, existential risk theory, resonates with Heidegger’s observation that the 
technological understanding of being turns, ontologically speaking, the entire world into a machine, 
where every natural process is seen from the perspective of making-and-using and, in principle, as 
something that can be brought under human command: “Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so 
threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the impression comes to 
prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives 
rise in turn to one final delusion: It seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only 
himself”.318 This becomes clearly apparent in what I have described in the first chapter as the turning 
of every risk, natural and anthropogenic, into, in effect, a technological risk. Physicist David Deutsch 
perfectly encapsulates the underlying mindset when he argues that: 
 
“before our ancestors learned how to make fire artificially (and many times since then too), 
people must have died of exposure literally on top of the means of making the fires that would 
have saved their lives […] In a parochial sense, the weather killed them; but the deeper 
explanation is lack of knowledge. Many of the hundreds of millions of victims of cholera 
throughout history must have died within sight of the hearths that could have boiled their 
drinking water and saved their lives; but, again, they did not know that. Quite generally, the 
distinction between a “natural” disaster and one brought about by ignorance is parochial. Prior to 
every natural disaster that people once used to think of as ‘just happening’, or being ordained by 
gods, we now see many options that the people affected failed to take — or, rather, to create”.319 
 
In existential risk theory the distinction between natural and man-made disaster has been entirely 
blurred. Both are rendered, in effect, as disasters of ignorance. In existential risk theory everywhere, 
as Heidegger argues, with reference to Heisenberg, we appear ‘to encounter only ourselves’. The 
purpose of existential risk theory is to prevent humanity from making the same mistake as those of 
our forefathers who froze to death whilst bedded on combustible material. Its goal is to leave behind 
ignorance for good, to anticipate potential disasters and technologically utilise the resources nature 
yields to prepare for such eventualities – from lighting a fire in winter to launching asteroid-
deflecting missiles into outer-space, as it were. Heidegger has pre-empted this mindset when he 
argued that, prima facie, “the world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative 
thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist”.320 From this perspective, 
everything is possible, nothing is given, and what becomes of humanity depends entirely on how well 
we design and use the tools science and technology can, in principle, provide us with.  
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It is in that vein that Kateb (1997) understands Heidegger to be arguing that at the heart of 
the technological understanding of being, i.e. of Western humanity’s enthusiastic compliance with 
the dictates of Enframing, its acting as the ‘orderer of the orderable’, is a ‘rebellion’ and a “war with 
given reality”, the deepest root of which “is not scarcity, not the failure of nature to make better 
provision for a necessitous humanity, instead, a Western wilfulness, a will to power, to mastery, an 
overflow of energy that wants to shake the world to pieces and make it over. The craving is either to 
put the human stamp on reality or at least to rescue nature from the absence of any honestly 
detectable stamp, any detectable natural purpose and intention”.321  
Heidegger might have seen it that way, at least one can read him along such lines when he 
argues that what lies behind the technological will to mastery and hence ‘endangers man’, is “the 
view that man, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channelling of the energies of 
physical nature, could render the human condition […] tolerable for everybody and happy in all 
respects”.322 This indeed suggests that Heidegger considered technological progress to be, at least on 
some level, driven or sustained by a utopian belief in the perfectibility of the human condition. 
However that may be, existential risk theory certainly complicates a critique directed against 
technology and technological thinking on such grounds because it does not in the first place speak of 
an ‘overflow of energy’, of an, at bottom, irrational rage against the given, of a technology driven 
utopian visions of the future as we find them for instance in Soviet Cosmism.323 It does not even 
necessarily have the goal to make the world a better place, but bases its call for technological 
mastery simply on the observation that without technological progress humanity could not be 
expected to survive for an extended period of time on cosmic timescales. It demonstrates, in other 
words, that the desire to bring order into the world, make it calculable and escape contingency, must 
not take its departure from utopian hopes, or a craving to compensate for the death of god, but can be 
born out of the simple, and arguably rather common-sensical, desire for survival.324 A rebellion 
against the given and against contingency it is of course nonetheless, albeit a rebellion against the 
naturally preordained finitude of ‘the human enterprise’, rather than the rather benign imperfections 
of everyday existence.  
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This leads us to the, for the purposes of this thesis, perhaps most consequential difference between 
Heidegger’s philosophy and existential risk theory: a (lack of) concern for the survival of the species. 
As we have seen, Heidegger, like existential risk researchers, identifies in technology an existential 
threat to humanity. However, he identifies in technology an existential threat to humanity in both 
meanings of the word, to humanity as humankind, i.e. to human life on earth, as well as to 
humanity’s ‘essential nature’, i.e. to the properties that make us human, which to him, in the first 
place, is a certain form of being-in-the-world, involving an awareness of things that goes beyond the 
merely ontic, beyond the calculative, technological understanding of things. As we have seen, and 
crucially, for this discussion, for Heidegger these two dangers to humanity were not only essentially 
the same (essentially in the sense of ‘expressive of the same essence’) but they were connected in a 
highly problematic fashion. He was concerned that the possibility of total annihilation might come to 
dominate our thinking to the extent that we embark on a mindless frenzy to get technology 
technologically under control whilst turning a blind-eye to the less immediate, less visible, but in his 
opinion no less dangerous metaphysically rooted dangers associated with that quest. His fear thus 
was that the possibility of nuclear apocalypse would ‘deliver us over’ to standing reserve by 
providing the grounds for the ever further extension of technological control over ever more aspects 
of life.   
His focus on the dangers to Being, humanity’s humanness, hence was accompanied by near 
total neglect, even a dismissive treatment of the spectre of human extinction. But how are we to make 
sense of this dismissiveness? After all, the end of humanity would imply an end of the very 
possibility of a positive, meaningful transformation of Being in his sense - a shutdown of the very 
possibility of meditative thinking, dwelling, rootedness, openness to mystery, etc. - and, surely, 
Heidegger must have been aware of the peculiar imminence of the nuclear threat to the human 
being’s survival under cold war conditions. Hence, if Heidegger’s aim was to secure the conditions 
under which a meaningful life was possible how could he neglect the imminent threat that nuclear 
war presented to them. How could he neglect the need for action in the face of such a threat and 
focus all his philosophical energies on pinpointing the dangers of trying to master it instead? 
Answering this question would deserve a more comprehensive and nuanced discussion than 
can be provided here. However, the remaining paragraphs of this chapter are intended to approximate 
an answer because doing so will lead us to what is at once at the heart of the tension between 
Heidegger’s thought and existential risk theory and its common ground – namely that in both, albeit 
on different ontological levels, technology is the benchmark, the sole reference point for thinking 
about the human condition, present and future. As a result, in both cases, a more intricate 
understanding of the complexities of human existence, specifically of political reality, is squeezed 
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out, resulting in, as it were, the motif of technology as destiny. Either one embraces it, or one rejects 
it, there is no path in-between. 
One potential reason for Heidegger’s refusal to take much interest in the danger to 
humanity’s survival has been touched upon earlier. For Heidegger the atomic threat to humanity’s 
survival was ‘essentially the same’ as mechanized agriculture or as the threat to the Rhine river, 
manifest in the hydro-electric power plant, or even as Nazi extermination camps - an embodiment of 
the metaphysical violence inherent to the challenging revealing of the modern ontological condition. 
Seen from that perspective the atomic destruction of humanity would merely amount to more of the 
same. It is in that vein that he argues in his 1950 lecture The Thing that:  
 
“Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He does not see that the 
atom bomb and its explosion are the mere final emission of what has long since taken place, has 
already happened. Not to mention the single hydrogen bomb, whose triggering, thought through 
to its utmost potential, might be enough to snuff out all life on earth. What is this helpless 
anxiety still waiting for, if the terrible has already happened?”325  
 
This ostensible lack of sensitivity to difference in ethical weight between the events in question 
earned Heidegger the scorn of many a prominent philosopher. Habermas (1989) calls this tendency in 
Heidegger ‘abstraction by essentialization’: “Under the levelling gaze of the philosopher of Being 
even the extermination of the Jews seems merely an event equivalent to many others”.326 And 
Richard Rorty calls Heidegger a ‘self-infatuated blowhard’ because “all that nuclear annihilation 
meant” to Heidegger, Rorty claims, “was one more bit of evidence for his claim to have understood 
Das Wesen des Dinges [the essence of the thing] better than Plato and Aristotle”.327 But does 
Heidegger’s ‘abstraction by essentialization’ necessarily imply an ethical judgment on his part? Does 
it truly mean that he believes the utilisation of modern agricultural machinery to be no different, 
ethically speaking no more or less problematic than the utilisation of nuclear weapons and vice 
versa? Of course, if that were the case, that would explain his lack of interest in the survival of the 
species, because it would mean that humanity’s destruction would be no more or less problematic an 
event than the mechanisation of agriculture. But for above reason that does not make sense. The 
existence of humanity is the condition of possibility for a positive transformation of Being and 
Heidegger does care about humanity, about poetry, etc., otherwise he would not care about Being’s 
destiny. The only way in which we can make sense of the counter-intuitive callousness of 
Heidegger’s levelling gaze is to understand it as the expression of a meditation about the conditio 
sine qua non of such events as a nuclear war or industrial agriculture. Interpreted that way, his 
statement that the production of nuclear weapons is ‘essentially the same’ as mechanized agriculture, 
does not necessarily imply an ethical evaluation. What it first and foremost means is that they speak 
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the same essential language and become intelligible only when placed against the background of 
modern technology. 
This, however, leaves the crux of the matter untouched, which is the question why, if there is 
an ethical difference, he did not take a heightened interest in the possibility of nuclear catastrophe 
and rally against it. A second potential answer to this question might be that, he simply did not think 
of the possibility of total annihilation as particularly terrible as compared to a world that would be 
barred such an abrupt ending and instead be allowed to continue on its path towards total 
technicalisation. George Kateb argues in that vein that Heidegger seems to suggest that “it is less bad 
for the human status and stature and for the human relation to reality that there be nuclear destruction 
than that […] genetic engineering should go from success to success”.328 Hubert Dreyfus arrives at a 
similar conclusion when he argues that Heidegger was less concerned with the physical havoc 
technology can wreak, than with the "devastation that would result if technology solved all our 
problems".329 And, again, there are passages in Heidegger’s work that do indeed suggest that he 
thought along such lines: “we do not stop to consider that an attack with technological means is being 
prepared upon the life and nature of man compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb 
means little. For precisely if the hydrogen bombs do not explode and human life on earth is 
preserved, an uncanny change in the world moves upon us”.330 But even if Heidegger did consider 
nuclear destruction to be a lesser evil than total technicalisation, he must, at a minimum, have 
considered both extraordinary evils and thus have hoped for neither to materialise, which then again 
leads back to the original question. 
The last potential answer to this question lies in Heidegger’s peculiar perspective on human 
agency under the reign of the technological paradigm. What we find in Heidegger’s thought is, in 
effect, deep fatalism and, correspondingly, a deeply apolitical, even anti-political attitude. He simply 
did not believe that anything practical could be done to rescue humanity from the technological evils 
it faced, be it from nuclear apocalypse or from the mechanisation of agriculture, for as long as the 
technological understanding of being itself had not been transformed, for as long as humanity’s mode 
of Being had not fundamentally changed. But since the latter, for him, was out of the reach of active, 
wilful interference, nothing could be done at all: "no single man, no group of men, no commission of 
prominent statesmen, scientists, and technicians, no conference of leaders of commerce and industry, 
can brake or direct the progress of history in the atomic age".331  
The scope of this chapter does not allow for an in-depth historical analysis of the anti-
political dimension of Heidegger’s thought and its connection to his philosophy of technology.332 
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However, it might be worthwhile to recall that Heidegger’s thinking changed profoundly throughout 
the 1930s and 40s (the so called ‘Kehre’, or ‘turn’) and that what is generally referred to as his 
‘philosophy of technology’ is mainly the work of ‘the late’ Heidegger.333 A reason for his anti-
political post-war fatalism might hence be found in the ‘pro-political’ phase that preceded it.334 As 
Heidegger pointed out in an infamously unapologetic letter to his former student Herbert Marcuse, he 
supported the Nazi regime precisely because he had hoped for a “spiritual renewal of life in its 
entirety” and even a “redemption of occidental Dasein”.335 In other words, he had hoped for a 
politically induced transformation of Being and thus a political solution to Western civilization’s 
technological predicament. In 1935 Heidegger considered occidental Being to be equally threatened, 
virtually throttled, by US capitalism and USSR communism, whom he denounced as “metaphysically 
… the same”.336 Just as nuclear weapons and mechanised agriculture to him were essentially (i.e. 
metaphysically) the same, capitalism and communism were expressive of the same problematic 
relation to being and Heidegger, at the time, had hoped that something could be done in the political 
realm to rescue occidental Being from that root of all evil. After the war, whether out of real-felt 
disillusion, or simply in a calculated attempt to shield his personal and professional reputation, he 
argued that Nazi politics, too, had been but another incarnation of technological thinking, as 
evidenced by his callous remarks about extermination camps as ‘essentially the same’ as mechanised 
agriculture. In other words, he appears to have thought that he had made a mistake. He had placed his 
hopes in political action and ended up supporting a political movement which was but another 
incarnation of technology. What remained, in any case, was a deeply anti-political attitude and the 
idea that nothing good could possibly result of political action for as long as the Being of Western 
humanity had not fundamentally changed. But since humans, as we have seen, cannot exert control 
over Being, since we are the ones being ‘challenged’, ‘spoken to’, and since Heidegger accordingly 
did not himself claim to know wherein a new, non-technological mode of Being could consist, the 
late Heidegger’s fatalism culminates in his well-known exclamation that “only a god can save us 
now” (not to be taken literally).337 Until the arrival of such a new god, all humans could do was to 
keep meditative thinking alive, which means resisting the dominance of calculative thinking on a 
personal level, to remain open to the mystery and practice ‘releasement towards things’.338 Part of 
that exercise, to him, appears to have been to resist taking nuclear catastrophe seriously. In fact, and 
perhaps in response to his own earlier political hopes, he argued that the very act of thinking in terms 
of catastrophe, destruction, decline and loss are mere historiographical representations of 
technological consciousness:   
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“All mere chasing after the future so as to work out a picture of it through calculation in order to 
extend what is present and half-thought into what, now veiled, is yet to come, itself still moves 
within the prevailing attitude belonging to technological, calculating representation. All attempts 
to reckon existing reality morphologically, psychologically, in terms of decline and loss, in 
terms of fate, catastrophe, and destruction, are merely technological behaviour”.339  
 
In other words, another potential explanation for why Heidegger might not have taken the problem of 
human extinction seriously, is that he feared that the mere act of thinking about the future under that 
aspect would necessarily lead him down a technological path of thinking. From his perspective, the 
very act of thinking about nuclear catastrophe, in fact the very act of thinking in the category of 
catastrophe or doom, is inherently technological. Nuclear weapons by the sheer fact of their existence 
were threatening to hijack the agenda, forcing a binary perspective on the future onto us, challenging 
us to think about the future of humanity in technical terms, whether we are thoroughly opposed to 
them or not. As the hydroelectric powerplant reveals the river Rhine as standing reserve, the 
categories of demise and doom, Heidegger feared, would reveal humanity as a technological 
problem. Interestingly enough, existential risk theory appears to substantiate these concerns. 
Existential risk research’s self-declared mission is to establish the category of existential catastrophe 
as our primary benchmark for thinking about the future of humanity. As a result of doing so (cf. 
chapter 1), our visions of the future are reduced to purely technical ones. By focusing on catastrophe 
and destruction, humanity is mentally transformed into an optimisation process to the effect that the 
notions ‘future of humanity’ and ‘future of technology’ become undistinguishable.  
 Arguably, all of the above listed reasons might have played a role in Heidegger’s decision not 
to seriously ponder the problem of human extinction in its own right. What is clear in any case, is 
that, at no point in his writings, he indicates that he considered the preservation of human life a cause 
worth struggling for. Whether that was because of a thoroughly fatalistic perspective on political 
action in a technological age, out of fear that it would deliver him over to technological thinking, or 
because he simply did not really care - what matters for the purposes of this thesis is that Heidegger 
did not do so. His holistic treatment of technology, his abstraction by essentialisation, meant that he 
brushed over the particular problem of the threat to the continued existence of the species.  
 We thus find ourselves confronted with a curious situation. In both, existential risk research 
and Heidegger’s thought, technology occupies a similar role and emerges as an, at heart, existential 
problem, as intrinsically and inexorably intertwined with humanity’s destiny. But, on the one hand, 
existential risk theory does not take technology philosophically seriously, making it blind to the 
dilemmas and paradoxes of ‘technology as destiny’, whilst Heidegger, on the other hand,  transforms 
the problem of technology into a matter that is entirely out of humanity’s reach, and does not take the 
problem of human extinction seriously, treating it, if at all, merely as derivative of the wider problem 
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 Accordingly, we find on both sides a near-complete neglect of the other sides’ concerns. 
Heidegger’s conception of technology as a metaphysical force meant that he did not allow himself to 
acknowledge the need for purposeful, organised action and the positive role technology might play in 
the face of total catastrophe. Existential risk researchers, on the other hand, for whom technology is a 
tool that might allow humanity to escape its otherwise naturally preordained destruction, abstract 
from the kind of fears that Heidegger entertained, fears associated with problems such as 
thoughtlessness, objectlessness and standing reserve, not least because, from their point of view, all 
of these threats, even if one were to take them seriously, would have to be considered secondary as 
compared to the threat of existential catastrophe.  
In the next chapter I will turn to philosophers who occupy a position between these two poles 
and might provide us with a basis for developing a more nuanced perspective on the wider context of 








The first chapter argued that in existential risk theory, the future is framed in such a way that 
technology emerges as humanity’s destiny. It is only through a continuous extension of humanity’s 
technological capacities and a technological transformation of the human condition that humankind 
can be expected to survive in the long run. The motif of ‘technology as destiny’ suggests that the 
phrases ‘future of humanity’ and ‘future of technology’ become for all practical purposes 
interchangeable. The preceding, second chapter surveyed Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. 
According to Heidegger’s ‘Question Concerning Technology’, the essence of technology itself is 
nothing technological but, rather, a destining of being; Namely a way in which reality reveals itself to 
us. Understood this way technology has an inherently challenging and ultimately all-encompassing 
dynamic. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology frames ‘technology as destiny’ and therefore can be 
said to correspond with existential risk theory in that regard.  
 In sum, Heidegger’s account of technology enables a critical reflection of existential risk 
theory as part of a temporally extended, philosophical effort to come to terms with the ultimate 
possibilities of technology’s ideational and material hold over modern humankind. Heidegger’s 
philosophy provides us with, as it were, a conceptual toolkit to embed existential risk theory 
conceptually and historically, and a counterpoint to reflect about what ‘technology as destiny’, 
fleshed out in terms of standing-reserve, might actually mean: an objectless world of perpetual 
mobilisation for no conceivable purpose. 
At the same time, as was explained in Chapter 2, a concern for the survival of the human 
species appears to be absent from Heidegger’s thought, despite an evident awareness of the threat 
that nuclear weapons posed to humanity’s survival. At no point did Heidegger call for political action 
against nuclear armament. He did not even single out nuclear weaponry as a technology that would 
warrant special philosophical attention. Such absences stem from his holistic treatment of 
technology, whereby thinking about the future of humanity in terms of survival, catastrophe and 
doom, were considered by Heidegger to be technological behaviour that could only result in 
‘delivering us over’ to technology. Existential risk research, for which thinking in terms of doom, 
catastrophe, and survival is its very raison d’être, inadvertently allows us to see what Heidegger 
might have had in mind – technology emerges as the only path forwards. Confronted with an aporetic 
ending, with the choice between doom in the form of a threat to the human species, and doom in 
form of a threat to humanity’s Being, Heidegger appeared to have succumbed to fatalism - a deeply 
apolitical, even anti-political, retreat to thought and, in effect, pure presentism.  
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Heidegger’s students Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders (on whose work I will focus in 
what follows), certainly did not follow Heidegger’s neglectful treatment of the possibility of a 
nuclear catastrophe. Arendt and Anders appropriated many features of Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology. But they neither wholly abandoned their belief in human agency, nor did they accept that 
the precariousness faced by humanity - epitomised in the nuclear arms race between East and West - 
could be explained in terms of unfolding epochs of being, i.e. under total abstraction from political, 
social, psychological, or economic realities. 
 As Waseem Yaqoob (2014) notes, Arendt believed that Heidegger “could grasp world-
historical processes, but not the political character of the ‘world’ that was in the process of being lost. 
Rather than treating science and technology in terms of unfolding essences, Arendt sought to stress 
their contingent development as part of a parable about the unpredictability of human action”.340 
Additionally, Arendt was, to put it in Seyla Benhabib’s (2003) influential formulation, a “reluctant 
modernist”, who did not wholly break with the humanism of the Enlightenment, as Heidegger had 
done, nor did she wholly forsake her belief in the potential healing powers of politics. 341 Anders 
differs from Heidegger along similar lines. Like Arendt, he observed that “interest in moral or 
political participation or action […] has become extinct in Heidegger's philosophy. The only thing, 
the ‘Dasein’ takes into its own hands, is the Dasein itself; each individual in his individual hands - in 
spite of the world”.342  
 The differences between Heidegger and his students with regards to human agency are 
particularly noticeable with regards to the nuclear bomb and the problem of human extinction. For 
Arendt and Anders the nuclear bomb highlighted the exponentially increased powers of political 
elites, and thus indicated a monstrous transformation of human agency under modern technological 
conditions. As Steven White puts it, Heidegger “failed to see that the threat of nuclear extermination 
of life shifts the terms of attachment to existence in a fundamental way: the inessentiality of things, 
their precariousness, now has a novel relation to human choice”.343 I have argued in Chapter 2 that, 
for Heidegger, the nuclear bomb was for the most part no more than the materialisation of the 
essence of technology and thus essentially no different from other technological problems. For 
Arendt and Anders, on the other hand, the nuclear bomb in a sense highlighted that the problem of 
technology could not be reduced to an essentialist treatment along the lines of ‘unfolding essences’. 
In a twisted way, the nuclear bomb had re-established human choice and thus agency as a decisive 
factor in humanity’s destiny, both in theory and practice. 
 Faced with the negative omnipotence of human beings (or rather, of the politico-military 
elites) under nuclear conditions, Anders in particular rallied against both, uncritical, technocratic 
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343 White, S. (2000), p. 28. 
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interaction with technology, as well as against Heideggerian fatalism, denouncing, in effect, the one 
as irresponsibly thoughtless and the other as irresponsibly intellectualistic. In his personal notes on 
Heidegger, collected in Über Heidegger, Anders expresses his deep frustration with Heidegger’s 
treatment of the nuclear question: 
 
“In his second phase, just as in Being and Time […], Heidegger locates a momentous guilt at the 
origin of everything. A guilt that is no guilt – a guilt which needs to be atoned for by reclaiming 
being, the remembrance of being, a remembrance on which the destiny of the occident depends, 
indeed, the destiny of the entire new era. Such momentous moral tasks he gives himself […] Such a 
task. In times of camps and of ‘the bomb’. Where the real tasks are to change beings, not being, to 
secure human beings that are, not being; at this point, suddenly, for him, whatever happens […] 
turns into a destining of being. The gruesome things that happen are a destining and one does not 
oppose destining; rather, one focuses all one’s energies on attacking an allegedly far greater evil, 
the guilt of the forgetfulness of being –  the disgrace; to fight it with all one’s might, a struggle 
which is exclusively concerned with keeping thinking about being alive, which otherwise threatens 
to withdraw itself, this – oh this, in his eyes, is a fight that is much more than a deed that merely 
changes the world, it is world-transformation qua actus. Sure, he does vaguely touch upon specific, 
moral defects of the time. But all of them are nothing but symptoms of the oblivion of being. That 
is, of the ‘Fall of Man’”.344 
 
It is important to note that Anders here does not necessarily express disagreement with Heidegger’s 
analysis, instead protesting Heidegger’s intellectualistic passivism and his associated recipe for 
dealing with the modern human condition: to develop Gelassenheit (‘releasement-towards-things’), 
namely to focus on one’s own mental sanity in spite of all of the factual and potential tragedies that 
(nuclear) technology held in stock for humankind. Anders’ own philosophy is the exact opposite, a 
decades-lasting, deeply political rallying cry against nuclear weapons and modern humanity’s naïve 
and paradoxical treatment of technology, both in thought and action. In doing so, Anders highlighted 
the momentous importance of political activism (understood as an offshoot of human imagination 
and human agency) in the 20th century, so as to ‘recapture technology’ and re-emancipate humanity. 
                                               
344 See Anders, G. (2001), pp. 299-300, translated by the author. The original text reads as follows: “Wie 
immer man diese Fragen beantwortet, entscheidend ist, daß H. genau wie in ‚Sein und Zeit‘ (das er mit dem 
verächtlichen, an das Zuhandene ‚verfallene‘ Dasein begonnen hatte) auch nun, in seiner zweiten Phase, eine 
ungeheure moralische Schuld, die keine ist, an den Anfang stellt - eine Schuld, die angeblich auf ebenso 
ungeheure Weise getilgt werden müsse wie, und zwar durch Rückgewinnung des Seins, durch das Andenken 
an das Sein, durch ein Andenken von dem das weitere Geschick des Abendlandes, ja das neue Zeitalter 
abhänge. So ungeheure (freilich durchweg durch das Denken zu lösende) moralische Aufgaben stellt er sich 
diese Aufgabe. In einer Zeit der Lager und der Bombe. Denn wo die wirklichen Aufgaben liegen, die 
Aufgaben, die darin bestehen, Seiendes, nicht Sein, zu verändern; seiende Menschen, nicht Sein zu retten; da 
wird für ihn plötzlich alles, was geschieht - ob es nun, wie in der Rektoratsrede oder der in diesem Jahre 
veröffentlichten Metaphysischen Einführung, der Nationalsozialismus, oder im Humanismusbrief, ganz 
vorübergehend (man kann es nie wissen) der Marxismus -, ein Seinsgeschick. Die elenden Dinge, die 
passieren, sind Seinsgeschick, ihm oponiert man nicht; statt dessen hämmert man los auf eine angeblich viel 
gewaltigere Schuld, eben die Seinsvergessenheit - sie ist eine Schande; und gegen sie mit aller Verwegenheit 
den Kamp auszufechten, einen Kampf, der ausschließlich im Denken an das sich entziehende Sein besteht, das 
- oh, das ist in seinen Augen weit mehr als eine "Handlung", die nur die Welt verändert, das ist qua actus die 
Weltveränderung. Gewiß, auch gewissen moralischen, vage formulierten Defekten der Zeit gedenkt er. Aber 
sie alle sind nichts anderes als Folgen der Seinsvergessenheit. Also des Sündenfalls”.  
 
 91 
 However, for the purposes of this chapter it is less the precise nature of Arendt’s and Anders’ 
politics that matters, than the ways in which it influenced their philosophical analysis of the nuclear 
threat. What makes them interesting for the purposes of this thesis is that they constitute a middle 
ground between Heidegger and existential risk theory. As explained in previous chapters, through 
existential risk theory the problem of technology becomes invisible in normative and theoretical 
terms due to its instrumental conception of technology. In turn, in Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology technology assumes a position of such overpowering significance that everything else 
becomes invisible, leaving no room for human agency or an appreciation of the unique philosophical 
implications of the problem of human extinction. 
 Arendt and Anders are between the two poles. They agreed with Heidegger that modern 
technology is much more than a mere collection of neutral tools that can be used for good or bad but 
needs to be understood as something that is deeply entangled with and affects the particular way in 
which humans exist, perceive and act in the world. Like Heidegger, they can be said to have wanted 
to make technology visible as a force that shapes modern human existence. Accordingly, many 
aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, in particular his phenomenological approach, are 
reflected in their work. At the same time, their thought diverges from Heidegger’s holistic treatment 
of the modern human condition on many levels. It is united with existential risk theorists in a deep 
and practical concern for the survival of humanity. Anders’ language in particular is characterised by 
a comparably alarmist tone, stressing the imminent importance of action to avert the worst. But what 
is arguably most important for the purposes of this thesis, is that their non-holistic perspective on 
human existence on the one hand side, and their phenomenologically schooled, critical perspective 
on technology on the other hand side, allowed them to discuss the problem of (what we now call) 
existential risk as part of a complex transformation of the human condition in the present.  
 According to Arendt and Anders the new negative omnipotence of modern humans, the 
monstrously inflated levels of human responsibility under nuclear conditions had transforming 
implications for the human condition of their own, they directly affected what it meant to be human. 
Apart from embodying the nihilistic essence of the technological understanding of being, it 
confronted humanity with a new perspective on its existence and thus a new sense of being-in-the-
world. Heidegger curiously missed that idiosyncratic phenomenological effect of the spectre of total 
annihilation. He did not investigate if and how it might affect what he calls Being, the human way of 
being-in-the-world. Anders’ thought on the other hand, and we can also include Arendt’s here (at 
least where it is concerned with nuclear weapons), can be read as a meditation on the transformation 
of Being under nuclear conditions, or, as Babich (2013) phrases it, “the phenomenological effects of 
the end-time”.345 
 Above all, humanity’s power to destroy itself meant to them that humanity had lost its 
                                               
345 Babich, B. (2013a), p. 152. 
 92 
innocence. Our idea of humanity had been transformed from one in which we could safely assume to 
be part of an open-ended community of generations into one where, suddenly, we had to think of 
humanity as mortal and of the future as a space that no longer came of its own but had to be 
‘produced’.346 The nuclear bomb meant that the existence of the or, rather, any future at all could no 
longer be taken for granted and was dependent on decisions made in the present. To them this 
implied that humanity was deprived of central conditions that used to structure human life and 
shaped our categories of thought. Arendt for instance highlights the monstrous transformation of 
politics, and thus a vital aspect of how she understood the human condition, once infused with, what 
she calls, ‘the radical evil’ or ‘all-or-nothing’ questions. What Arendt and Anders have in common is 
the idea that humanity had therewith entered a schizophrenic age. In spite of the multiple ways in 
which their thought diverts from Heidegger’s, Heidegger’s characterisation of the technological 
understanding of being – the idea that modern technology is rooted in, expressive of, and conducive 
to the expansion of, a particular ontological condition or attitude to being, which differs categorically 
from how phenomenal reality reveals itself naturally to our consciousness -  is of enormous 
importance if we are to understand their analysis of the transformative implications of the nuclear 
age, i.e. of the emergence of existential risk. 
 Part of what I want to show in this chapter is that existential risk theory can be understood as 
indicating a further complication of the situation Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders had been 
writing about. Whilst these authors were confronted with one existential risk, i.e. the possibility of an 
all-out nuclear war, existential risk theory highlights that we are now facing several risks that are 
comparable in scope. I.e. when according to Anders the bomb was ‘ontologically unique’,347 this has 
now changed. I argue, that therefore, with existential risk theory, our conception on the future 
changes again and becomes in some ways more complicated than the one that the above authors 
described. What is new about existential risk theory, as was discussed in Chapter 1, is not so much 
that it takes the possibility of human extinction seriously. Arendt and Anders already did that and 
arguably they took it much more seriously than existential risk researchers do today. What is new 
about existential risk theory is the way in which the concept frames our perspective on the future, 
namely as a technological optimisation problem, where we are encouraged to arbitrate different 
extinction risks against one another and to develop a perspective on the future akin to that of a 
minefield, a space which needs to be scanned and mapped, where we must carefully consider each 
and every step we make in order to survive for any considerable amount of time.348 
 As will be outlined in this chapter, this is a perspective that differs in various respects from 
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that of Arendt and Anders. This, however, does not mean the latter’s analyses of how the threat to 
humanity’s future affects us in the present should be considered outdated. On the contrary, I intend to 
demonstrate that existential risk theory in many respects underscores their respective analyses’ 
ongoing relevance. The fact, for instance, that all risks, anthropogenic and natural are turned 
technological optimisation problems echoes Arendt’s observation that history and nature are in the 
process of becoming one owing to progress in modern science and technology. 
 In sum, Anders’ and Arendt’s works provide us with a suitable touchstone to further embed 
existential risk theory in traditions of thought about the problematic relationship between modern 
technology, human agency and human value. They are much closer to the concerns of existential risk 
researchers than Heidegger in so far as they did take the risk of human extinction (or ‘the nuclear 
question’) seriously not only as a topic of philosophical investigation but also in political terms. At 
the same time, they were heavily influenced by Heidegger in so far as they understood that risk as 
resulting from and embodying a peculiar Western technological mindset or, as Heidegger put it, ‘a 
revolution in philosophical concepts’, that was ripe with dangerous and self-defeating pretensions of 
the possibility of mastery. Like Heidegger, they saw the possibility that, for as long as the underlying 
mindset was not challenged, the spectre of extinction would turn out to foster rather than weaken 
these pretensions and translate into an even stronger hold of technological rule over modern 
humanity. However, since they did not think about history in terms of unfolding metaphysical 
essences, they did not wholly forsake their believe in human agency. They conceived of the 
technological mindset as part and parcel of the political predicament of the day and something that 
needed to be engaged with both philosophically and politically. Since they had not wholly forsaken 
their belief in human agency and reason, they made it their mission to pinpoint exactly how and 
where the technological mindset leaves its mark in everyday and political practice, with what 
consequences, and why it cannot deliver what it promises.  
Since the limited scope of this chapter does not allow for a comprehensive discussion of the 
role of science and technology in the works of Arendt and Anders, in the following I proceed by 
connecting existential risk research to four individual key-motifs in Arendt’s and Anders’ thought. 
Accordingly, the chapter is divided in four sections. The title of each section refers to the respective 
motif in Arendt or Anders works which forms the pillar of the discussion. These are, in order of 
appearance, ‘Promethean shame’, ‘technology as action’, ‘all-or-nothing or the radical evil’, and 
finally ‘collective schizophrenia’. In each section I begin by briefly introducing and elaborating on a 
key theme in existential risk theory that is either explicitly discussed in the literature or that I have 
identified as implicit to it in my previous analyses. I then relate the thus established theme to the 
above motifs in Arendt’s and Anders’ thought. Sometimes the order is reversed with Arendt’s, or 
Anders’ work providing the vantage point of the discussion.  
The concept of Promethean shame is a centre piece of Anders’ philosophy of technology. It 
brings Heidegger’s argument that the technological danger to humanity as a species cannot be 
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separated from the danger to humanity’s humanness ‘down to earth’, as Babette Babich puts it, by 
demonstrating how in our every-day interaction with it, technology has replaced the human as the 
measure of things. The concept of ‘technology as action’ can be seen as the cornerstone of Arendt’s 
criticism of the instrumental conception of technology. It firmly embeds her in what Langdon Winner 
calls the ‘anti-mastery tradition’ of philosophy of technology, both highlighting that she was already 
attune to the generalised concerns about technology familiar from existential risk theory and 
providing us with a starting point for critical reflection about the policy recommendations in 
existential risk theory.349 ‘The radical evil’ can be seen as Arendt’s term for what we nowadays call 
existential risk. Both Arendt and Anders were no less concerned about the possibility of human 
extinction than existential risk researchers are today. However, as the concept of the ‘radical evil’ 
allows us to establish, Arendt’s and Anders’ main concern was with how the emergence of the 
spectre of self-annihilation affected humanity in the present, rather than seeing it simply as a threat to 
the future, and what this tells us about the role of technology in our lives. These types of reflections 
are largely absent from existential risk research. The motif of ‘the schizophrenic condition of modern 
existence’, lastly, brings the discussion back onto the ontological level introduced in the preceding 
chapter. Both Arendt and Anders shared Heidegger’s view that the challenges stemming from 
modern technology have their roots in an ontological clash between what Heidegger terms the 
‘technological understanding of being’ and the natural way in which things show themselves to our 
consciousness. This clash is what ultimately sustains ‘Promethean shame’, ‘technology as action’ and 
the ‘radical evil’. 
I close the chapter with a concluding section where these discussions are brought together in 
order to discern some general take-away points on what the established connection between 
existential risk theory and aspects of Arendt’s and Anders’ work entails for our perspective on 
existential risk theory.  Generally speaking, Arendt and Anders can be seen as united in an effort to 
‘think through’ and interpret the relationship between technology and human affairs under conditions 
of what I have earlier called ‘existential pressure’. As we have seen, Heidegger escaped from facing 
that pressure by placing the blame on the history of being itself, effectively converting it into a 
question of fate.350 Existential risk researchers can also be said to escape the problems posed by 
‘existential pressure’. By embracing a purely technical perspective, such researchers transform the 
problem into an ostensibly manageable one. However, in doing so, this approach evades the difficult 
questions that existential risk confronts us with. In particular, the methodology of existential risk 
researchers detaches itself from a variety of ontologically rooted complications that need to be taken 
into account if we truly are to ‘take existential risk seriously’. Arendt’s and Anders’ thought allows 
us to bring those out.   
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Phil Torres, director of the FHF and research associate at the FLI, recently published two papers 
entitled respectively ‘Agential risks and information hazards: An unavoidable but dangerous topic?’ 
and ‘Who Would Destroy the World? Omnicidal Agents and Related Phenomena’.351 In both papers 
Torres discusses the same question: how can humanity survive the dissemination of access to 
“advanced dual use technologies” across society in the coming centuries? Torres observes two trends 
in contemporary technological development: First, technology is becoming increasingly powerful in 
many sensitive areas. Second, technology is at the same time becoming increasingly accessible for a 
growing user base. For Torres, these trends imply that increasingly destructive technological 
capabilities are bound to disseminate across society in the future. The logical conclusion for Torres is 
that access to weapons of mass destruction – including ‘weapons of total destruction’ (WTDs) – will 
no longer be limited to actors with the financial and organisational resources of nation states but will 
eventually be available to non-state actors such as terrorist groups or even single individuals.  
 The production of military grade nuclear bombs for instance requires the concerted efforts of 
hundreds, if not thousands in scientific personnel; large-scale infrastructure; the development of 
global supply chains; as well as the investment of hundreds of millions of US dollars. In contrast, 
Torres believes that such might not be the case for ‘dual-use emerging technologies’:  
 
“CRISPR/Cas-9, base editing, digital-to-biological converters, nanotechnology, drones (e.g., 
“slaughterbots”), SILEX (i.e., separation of uranium isotopes by laser excitation) […] are not 
only enabling humanity to manipulate and rearrange the physical world, for better or worse, in 
unprecedented ways, but placing this power in the hands of more and more states, groups, and 
even lone wolves”.352  
 
If this scenario were to materialise, Torres claims, it would become virtually inevitable that 
existential risk levels would be inflated beyond anything conceivable today since “the probability of 
any given individual pressing a ‘doomsday button’ does not need to be very high per century for an 
existential catastrophe to be more or less certain” if the number of individuals with access to that 
button is sufficiently large.353  
 Such fearful expectations, identifying an omnicidal tendency inherent to the democratization 
of technological power, are not exactly new.354 However, there is presently a renewed interested in 
                                               
351 Torres, P. (2017a, 2017c). 
352 Torres, P. (2017a). 
353 Ibid, p. 1. 
354 A prominent earlier articulation of this concern can be found for instance in Bill Joy’s widely read article 
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the problem due to existential risk research. This trend is for instance encapsulated in CSER’s 
mission statement which warns that future “technologies might provide direct and relatively short-
term control over circumstances essential to our survival, and place that control in dangerously few 
human hands”.355 Another example is Wittes’ and Blum’s 2015 volume The Future of Violence: 
Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones: Confronting a New Age of Threat, where the authors 
identify the underlying problem as that of technological ‘mass empowerment’: 
 
“in our modern age . . . new technologies are able to generate and channel mass empowerment, 
allowing small groups and individuals to challenge states and other institutions of traditional 
authority in ways that used to be the province only of other states. They are growing 
increasingly cheap and available. They defy distance and other physical obstacles. And, 
ultimately, they create the world of many-to-many threats, a world in which every individual, 
group, or state has to regard every other individual, group, or state as at least a potential security 
threat”.356 
 
Bruce Schneier of the FHF and head of (cyber-)security at IBM states in a similar vein that “sooner 
or later, the technology will exist for a hobbyist to explode a nuclear weapon, print a lethal virus 
from a bio-printer, or turn our electronic infrastructure into a vehicle for large-scale murder”.357 
Andrew Snyder-Beattie of the FHI, discusses this problem in an article published in the Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists entitled ‘Small Groups, Dangerous Technology: Can They be Controlled?’.358 
And, to give one last example, Eliezer Yudkowsky of MIRI summarises these concerns in what he 
calls ‘Moore’s Law of Mad Science’: “every eighteen months, the minimum IQ necessary to destroy 
the world drops by one point”.359 
In the light of such looming technological ‘mass empowerment’ or ‘universal unilateralism’, 
Torres posits whether there is an “increasingly pressing question of who would destroy the world if 
only the means were available”? 360 In other words, Torres claims that it is increasingly important to 
focus not on technologies and how to make them safer, but on “the users who would exploit them for 
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CSER wants to convey is that the risk stems from the fact that fewer hands will be required to wield the kind of 
technological powers that formerly required the cooperation of ‘many hands’. i.e. large-scale organizational 
efforts, as in the case of nuclear technology.  
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bad ends”.361 In order to capture this shift in perspectives Torres proposes to introduce a new 
category of existential risk, namely ‘agential risks’, defined as “risks posed by any agent who could 
initiate an existential catastrophe in the presence of sufficiently powerful dual-use technologies”. 362 
‘Agential risk research’ would, according to Torres, focus not on horizon scanning, 
differential technological development, safety engineering, etc., but on identifying groups and 
individuals, that might express “omnicidal, mass genocidal, anti-civilizational, or apocalyptic 
beliefs/desires”.363 Torres thus sets out to identify and categorise beliefs, desires and mindsets, of 
which he believes that they might result in a willingness to “to exploit current and future 
technologies to bring about an existential catastrophe”. 364 On balance he appears to be most 
concerned by what he calls ‘apocalyptic terrorists’ who entertain ‘active-cataclysmic modes of 
believes’ (individuals who consider themselves as active parts in a wider eschatological narrative) 
because such forms of apocalypticism have repeatedly resulted in large scale violence in the recent 
past.365 Torres lists for instance the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attacks by Japanese doomsday-cult 
Aum Shinrikyo, whose adherents hoped to trigger a third World War, or specific forms of Islamic 
apocalypticism that played a critical role in the eschatological narratives entertained by Daesh.366  
Torres argues that a “book’s-worth of examples could be adduced to show just how common across 
space and time, geography and history, violent apocalyptic movements have been”,367 and concludes 




The motif of ‘agential risk’ and related concepts such as ‘universal unilateralism’ or ‘technological 
mass-empowerment’ resonate deeply with the centre piece of Günther Anders’ philosophy of 
technology: ‘Promethean shame’. These concepts therewith underscore, as will be demonstrated in 
the following paragraphs, the striking actuality and analytical force of Anders’ theses on the 
‘obsolescence of the human being’ in the context of existential risk theory. 
Given the instrumental conception of technology in existential risk theory, ‘agential risk’ has 
the benefit of focusing our attention on what, necessarily emerges as the ultimate source of 
existential risk: malicious intent, good versus evil, or ignorance. In other words, the whole human 
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predicament.369 Only rarely is it expressed as clearly as by Wittes and Blum in their approving 
invocation of Microsoft security chief Nathan Myhrvold, who argues that “most people now will use 
new biotechnologies to prevent disease; a few will use them to cause it […] technology contains no 
inherent moral directive -it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil.” 370 As we have 
seen, if technology is defined neutrally, i.e. as mere instruments that can be used for good or for ill, 
the risk necessarily lies with the human using or designing the technology and thus comes down to 
ignorance or ill intend. Torres hence presents as findings what is built into the assumptions of 
existential risk theory. As discussed in chapter 2, the problem of the neutrality thesis is that it makes 
technology invisible on a normative level. The problem, in all cases, is not technology, but humans: 
human unpredictability, human faultiness, human propensity for violence and warfare, human lack in 
prescience, etc. Technology itself, from this perspective, remains benign.  
 The relationship between humanity and technology that results from this perspective is the 
subject of Günther Anders’ main work Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (the ‘obsolescence of the 
human being’).371 The central component of Anders’ philosophy of technology is the concept of 
‘Promethean Shame’, captured perhaps most vividly in his re-phrasing of the tale of Icarus: “If only”, 
Anders argues, “his wings could drop Icarus as ballast – they would be free to conquer the skies”.372  
Most generally understood, Promethean shame denotes a feeling of inferiority vis-à-vis the 
perceived perfection of technology in comparison with which humans begin to conceive of 
themselves as “faulty constructions”.373 The saying by Protagoras that ‘man is the measure of all 
things’, Anders argues, has lost its validity in the machine age where technology has become the 
point of reference for how we conceive of ourselves and the world in general.374 Only by elevating 
the category of the machine as universally valid and exhaustive, Anders claims, the non-constructed 
can even begin to appear as ‘faultily constructed’. Promethean shame thus indicates that humanity 
has acknowledged the superiority of the machine and begins to confuse the machine’s needs for its 
own.375 There are echoes here of Heidegger’s great danger, that humanity might deliver itself over to 
technology. In a similar fashion to Heidegger’s concept of Enframing, Anders’ Promethean shame 
implies that the project of scientific and technological progress is inherently un-anthropocentric, 
even anti-anthropocentric. It is not the human that occupies centre stage but technology itself.  
But how does that come about? How is it that modern technology has become the measure of 
all things?  Anders lists a variety of potential sources of this feeling. One is “the shame of having 
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been born instead of having been made”.376 Anders identifies a deep sense of forlornness at the heart 
of modern human existence and a resultant, almost pathological desire to remake the human 
condition, to turn it into something artificial in order to finally have an explanation, no matter how 
arbitrary, for why things are one way and not another. 377 Hannah Arendt, in the preface of The 
Human Condition, similarly claims that modern man appears to be possessed by the desire to escape 
“human existence as it has been given, a gift free from nowhere (secularly speaking)” and to 
exchange it “for something he has made himself”.378 However, apart from such existentialist analyses 
of the desire to ground human existence by technological means, Anders demonstrates 
authoritatively, how Promethean shame results from our practical, everyday interaction with 
technology, which I focus on in the following sections.  
I have argued in chapter 2 that our conventional conception of technology renders it 
normatively invisible and therefore effectively as something inherently positive because what remains 
as its only defining quality is that it expands our option-set, which is generally considered to be 
something desirable. Anders goes further than that. He argues that our understanding of technology 
as a neutral means to an end, translates into a situation where technology has become our idea of 
perfection. Our conception of technology as a neutral means implies that we, at any given point in 
time, conceptualise technology as potentially perfect, whilst faultiness is reserved for the human 
being. When we project ourselves into the future, making technology our benchmark, we thus see a 
world of potential perfection, where all options technology can in principle provide us with have 
been realised and make that vision the benchmark, the point of reference, for thinking about future 
and present. The implication is that we ourselves are constantly rendered the saboteurs of our own 
products, for, if it were not for our faultiness as engineers or users, these could yield perfect results. 
Anders’ allegory of Icarus illustrates the underlying idea rather well. If it had not been for Icarus’s 
hubris (or for Daedalus’s bad design choices) the wings, as an idea or, to put it in Bostrom’s words, 
as a ‘technological capability’ (see Chapter 1, p. 40), namely the capability of flying, could in 
principle have conquered the skies. 
Anders hence inverts the perspective on the neutrality thesis – his question is no longer, at 
least not in the main: what does the neutrality thesis imply for how we view technology and its risks? 
Rather, he asks: what does the neutrality thesis imply for how we see ourselves? Promethean shame 
is felt in response to the machine. The effect Anders achieves with this simple shift in perspectives is 
remarkable and I think it comes out very clearly in above discourses about agential risk. The problem 
is that when we portray machines as neutral tools we make their potential, which is prima facie 
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limitless, the measure of things and feel ashamed for not being able to realise it, blaming it on human 
faultiness.  
In the context of existential risk, as Anders makes clear in his discussions of the nuclear 
bomb, Promethean shame assumes a wholly new quality. For Anders we have erected a world of 
machines around us, which is premised on the idea of perfection and therewith we have created a 
new reality in which we no longer only feel as imperfect and faulty constructions vis-à-vis the 
machine but truly have become imperfect, faulty constructions in view of the requirements of the 
times: 
 
“Man […] in the midst of all the products he is producing, with his body that was the same 
millennia ago, seems not only outdated but hopelessly left behind. Promethean shame, the 
referral to machines as the measure of judgement in self-reflection and one another, implies the 
total rejection of anything given including of ourselves as givens. We become smaller than 
ourselves, because we are no longer on an equal footing with our own products”.379 
 
The above discussion of ‘agential risk’ illustrates Anders’ fears closely. Technological progress is 
seen as a given, technology as neutral (‘dual-use’) and therefore the need for adjustment comes to 
rest on humanity, to such an extent in fact that the faulty, unpredictable, nature of humankind is 
beginning to be rendered a liability too large to bear. Anders therefore identified in humanity the 
longing to ‘flee into the camp of its machines’ – a point strongly echoing what Heidegger considers 
as the great danger of course, the idea that ultimately humanity would turn into ‘standing reserve’, 
into a product and a technological optimisation problem itself – to become as faultless and 
predictable as machines in order to live up to the requirements of the artificial world it had created. 
Promethean shame thus ultimately amounts to the longing to become a fabricated thing, to be freed 
from the constraints and limitations of ones given, embodied human existence and become one with 
the dynamic world of machines so that its enormous potential can be realised without human nature 
sabotaging the project.380  
 We see exactly that dynamic playing out in contemporary discourses surrounding agential 
risk. Martin Rees for instance hypotheses about potential futures in which pre-crime interventions of 
the type depicted in the science fiction film Minority Report might become both necessary due to 
‘agential-risk’ as well as feasible due to advances in genetics and physiology which might help us 
identify potential high-risk individuals: “If our propensities are indeed determined by genetics and 
physiology […] then identifying potential criminals may soon not require psychic powers. There will 
then be growing pressures to institute this kind of pre-emptive action in the real world, as a safeguard 
against the outrages - ever more calamitous with each technical advance - that could be wrought even 
by one delinquent individual”.381  Torres speaks about the potential necessity to employ technological 
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bio- and moral enhancement measures in order to manage ‘agential risk’, i.e. in order to make 
humanity safe for the technological advances lying ahead.382 Bostrom (2013) speaks about the 
necessity to introduce global surveillance systems and perhaps even ‘mind-control’ in order to reduce 
the potential risks associated with emerging technologies,383 and Oxford ethicists Ingmar Persson and 
Julian Savulescu argue that, since “the expansion of scientific knowledge and technological prowess 
will put in the hands of an increasing number of  people weapons of mass destruction”, there is an 
“urgent imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity”. One idea they entertain is that of 
artificial moral enhancement in form of specific drugs or genetical interventions. This, they argue, 
might for instance be necessary in order to mitigate climate change. 384 
There could be no clearer illustration of Promethean shame hence – what ‘agential risk’ 
amounts to is a complete inversion of means and ends. Whereas technology has always been 
considered to be a means in the service of humanity, now humanity must instrumentalise itself in 
order to keep the machine going, it turns into, as Anders claims, a gadget for gadgets.385 Humanity 
has to adjust itself in accordance with technology in order to make sure that it can function as well as 
it potentially could. The machine could, as we have seen, potentially, function perfectly and it is 
required of the human to adapt physically, politically and in whatever way necessary so that this 
limitless potential of the machine can be realised. This boomerang effect of technology, as Anders 
allows us to see, is implicit to concepts such as ‘dual use’ or ‘neutrality’. We begin to look antiquated 
and unfit for the requirements of our time - for the realities we ourselves have created ostensibly for 
our own good. At first our imperfections might have seemed merely regrettable to the utopian 
techno-fetishist, in future, in times of ‘universal unilateralism’, according to existential risk 
reseachers, they may become unacceptable. Our needs have become the needs of technology. 
 Anders critique of the neutrality thesis thus is based on the insight that it makes us ask the 
wrong questions. For Anders the relevant question was: What does modern technology do to us 
simply by virtue of its existence, what does it imply for how we see ourselves and the world around 
us? What Anders saw was that we are erecting a world in which there is no place for the unmodified 
human being – no place for human imperfection because we implicitly make projected perfection in 
the form of technology the benchmark for our interaction with the natural world and ourselves.  
This, in turn, opens up new perspectives on the old problem of technology as a rage against 
the given. Carl Schmitt (1991) argues that “the machine is the tool of utopianism, the weapon of plan 
realisation” and therefore inherently hostile to “the human”.386 Heidegger, as we have seen, similarly 
argues that the technological danger is sustained by the “the willed view that man, by the peaceful 
release, transformation, storage, and channelling of the energies of physical nature, could render the 
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human condition, man's being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all respects”,387 and that 
“science (and that is modern natural science) is a road to a happier human life”.388 Both authors 
believed that technological progress was sustained by a perfectionist “revolt against the given”, as 
George Kateb (1997) and Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2009a) put it.389 Typically, criticisms of techno-
perfectionist thinking take the form of rendering it illusionary, i.e. ‘utopian’ in the everyday sense of 
the word. The common concern regarding such forms of utopianism is that the pursuit of perfection 
will not only result in unfulfilled hopes, but that its lack of epistemic humility could lead utopians to 
do more harm than good along the way.390 John Gray (2012) for instance argues in that vein that 
“Instead of enabling humans to improve their lot, science degrades the natural environment in which 
humans must live. Instead of enabling death to be overcome, it produces ever more powerful 
technologies of mass destruction. None of this is the fault of science; what it shows is that science is 
not sorcery. The growth of knowledge enlarges what humans can do. It cannot reprieve them from 
what they are”.391 
 Against the background of existential risk theory, however, the problematic interface 
between utopianism, science and technology gains a novel dimension and Anders’ concept of 
Promethean shame allows us to see which. If utopianism, naively understood, denotes the desire to 
perfect the human condition and human nature, in times of existential risk we are confronted with a 
situation in which humans increasingly can no longer be allowed to be what they are, i.e. in which we 
need to be perfected. If existential risk researchers are correct, we are in the process of creating a 
reality in which we have to be technologically perfected, or at least significantly improved, if we 
want to survive as a species. The problem is no longer that we wish to be reprieved from what we 
are, but that we need to be reprieved from what we are. In Günther Anders’ view, too, technological 
progress is sustained by the desire to overcome chance, contingency and perfect the given. However, 
he allows us to see the irony of this undertaking - that humanity, in chasing technological perfection, 
creates realities in which the quest for perfection and the quest for survival can no longer be 
meaningfully distinguished. This is an extortive form of utopianism, a utopianism where the goal to 
perfect the human condition may have its roots in melioristic hyperbole but ultimately translates into 
and is sustained by fear and real necessities which result from this hyperbole. This irony manifests 
itself in the necessity for humanity to perfect itself because powers have been summoned that are 
premised on the idea of perfection. This turns Heidegger’s claim that the technological danger to 
humanity as a species cannot be separated from the danger to humanity’s humanness, into a more 
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concrete, graspable problem. As Babich (2013) argues, Anders in these kinds of observations brings 
Heidegger’s philosophy “down to earth”.392 
Against this background it becomes clear why, as Müller (2016) accurately points out, in 
Anders’ view, the enlightenment is not a project that aims at emancipating the human but a project 
which “represents an active turn away from, and a faltering trust in, everything human”.393 It means 
that, “as modernity unfolds, we seem to expect ever ‘more from technology and less from each 
other’.394 We hope, for example to stop global warming by developing new, less carbon-intensive 
means of energy generation, or, as an ultima ratio, geo-engineering, whilst our expectation that 
humans will change their increasingly carbon-intensive life-styles, economic growth model, etc., 
appear to be low, to say the least. Or, as we have seen above, we hope to keep ‘universal-
unilateralism’ in check by means of technological moral enhancement or far-reaching systems of 
surveillance. But Anders’ also tells us why this logic is inherently paradoxical. Someone still needs 
to develop such miraculous new technologies, including those intended to perfect the human being. 
Every dream - no matter how far-fetched - about the future capacities of technology simultaneously 
still is a dream about the future capacities of human ingenuity. Anders therefore describes the attitude 
characteristic for modern humanity as ‘hubristic humility’ or ‘arrogant self-degradation’.395 We 
consider ourselves faulty constructions whilst at the same time self-deifying ourselves when we think 
that we can recreate and redesign ourselves and perhaps all of earthly nature to perfection.396 The 
figure of Prometheus, which according to Anders used to be invoked allegorically by authors from 
Goethe to Shelley, Ibsen and Sartre in order to describe the hubristic modern human mindset, 
according to him has lost is allegorical significance: “Our contemporaries”, Anders argues, “are 
certainly still Prometheans, but strangely perverted ones […] They also have presumptuously self-
aggrandising ideas of entitlement - but these are so aggrandising that they begin to feel inadequate 
themselves. They also suffer lacerations – but not because Zeus punishes their high-flying ambitions, 
but because they chastise themselves on account of their own ‘backwardness’ and the shame of 
having been born”.397 
At the bottom of the modern human (technological) predicament Anders hence identified a 
paradoxical cocktail of dynamics and emotions. We want to liberate ourselves from ourselves, from 
our limitations and the givens of nature, not noticing that our retreat to artifice in crucial respects 
produces the opposite effect, exposing us to an ever more problematic extent to our own limitations, 
reinforcing the hopes we place in our capacities and simultaneously highlighting our faultiness. 
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This, in turn, tells us something about the high prominence of debates surrounding artificial 
intelligence in the context of existential risk. As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, 
artificial intelligence is not only seen as a source of existential risk. By many in the field it is also 
seen as the potential solution to our problems. The fact that existential risks are threatening to get out 
of hand and that we increasingly seem to be incapable to control the consequences of technological 
progress results in the hope that a better problem-solver could be technologically produced. This is 
Anders’ Icarus in a nutshell. It is hoped that the technological project can somehow extricate itself 
from its faulty human ballast, which would then leave it free to literally conquer the skies, colonising 
the universe and spreading intelligence on a cosmic level.398 The idea, again, being that technology as 
such, if only we get it exactly right, could yield perfect results, echoing Heidegger’s dictum that "the 
instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation 
with technology. Everything depends on our manipulating technology in a proper manner as a means. 
We will, as we say, […] master it. The will to mastery will become all the more urgent the more 
technology threatens to slip human control".399 The problem of superintelligence, as will be discussed 
at greater length in the following chapter, indeed appears to collapse the issue of Promethean shame 
into a single technological problem. 
However, apart from teaching us something about the instrumental vision of technology and 
the ongoing relevance of Anders’ thought regarding that vision in the context of existential risk, 
Anders’ concept of Promethean shame gives substance to what I have touched upon in the 
introduction of Chapter 2, namely how, in existential risk theory, the terms of human existence are 
drawn into ‘existential space’ and how this begins to transform the human condition and human 
nature into a technological optimisation problem.  
 
3.2 Technology as action 
 
Ultimately, the reason why the terms of human existence are drawn into ‘existential space’ is the 
growing power of our technological tools, which are projected to place ever greater powers in ever 
more hands. The theme of ‘universal unilateralism’ can be seen as the defining theme of 
technological existential risk in general, converging in the fear that human activity, increasingly 
technologically amplified as it is, has become inherently tied up with existential risk. 
 Hannah Arendt’s thinking turns out to be strikingly prescient in that regard. Arendt sought to 
show, as Yaqoob (2014) argues, that modern science and technology should best be understood as 
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part of a “parable about the unpredictability of human action”.400 One of the things Arendt adopted 
from Heidegger was the view that modern technology was radically different from the type of human 
activity that is its etymological root, namely tekné, i.e. the arts and crafts by the means of which 
humans erect what Arendt calls ‘world’, a concept which will be discussed at greater length below. 
Contrary to tekné, the purpose of which for Arendt was the creation of tangible tools and objects, 
such as tables or jewellery, modern technology really was a new type of action, namely “action into 
nature” as well as, action in the form of automation. The emergence of these new forms of action, for 
her was emblematic of a deep and uncanny transformation of the human condition, a transformation 
which we find reflected in existential risk theory but the philosophical implications of which remain 
at large unacknowledged by authors in the field, namely a transformation in which the realms of 
nature and history were in the process of becoming one. For Arendt who was, as Benhabib (2005) 
points out, a humanist, this, as we will see below, was an inherently dangerous process because it 
meant that the spaces which used to provide a stable backdrop for human life were under threat, with 
humanity exposing itself to entirely new risks, of which manmade threats to the survival of the 
species were but one. 
 
History and nature become one - or ‘the altered nature of human action’ 
 
For Arendt, humanity’s existence used to be bracketed rather comfortably between the two separate 
realms of nature and human artifice. Nature, for her, were “all processes that come into being without 
the help of man”, i.e. things that are “not made but grow by themselves into whatever they 
become”.401 The natural thing's existence, she elaborates, is not separate but is “somehow identical 
with the process through which it comes into being.” Human artifice on the other hand must be 
realised step by step and “the fabrication process is entirely distinct from the existence of the 
fabricated thing itself”.402 The hammer or the house is being made with an eye to the finished product 
and the production process itself is exogenous to that product rather than endogenous. The natural 
thing, on the other hand, exists only as a process, as a becoming thing, where process and thing are 
undistinguishable. A tree, for instance, is already contained in the seed, the process of growth is part 
of what ‘tree’ means and when the process stops the ‘tree stops’. Nature, Arendt argues, is the realm 
of never-ending, automatic processes, whereas the human artifice is the realm of willed beginnings 
and definite ends.403  
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That contradistinction between human artifice and nature is central to Arendt’s conception of 
the human ‘world’ which was in the process of being lost at the hands of modern science and 
technology. As Canovan (1995) demonstrates, ‘world’, in Arendt’s thought, is not the natural 
environment or the totality of everything that exists on and constitutes this planet. ‘World’ to Arendt 
meant, on the contrary, the world of human artifice and civilisation, which provides an environment 
where “instead of an ever-changing natural environment, the man-made world of houses, artifacts 
and institutions provides a stable background against which individual lives can show up and have 
significance”.404 When Arendt speaks of world, this can hence be understood in the sense of a ‘home’ 
that humanity builds for itself in order to escape from the never-ending, purposeless processes of 
nature. The most important task of traditional artifice, she argues, is to “offer mortals a dwelling 
place more permanent and more stable than themselves”. 405 
As George Kateb (1997) argues, Arendt was no nature lover.406 She understood the natural 
realm as a realm of free-roaming, metabolic processes and the significance of world, in her eyes, 
consisted precisely in its function to limit and exclude these processes. It provides a backdrop of 
lasting significance for human existence, within which mortals appear and disappear whilst their 
products remain. Homo faber, she argues, “the toolmaker, invented tools and implements in order 
to erect a world”.407 
In Arendt’s view, these contrasts between world and nature, artifact and process, had formed 
a pillar of the human condition and thus of humanity’s self-understanding since the very beginnings 
of civilisation. With the emergence of modern science and technology, however, they were in the 
process of being blurred by two intertwined trends. First, by a trend towards automation, which was 
turning the world of human artifice into a world increasingly resembling the world of ‘automatic’ 
natural processes: “We call automatic all courses of movement which are self-moving and therefore 
outside the range of wilful and purposeful interference.” Superficially viewed, of course, humanly 
initiated and sustained automated processes, such as automated industrial production processes, are 
not ‘outside the range of wilful and purposeful interference’, as they can be stopped at will. However, 
as will be discussed in greater detail below, Arendt, like Anders, argued that, for all theoretically and 
practically relevant purposes, this difference is becoming meaningless. Second, by the growing 
ability of humanity to “act into nature”, by which Arendt means that humanity has acquired the 
ability to start natural processes entirely on its own, the capacity to wilfully unleash processes into 
nature which would otherwise not have come into existence. 
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Arendt, like Heidegger, observed a categorical difference between the ‘ancient arts and 
crafts’ and modern technology. Arts and crafts were dedicated to erect the world of human artifice - 
hence a world of permanence, of tangible objects and things, which would shield humanity from the 
constant changes of nature. It is with tekné that the separation of nature and the human world has 
become possible in the first place. Homo faber, Arendt argues, “used material as nature yields” and 
“changed and denaturalized nature for our own worldly ends, so that the human world or artifice on 
one hand and nature on the other remained two distinctly separate entities”.408  
Modern technology and science, on the other hand, in Arendt’s view could no longer be 
accurately described as a “gigantic enlargement and continuation of the old arts and crafts”. With 
modern technology and science we had begun to “unchain natural processes of our own which would 
never have happened without us, and instead of carefully surrounding the human artifice with 
defences against nature's elementary forces, keeping them as far as possible outside the man-made 
world, we have channelled these forces, along with their elementary power, into the world itself”.409  
Whilst humanity, for most of its history, had merely imitated and interrupted naturally 
occurring processes, that is, repurposed what ‘nature yields’ for its own ends,410 modern 
humanity, according to Arendt, had begun to unleash natural processes of its own. Even if 
humanity was not able to ‘make nature’ in the sense of creation, Arendt argues, “we are quite capable 
of starting new natural processes, and that in a sense therefore we ‘make nature’ to the extent, that is, 
that we ‘make history’”.411 Nuclear technology clearly served as Arendt’s prime example here. With 
nuclear technology she argues, natural forces are let loose that “would never have existed without 
direct interference of human action”.412 In the preface to The Human Condition Arendt distinguishes 
between the modern age and the modern world.  The modern age, she argues, began in the 
seventeenth century and came to an end in the beginning of the twentieth century when the modern 
world was born. The modern world, “was born [politically] with the first atomic explosions”.413 It is 
not immediately clear what exactly Arendt was referring to when she speaks of a ‘political birth date’ 
- if she had in mind simply the birthdate of the atomically supercharged politics of the cold war era or 
a wider and deeper transformation of politics as a result of the confluence of history and nature, 
whereby nature, formerly the realm of independent, automatic processes, was drawn into the realm of 
action through science and technology. Most likely Arendt had both in mind, but in the light of the 
previous discussion, it seems reasonable to suspect that she saw the former mainly as a (monstrous) 
symptom of the latter, bringing out the politically problematic implications of the new world, into 
which humanity had been released by modern science and technology.  
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Hans Jonas, a fellow student of Heidegger and close friend of both Anders and Arendt, can 
be read in parallel when he argues in a section of his Imperative of Responsibility (1984), entitled 
‘'The Universal City as Second Nature', that, owing to technological and scientific progress, all of 
nature is poised to be drawn into the realm of human responsibility: “The boundary between 'city' 
and 'nature' has been obliterated: the city of men, once an enclave in the nonhuman world, spreads 
over the whole of terrestrial nature and usurps its place. The difference between the artificial and the 
natural has vanished, the natural is swallowed up in the sphere of the artificial”.414  
In 2016, the Anthropocene Working Group of the Subcommission on Quarternary 
Stratigraphy proposed to formally adopt the term ‘Anthropocene’ as a geological time unit within the 
Geological Time Scale, at the same hierarchical level as the Pleistocene of the Holocene, for the 
present geological interval of the Earth. According to the working group the Anthropocene 
designates a “period of Earth's history during which humans have a decisive influence on the state, 
dynamics and future of the Earth system”, including for instance on “the chemical composition of the 
atmosphere, oceans and soils, with significant anthropogenic perturbations of the cycles of elements 
such as carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus and various metals”.415 A recent paper published by authors of 
the group further holds that humans are the most significant global geomorphological driving force 
of the 21st Century.416 There could be no better illustration for the transformation Arendt and Jonas 
were observing, the blurring lines between the artificial and the natural and the idea of action into 
nature, than the Anthropocene concept. Against the background of this, it may not be a mere 
coincidence that the Working Group proposes, as Arendt did, to consider the beginning of the nuclear 
age as one potential demarcation point for the beginning of this new epoch.417 
According to Arendt the blurring of boundaries between nature and history was preceded by 
the blurring of these boundaries in the ontological outlook of humanity: “The modern age […] has 
led to a situation where man, wherever he goes, encounters only himself. All the processes of the 
earth and the universe have revealed themselves either as man-made or as potentially man-made”.418 
We know this idea already from Heidegger’s philosophy and his claim that, under the reign of 
‘Enframing’, i.e. the ‘technological understanding of being’, nothing is believed to be able to resist 
the onslaught of calculative thought any longer.  
In existential risk theory we find this mindset reflected vividly. In chapter 2 I have argued 
that, in existential risk theory, every risk, anthropogenic or natural, turns into a technological 
problem and that therefore, to put it in David Deutsch’s words, the distinction between a natural 
disaster and one brought about by ignorance has become ‘parochial’.419 From that perspective, every 
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risk, anthropogenic or natural, is first and foremost a risk of ignorance. Hence, when Arendt argues 
that “wherever we go, we encounter only ourselves”, existential risk theory can not only be seen as a 
pure version of this ontological shift in perspectives but, with it, we might even update Arendt’s 
claim to ‘wherever we go, we encounter only our ignorance’. 
Combining existential risk theory with Arendt’s and Heidegger’s characterisation of the 
modern ontological condition leads us back to what Günther Anders considered to be the defining, 
paradoxical attitude of the modern human being– ‘hubristic humility’ or ‘arrogant self-
degradation’.420 The fact that all the processes of the earth and the universe have revealed themselves 
either as man-made or as potentially man-made, is inherently self-aggrandising. It places us at the 
centre of the universe and  implies that, in principle, if humanity plays its cards right, we could not 
only survive for an indefinite amount of time but have virtually infinite amounts of resources - a 
‘cosmic endowment’ - at its finger-tips.421 In that view, nature, Heidegger argues, “becomes a 
gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry”.422 However, the 
flipside of this mindset is that, due to the fact that wherever we go, we encounter only ourselves, we 
are also responsible for everything that happens, which means that our ignorance, our faultiness as it 
were, emerges as the all-defining problem of our existence. We become the eternal saboteurs of our 
destiny, which, if it were not for our ignorance, could potentially be never-ending.  
For Arendt, however, the problem was that ignorance is not something that can eventually be 
overcome, for instance by careful planning and horizon scanning programs. On the contrary, Arendt 
argued that one effect of our increasing technological powers is that our ignorance on several vital 
dimensions, for instance our prescience and our ability to ‘understand’ the new world we are living 
in, necessarily increases. To the extent that with the help of technology we have become increasingly 
successful in acting in accordance with the technological understanding of being, that is, in remaking 
and repurposing processes of the earth and the universe for human ends, this trend, for Arendt, could 
only result in less control and less prescience, rather than more.  
The reason is that history according Arendt is made up of 'events' and not of the statistically 
predictable developments of collectives. Events, in Arendt's view, are the spontaneous moments, 
where history takes the kind of entirely unexpected, unpredictable turns which tend to be 
remembered and recorded. The occurrence of events are a direct consequence of humanity's plurality 
and its capability for spontaneous action and thus are a defining component of what it means to live 
in a human world. In opening up nature as a field for action too we are therefore poised to make it as 
unpredictable as history: “The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome 
and end of any action is simply that action has no end. The process of a single deed can quite literally 
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endure throughout time until mankind itself has come to an end”.423 Our ability to act into nature thus 
means that we are now able to release never-ending processes with unpredictable consequences into 
nature, just as we used to do in the exclusively human realm.  
The implication of the merging of nature and history is that nature becomes as unpredictable 
as history and therefore that one of the core convictions of the ‘Cartesian’ or ‘Baconian programme’, 
the conviction that science and technology will help us to make nature more controllable, needs to, if 
not be turned on its head, at least notably qualified. Science and technology do not only make nature 
more predictable and more controllable they also make it less predictable because our interference 
with natural processes means that it depends on our action what nature and natural processes will be 
like in 50, 100, or 1000 years’ time. Climate change here can serve as the prime example. Whilst our 
understanding of climatic processes is arguably better than ever before, allowing us to predict 
climatic developments more accurately than previous generations could, fossil fuel combustion at the 
same means that we are acting into the climate system and thereby risk to alter it in unprecedented 
and unpredictable ways.  
What Arendt hence adds to our understanding of existential risk, is that she, as Yaqoob 
(2014) puts it, embedded her analysis of science and technology within her theory of the 
“unpredictability of human action”.424  Action, in Arendt’s vocabulary means starting things, setting 
off trains of events into the open, releasing them into time, without being able to foretell their 
ultimate consequences. With technology turning into a new type of action, the starting of new chains 
of events in nature, humanity is thus, by definition, exposing itself to a new quality of 
unpredictability.425  
Jean Pierre Dupuy for this reason argues that Hannah Arendt “brought out the fundamental 
paradox of our age: whereas the power of mankind to alter its environment goes on increasing under 
the stimulus of technological progress, less and less do we find ourselves in a position to control the 
consequences of our actions”.426 Dupuy here highlights one limit of human understanding in the 
context of science and technology, which is central to Arendt’s thought: the limits of our prescience 
and its dialectical relationship with technological and scientific progress. The relationship between 
prescience and technology and science is dialectical because science and technology in one sense can 
be said to increase our knowledge about the future – they extend our knowledge about natural causal 
processes and thereby allow us to predict their future course far better than previous generations ever 
could. It is that very ability to predict natural processes which provides the basis of our ability to 
control the natural environment. At the same time, the very fact that we are increasingly able to 
predict and therefore control natural processes, in Arendt’s view, has propelled us into a position 
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where we begin to act into nature with the implication that nature is bound to become as 
unpredictable as history. The blending of history and nature through action thus means that the 
future, in vital respects, becomes less predictable and less controllable than ever before, even though 
scientific and technological progress itself, is based on our increased powers of prediction and 
control over nature. For Dupuy this paradox means that “The sorcerer’s apprentice myth must 
therefore be updated: it is neither by error nor terror that mankind will be dispossessed of its own 
creations, but by design— which henceforth is understood to signify not mastery, but non-mastery 
and out-of-controlness”.427   
The important lesson for existential risk research is that scientific and technological progress 
from an Arendtian perspective do not lead to unintended consequences by “terror or error”, which is 
the oft invoked mantra in existential risk theory, but by design – the loss of control and prescience, 
our lack of understanding of where we are headed, is not the result of a lack of effort, of a lack of 
reflection or due diligence on the side of engineers, researchers and scientists, it is a necessary 
consequence of the very project of scientific and technological progress itself: “The dangers of this 
acting into nature are obvious”, Arendt argues, “if we assume that the above mentioned 
characteristics of human action are part and parcel of the human condition. Unpredictability is not 
lack of foresight, and no engineering management of human affairs will ever be able to eliminate it, 
just as no training in prudence can ever lead to the wisdom of knowing what one does”.428  
Understanding technology as action along Arendt’s lines provides us with yet another angle 
on existential risk studies. On the one hand Arendt can be seen as an example for the long history of 
fears surrounding potentially unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences of technological 
progress. She was clear that the blending of history and nature through technologically amplified 
human actions implied an absurd inflation of humanity’s powers, propelling us into entirely 
uncharted waters: “It is beyond doubt that the capacity to act is the most dangerous of all human 
abilities and possibilities, and it is also beyond doubt that the self-created risks mankind faces today 
have never been faced before”.429 Arendt hence shared and to an extent even pre-empted many of 
the anxieties regarding technology in general that permeate in the field of existential risk studies 
today. On the other hand, against the background of Arendt’s characterisation of technological 
existential risk as part of unpredictability of human action, the macro-strategic ambitions of 
existential risk research, notions such as ‘preferred order of arrival’, or ‘technological maturity’ 
appear rather naïve and even dangerous.  
They seem naïve because, to employ Arendt’s terminology, they are expressive of an 
‘engineering management of human affairs’ approach to the problem, rather than seeing it for what it 
really is, namely a problem of the human capacity for spontaneous action. From Arendt’s perspective 
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existential risk theory appears to cling on to an anachronistic conception of technology as tekné, i.e. 
along the lines of the old crafts and techniques, which were producing finished products for definite 
ends, resulting in stable physical objects such as houses, hammers, or tables. This fosters the belief 
that one day humanity might be able to reach a ‘house-like’, stable endpoint, a state of perfect 
technological mastery resulting in some form of equilibrium, the idea being that unpredictability and 
out-of-controlness are merely characteristics of a transitory phase that can eventually be left behind. 
This is reflected in some existential risk researchers’ aim to reach ‘technological maturity’, defined 
as “the attainment of capabilities affording a level of economic productivity and control over nature 
close to the maximum that could feasibly be achieved”.430 This, from Arendt’s perspective, speaks of 
the mistaken idea that more technological control over nature is somehow equivalent to more control 
over the future when, in her view, the inverse is the case.  
 Arendt’s characterisation of modern technology as ‘action into nature’ refocuses our 
attention on seeing modern technology not as tools that can be put to good or bad use in a more or 
less stable environment, but as interventions with that very environment, i.e. the never-ending 
processes of nature, the ultimate outcomes of which can no longer be predicted precisely because of 
humanity’s ‘control’ over them. A close to maximum level of control over nature, from this 
perspective, would more likely result in a close to maximum level of unpredictability rather than 
some form of stability. Arendt therefore urges the reader to understand technological risk not in 
terms of ‘unintended consequences’, as a problem that can eventually be overcome by careful 
management but as a feature of a dangerous transformation of the human condition; an essential 
characteristic of the blurring lines between history and nature. 
If anything, choosing an ‘engineering management of human affairs’ approach, from 
Arendt’s perspective, is dangerous because, in fostering the illusion that we might one day reach 
some sort of stable state with the help of technological mastery, it has us push ahead with the very 
project that endangers us, expanding our technological capabilities and deepening the trouble we are 
in. It is furthermore dangerous because in last consequence it can only translate into the kind of 
boomerang effect which Anders calls Promethean shame – a rage against the perceived faultiness of 
the human being and the capacity for spontaneous action as such, which are the seeds of all 
unpredictability. As Arendt argues: “Only total conditioning, that is, the total abolition of action, can 
ever hope to cope with unpredictability”.431 The above discussed concept of agential risk 
unequivocally demonstrates that, at least in theory, the struggle against human spontaneity is already 
underway. But Arendt is clear that the hope to cope with unpredictability through the abolition of 
action is futile because “even the predictability which comes about through terror can never be sure 
of its own future”.432  
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For Arendt, the main take away from that discussion was twofold. First, she was, as 
existential risk theorists are today, concerned about the dangers associated with action into nature 
as such: “to act into nature, to carry human unpredictability into a realm where we are confronted 
with elemental forces which we shall perhaps never be able to control reliably is dangerous 
enough”.433 However, what she considered to be even more dangerous was the possibility that the 
situation might be misinterpreted and that people might “ignore that for the first time in our history 
the human capacity for action has begun to dominate all others—the capacity for wonder and thought 
in contemplation no less than the capacities of homo faber and the human animal laborans”.434 
Arendt here touches upon what she, at a different point, calls the ‘fundamental problem of  
modernity’ - that "man can do, and successfully do, what he cannot comprehend".435 Günther Anders 
calls this the ‘Promethean disjunction’ – “the growing gap between what man can do and what man 
can mentally realise”.436 The danger both authors saw was that the risks modern humanity found 
itself confronted with would be fundamentally misinterpreted, that they would be seen not as a 
problem that is inherent to scientific and technological progress, an inexorable symptom of a 
fundamental and growing mismatch between different human faculties, but as a problem that could 
ultimately be solved by the implementation of prudent technocratic measures. What both called for 
was interpretation, to take a step back and try to understand what the new powers of modern 
technology and science really spoke of. This is why Anders opens the second volume of The 
Outdatedness of the Human Being with the claim that “it is not enough to change the world, we do 
this anyway, and it mostly happens without our efforts, regardless. What we have to do is interpret 
these changes so we in turn can change the changes”. 437Arendt, in the preface to the Human 
Condition, states in almost exactly the same words that the task she set herself was to “to think what 
we are doing”.438 
As argued in the introduction, Arendt and Anders, contrary to Heidegger, understood the 
technological understanding of being as part of the political predicament of the day. Rather than 
locating the problem outside of human affairs (social, political, economic, or otherwise) as Heidegger 
had, and succumbing to fatalism, they saw the technological understanding of being as a historically 
contingent phenomenon and sought to highlight its paradoxes and limitations in order to pinpoint its 
dangerous role in everyday life and political decision making. Obliviousness to the Promethean 
disjunction, and the associated, thoughtless, uncritical interaction with technology, for both was 
expressive of the technological understanding of being and, arguably, the greatest political problem 
of the day. It meant that people, specifically technologists and policy makers, literally did not know 
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and understand what they were doing and what technology was doing to them, instead pushing 
ahead, considering technology a mere instrument at the service of humanity, and thus widening the 
Promethean disjunction to an ever-greater extent. The Promethean disjunction manifests itself in a 
variety of ways, which will be discussed throughout the following sections. One way in which it 
manifests itself, was discussed above – it is the fact that ‘man’ can set off new processes into nature 
without being able to predict the ultimate consequences of such actions, thus rendering nature less 
predictable and less controllable than ever before. Another way in which it manifests itself is that, 
according to Anders, we are incapable to understand and imagine, that is, to mentally realise the 
scale and severity of the potential consequences of our technologically amplified action, which 
brings us to the problem of human extinction. According to Anders modern humans are ‘inverted 
utopians’ : “The basic dilemma of our age is that ‘We are smaller than ourselves,’ incapable of 
mentally realizing the realities which we ourselves have produced. Therefore we might call ourselves 
"inverted Utopians": while ordinary Utopians are unable to actually produce what they are able to 
visualize, we are unable to visualize what we are actually producing”.439 
 
 
3.3 All-or-nothing or the radical evil 
 
 
Existential risk researchers are united in their conviction that the problem of human extinction 
warrants far more attention than it currently gets and seek to awaken humanity to the magnitude and 
nature of the risks we are facing this century. At the time, similar things could have been said about 
Günther Anders and to an extent also about Hannah Arendt. Anders, in a variety of essays, letters, 
books, and ‘commandments’, diagnosed modern humanity with ‘apocalypse blindness’ and made it 
his mission to awaken Western citizenry to the full scale of the horrors that loomed in the nuclear 
arsenals of the US and the USSR.440  
 In what sense did Arendt and Anders take the problem of human extinction seriously? They 
did not do so in the sense in which existential risk researchers do today, that is in the general, non-
domain specific sense characteristic for existential risk theory. But they did try to begin to develop an 
understanding of what that threat in itself and, by extension, any threat to the survival of the human 
species, amounts to in terms of moral and philosophical weight. That is, they sought to open up to the 
true severity of what this notion amounts to, which, as we have seen, also forms the basis of 
existential risk research. But in doing so they went much further than today’s existential risk 
researchers in so far as they went much deeper in trying to pay full heed to the meaning and 
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implications of this possibility. They wanted to understand what the at the time new possibility of 
existential catastrophe meant, what it implies and how it affects us our thinking today.  
As for existential risk researchers, for Anders and Arendt, the most pertinent conceptual 
effect of the introduction of nuclear weapons was that it put the entire future of humanity at risk. 
However, whilst existential risk researchers leave it there and simply posit that this amounts to the 
absolute bad and that existential risk reduction should become a global priority, Arendt and Anders 
set out to ponder about the wider philosophical implications of that threat. As Robert Jungk argues in 
the foreword to Anders’ Burning Conscience: “Since 1945, millions of words have been written by 
eminent authorities on 'the effects of nuclear weapons'. Nevertheless, there is still a yawning gap in 
this comprehensive volume of literature on the subject. The experts, it is true, have subjected whole 
mountains of ruins and tens of thousands of survivors to most minute examination, but in their 
meticulous studies, they omitted one very important object-themselves; and by so doing they have 
disregarded an aspect of decisive importance, namely, that atom bombs strike back at those who use 
them and, indeed, at those who earnestly labour at making their use possible“.441 In other words, what 
is of interest here, is Anders’ and Arendt’s analysis of how ‘the bomb strikes back’, how it affects 
humanity here and now and what this can tell us about existential risk theory. This ‘phenomenology 
of the end-time’,442 is an integral component of what Arendt and Anders considered thinking about 
‘what we are doing’, about the Promethean realities we are creating and the inhuman worlds we are 
erecting around us. 
For Anders and Arendt, the fact that nuclear weapons put the entire future of humanity at risk 
implied a major shift in our thinking about how we think about humanity -  it changed our 
perspective on the future from one in which the future existence of humans was taken for granted, i.e. 
in which humanity was thought of as effectively immortal, to one in which humanity had to be 
thought of as mortal. According to Anders, apart “from a handful of natural philosophers, and 
Christian thinkers”, it did not even occur to thinkers of previous centuries to seriously entertain 
thoughts about human extinction.443  In his view, it therefore was only with the introduction of 
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nuclear weapons that the old dogmas, “all humans are mortal”, and “all humans can be killed”, 
needed to be updated to “humanity as a whole is mortal” and even to “humanity as a whole can be 
killed”.444 This new fact, of having to consider humanity as killable, for both Arendt and Anders, was 
an enormous conceptual shock.  
Before discussing this shock and its repercussions within the authors’ work in greater detail 
there is of course a question to be asked about the historical accuracy of their account of past 
perspectives on the future. It is clear that apocalyptic thinking, eschatology, is a defining feature of 
Judeo-Christian thought. The historian of time Reinhard Koselleck (2004) for instance argued that 
“until well into the sixteenth century, the history of Christianity is a history of expectations, or more 
exactly, the constant anticipation of the End of the World on the one hand and the continual 
deferment of the End on the other. While the materiality of such expectations varied from one 
situation to another, the basic figure of the End remained constant”.445 Further, it has been 
demonstrated that eschatological thinking has not only survived the Enlightenment but profoundly 
shaped  Enlightenment thinking itself and persisted deep into the modern Zeitgeist, leaving its mark 
in ostensibly secular concepts such as ‘progress’, ‘revolution’, and even the concept of ‘modernity’ 
itself.446 According to  Derrida (1984),  apocalyptic thinking might even be the characteristic feature 
of the entire tradition of European thought.447 It is therefore not immediately clear exactly whose past 
perspective on the future Arendt and Anders were referring to when they claimed that the future 
existence of humanity used to be taken for granted, nor how representative for the temporality of the 
wider public they believed their claim to be. My aim here, however, is not in the main to establish the 
historical accuracy of Arendt’s and Anders’ account of past futures.  
For, there is a case to be made that even if we allow for the fact that religious forms of 
apocalypticism were and perhaps tacitly continue to be a defining feature of occidental thought, this 
does not necessarily sit problematically with the above authors’ main argument. The reason is that in 
apocalypticism as a religious concept the future of humanity effectively, i.e. in all practically relevant 
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respects, too, can be said to be taken for granted. As for instance Himmelfarb (2010) argues, the 
apocalypse in Judeo-Christian tradition is associated with “the Last Judgment and cataclysmic end of 
the world but also reward and punishment after death, the heavenly temple, the divine throne room, 
and astronomical phenomena and other secrets of nature”.448 In other words, the apocalypse is 
envisioned as a moment of absolute transcendence, a cataclysmic instance of revelation in which 
everything is falling into place and humanity enters a higher form of existence (this is also the 
original meaning of the Greek term apokalypsis, which translates into ‘dis-covery’ or ‘exposing’449). 
From this perspective, the notion of apocalypse does not contain a theory of the mortality of 
humanity, but rather a theory of its transformation. It does not present an image of humanity as 
mortal but hinges, on the contrary, on the notion of a collective afterlife and thus the ongoing 
existence of humanity in one form or another. Apocalypse as a religious concept, to put it briefly, 
presents us with a continuation of the story of humanity, rather than with one about its end. 
 This brings us to what Arendt and Anders considered to be so profoundly shocking about the 
nuclear bomb. If enlightenment, or ‘the death of God’, implied the end of the immortality of humans 
on a spiritual or transcendental level, the nuclear bomb implied the end of the immortality of humans 
in this world too. This effect of the nuclear bomb, according to them, catapulted humanity into 
genuinely uncharted philosophical terrain. Of course, apocalypse in the traditional sense would also 
mean an end of humanity as we know it. However, the difference between apocalypse as a religious 
concept and apocalypse as a secular concept is that the one bestows activities with meaning (be it that 
their meaning resides in averting the wrath of God or in hastening the arrival of the final day of 
judgement, or simply to present oneself as worthy in the eyes of God upon the day of its arrival), 
whilst, according to Arendt and Anders the other has the opposite effect – the mere possibility of 
this-worldly total doom threatens to deprive everything we do of meaning, irrespective of whether or 
not it is actually going to happen anytime soon. The one presents the culmination point of history, 
something that will in effect be the final confirmation of the value and meaningfulness (or lack 
thereof) of our collective and individual endeavours, whilst the other undermines what is, according 
to Arendt and Anders an unacknowledged condition for our very ability to make sense of our lives, 
namely that we think of ourselves as part of the “enduring chronicle of mankind”.450 From this 
perspective the intuitively attractive likening of existential catastrophe to apocalypse and of 
existential risk theory to eschatology is fundamentally misleading.451 In fact, it would make much 
more sense to consider existential catastrophe an anti-apocalypse. Rather than unveiling the ultimate 
truths and meaning of our existence, enlightening it in all respects, it means ultimate darkness - the 
                                               
448 Himmelfarb, M. (2010), p. 2, italics added by the author. 
449 See Groĭs, B. (2012), p. 72. 
450 Arendt, H. (1994), pp. 421-422. 
451 Munthe, C. (2015) for instance likens the logic of existential risk theory to that of Pascal’s wager, asking 
why existential risk researchers do not all attend mass. Whilst the concerns might be similar in structure (both 
concern events with low probability but arguably infinite impact) they are nonetheless very different in nature.  
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end of the very possibility of finding truth and meaning in life. It is in that sense that Anders claims 
that “if the mankind of today is killed, then that which has been dies with it; and the mankind to 
come too. The door in front of us bears the inscription: 'Nothing will have been'; and from within: 
'Time was an episode'. Not, however, as our ancestors had hoped, an episode between two eternities; 
but one between two nothingnesses; between the nothingness of that which, remembered by no one, 
will have been as though it had never been, and the nothingness of that which will never be. And as 
there will be no one to tell one nothingness from the other, they will melt into one single nothingness. 
This, then, is the completely new, the apocalyptic kind of temporality, our temporality, compared 
with which everything we had called 'temporal' has become a bagatelle".452 Or, as Hans Jonas argued: 
“Now we shiver in the nakedness of a nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-
emptiness”.453 Groys (2008) in that vein refers to the possibility of nuclear war as ‘the apocalypse of 
apocalypse’, arguing that it “destroys everything without uncovering any kind of truth and without 
leaving behind any kind of reality”.454 The introduction of nuclear weapons hence meant that even 
the last safe haven of the very idea of value and purpose was imperilled, if not obliterated outright. 
The categorical shift in our thinking about the future of humanity, from one in which we 
could (albeit perhaps mistakenly as existential risk research points out by highlighting the 
inescapability of natural extinction events in the long run) posit its immortality to one were we 
suddenly had to think of it as mortal, according to Anders and Arendt challenged the moral and 
ethical foundations of our existence and opened up, at bottom, the problem of nihilism - the 
possibility of absolute nothingness, extending right into the present. Hans Jonas made a highly 
similar remark, arguing that “the presence of man in the world had been a first and unquestionable 
given, from which all idea of human obligation in human conduct started out. Now it has itself 
become an object of obligation: the obligation namely to ensure the very premise of all obligation, 
that is the foothold for a moral universe in the physical universe - the existence of mere candidates 
for a moral order”.455  
However, given that the possibility of human extinction had not featured as a matter of 
sustained philosophical reflection before the 20th century - simply because it did not need to – the 
philosophical implications of this shift in perspectives, specifically for our thinking about the 
meaningfulness of human conduct, too, were a rather underdeveloped topic. Of the authors covered 
here the arguably clearest account of how the assumption that human life is an open-ended 
continuum served as a tacit precondition for how we attribute meaning to our lives can be found in 
Arendt’s work.  
                                               
452 Anders, G. (1961), p. 11. 
453 Ibid, p. 23. 
454 As argued above, for Derrida we are in a constant state of apocalypse, always thinking of ourselves as 
occupying a position at the end of revelation, possessing final truths. For an authoritative analysis of the theme 
of apocalypse in Derrida’s thought see Groĭs, B. (2012), p. 69 ff.  
455 See Jonas, H. (1984), p. 10. 
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As discussed in section 2 of this chapter, in Arendt’s thought ‘world’ can be seen as a bridge 
between the mortality of the human individual and the immortality of the human species. This notion 
provides us with a basis for reflecting about how the tacit assumption that the human species is 
immortal used to condition human life on an individual and collective level. Referring to the ancient 
Greek conceptions of mortality and immortality, Arendt argues that mortality, had come to be 
understood as the quintessentially human property, ‘the hallmark of human existence’: “Men are ‘the 
mortals’, the only mortal things there are for animals exist only as members of their species and not 
as individuals. The mortality of man lies in the fact that individual life, a zoe with a recognizable life-
story from birth to death, rises out of biological life, bios. This individual life is distinguished from 
all other things by the rectilinear line of its movement, which, so to speak, cuts through the circular 
movements of biological life. This is mortality: to move along a rectilinear line in a universe where 
everything, if it moves at all, moves in a cyclical order”.456 
In other words what makes humans mortals is their individuality, the fact that, contrary to 
animals, they lead lives that differ from one another in recognizable ways to the effect that the 
otherwise uniform circularity of natural life is interrupted. Because gods are immortal, and animals, 
in her view, exist only as members of their species, as part of bios, mortality emerged as the 
distinctive feature of the human individual: “embedded in a cosmos in which everything was 
immortal, it was mortality which became the hallmark of human existence: Men are ‘the mortals,’ the 
only mortal things there are”.457  
The human world on the other hand, Arendt claims, was understood to be immortal.458 World 
is the realm created by human work, into which individuals are born and from which they disappear, 
whilst their works in form of arts, culture, institutions, buildings, etc., remain, forming a continuum 
and providing mortals with a stable backdrop for their endeavours. As Canovan (1998) points out, at 
the heart of Arendt’s “analysis of the human condition is the vital importance for civilized existence 
of a durable human world, built upon the earth to shield us against natural processes and provide a 
stable setting for our mortal lives”.459 The mortality of the individual, on the other hand, in Arendt’s 
view, ensures that the human world is one of constant beginnings, of change and fresh ideas; it 
ensures that new individuals can leave their mark in the world and obtain, through their works and 
deeds, a share of immortality. What Arendt calls ‘world’ can hence be seen as the material and 
ideational bridge between individual mortality and collective immortality. Individual mortality would 
be much harder to come to terms with without the presumed immortality of our world and the world 
would become stagnant, without new persons, unique in their individuality, leaving their mark in it 
and changing its course. 
                                               
456 Arendt, H. (2000), p. 279. 
457 Arendt, H. (1958), p. 571. 
458 Arendt, H. (2000), p. 278. 
459 Canovan, M. (1998), p. xiii. 
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Once we insert nuclear weapons into this complex it becomes immediately clear why Arendt 
regarded them with a horror that went beyond the vague horror that everyone is likely to feel who 
dares to think seriously about the spectre of nuclear conflict. Nuclear weapons put what Arendt 
called ‘world’ at risk, they not only loomed large over our heads as the ever-present possibility of 
unfathomable levels of suffering and loss of future utility, but their mere existence affected us by 
rendering outdated one of the conditions which made us human in the sense in which we, according 
to her, used to understand that notion, namely as mortal beings in an immortal human world. Nuclear 
weapons by virtue of their mere existence, irrespective of whether or not they would ever be utilised, 
uproot us in time and, by implication, affect our idea of ourselves. This is why Günther Anders 
argues that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is a form of action. He repeated this time and 
again, almost like a mantra: “the nuclear bomb is not a means to an end”, it is an act qua existence.460 
The immortality of the human world became a thing of the past once the end of human life became 
mere possibility with the appearance of nuclear weapons.  
 If we now return to Hans Jonas’ claim that the threat to the ongoing existence of humanity 
imperils the very idea of human obligation in human conduct, Arendt’s conception of world provides 
this claim with some more substance. Obligation, in so far as it is deeply connected with what Arendt 
calls world, has an inherently temporal dimension, relying on a temporally extended sense of 
commitment. Recently, Samuel Scheffler, writing in the analytical tradition, made the exact same 
claim,  arguing that humans rely on the existence of future generations for leading value laden lives 
and that present generations therefore have egoistic reasons to secure the continued existence of the 
species.461 This is intended to highlight that one must not necessarily care about the existence of 
future generations in Parfit’s or Singer’s pan-generational utilitarian way in order to care about the 
survival of the species but that there are reasons to care for the future out of a concern for the present. 
                                               
460 See for instance Anders, G. (1956a), p. 247. 
461 Scheffler presents an intriguing argument based on two thought experiments in which he asks the readers to 
imagine that they were confronted with two different end-time scenarios: In the first case he asks us to imagine 
that we are confronted with the information that 30 years after our death an asteroid will collide with Earth and 
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meaninglessness because in many ways our ability to lead meaningful lives and even our ability to attribute 
value to not straightforwardly instrumental activities, such as "reading 'The Catcher in the Rye' or trying to 
understand quantum mechanics", depends on our confidence that there will be future human generations, or, as 
he calls it, "a collective afterlife". Without this confidence, he argues, our conception of a "life as a whole" 
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good life would be in such a world, nor can we even be confident that there is something that we would be 
prepared to count as a good life". Crucially, he does not suggest that we need to have confidence that humanity 
will exist "forever". Rather, Scheffler argues, we need to have confidence that humanity will not cease to exist 
for a "considerable" amount of time after we die. He infers from that that our confidence as individuals in the 
value of many of our activities depends to a large extend on our confidence that there will be future 
generations. Scheffler concludes that it is part of what it means to be a human being to think of oneself as part 
of a continuum stretching far into the future: "Our values express our own understanding of ourselves as 
temporally extended creatures with commitments that endure through the flux of daily experience". See, 
Scheffler, S. (2016). 
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Economist Partha Dasgupta of CSER in a recent working paper made a point along comparable lines 
when he argues in relation to art and other cultural products, including ideas and institutions, that 
“future people add value to the creators' lives by making their creations durable. Here the fact of a 
general assumption that people desire to have children is significant. An artist may regard his work to 
be far more important than parenting, but he is helped by the presumption that there will be future 
generations to bestow durability to his work”.462 Dasgupta goes even one step further, arguing  that 
one can understand procreation as a means of making one’s values and practices survive, which 
means that not only values that are part of the public realm tacitly depend on our assumption that 
there will be future generations but that “many are private, even confined to the family, and it is 
important to us that they are passed down the generations. Procreation is a means of making one's 
values and practices durable. We imbue our children with values we cherish and teach them the 
practices we believe are right not merely because we think it is good for them, but also because we 
desire to see our values and practices survive”.463 We thus see that ideas which Arendt entertained 
about 60 years ago in the wake of the nuclear arms race are now beginning to be taken up in altered 
form and different vocabulary by analytical philosophers and economists in the context of existential 
risk.  
 As argued in chapter 1, what existential risk theorists originally want to raise attention to is the 
1 per cent in Derek Parfit’s thought experiment, arguing that the stakes symbolised by this one per 
cent are all too often underappreciated. Arendt and Anders clearly agree that the 1 per cent transform 
a threat into one of an entirely different category as compared to all other kinds of catastrophes and 
disasters we have experienced so far. Yet they went further than existential risk researchers do today 
- they argued that the stakes involved are so vast indeed that they changed the very nature of what it 
means to be human and of what it can mean to be human in the present. What is immediately 
threatened by existential risk is not only future generations, future utility, but ourselves, irrespective 
of whether an existential catastrophe is actually ever going to materialise or not.464 
 This leads us back to the problem of action in the context of existential risk. As argued 
before, for Arendt the modern world was born, politically, with the first atomic explosions. The fact 
that human action, by attaining the capability to set off new chains of events into nature had also 
attained the capability to annihilate life on Earth was one reason why Arendt saw the conditions of 
                                               
462 Dasgupta, P. (2017), pp. 38-39. 
463 Ibid, p. 39. 
464 A similar argument can be found in Dupuy, J.-P. (2012). Dupuy suggests with reference to Anders that for 
the above reasons the West’s outlook on the future of humanity should be inverted, from one in which the 
future depends on us, and we are responsible for future generations to one in which we consider ourselves to be 
dependent on the future: “Whether or not the future has any need of us, we, for our part, need the future, for it 
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back at those who use them and, indeed, at those who earnestly labour at making their use possible… Under the 
weight of them, the very foundations of our moral and political existence are collapsing.” See Anders, G. 
(1961), p. xi. 
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our existence transformed to such an extent that, to her, we had begun to occupy an entirely new 
world, of which she was not sure how to make sense. In the context of politics, it meant that 
humanity found itself confronted with what she calls the ‘radical evil’ and therewith with something 
that according to her should never be involved in politics as we used to understand it, namely all-or-
nothing questions:  
 
“It is the appearance of some radical evil, previously unknown to us, that puts an end to the notion 
of developments and transformations of qualities. Here, there are neither political nor historical nor 
simply moral standards but, at the most, the realisation, that something seems to be involved in 
modern politics that actually should never be involved in politics as we used to understand it, 
namely all or nothing - All, and that is an undetermined infinity of forms of human living-together, 
or nothing, for a victory of the concentration camp system would mean the same inexorable doom 
for human beings as the use of the hydrogen bomb for the human race”.465 
 
In other words, atomic weapons, by turning the continued existence of the human species into a 
matter of political choice, had led to such a grotesque over-inflation of political power that, in 
Arendt’s view, politics itself was deformed beyond recognition, rendering our habitual understanding 
of it anachronistic.  
Unfortunately Arendt typically remains rather vague in her remarks about the radical evil and 
all-or-nothing questions, and how, in her view, it transformed politics, despite the fact that she 
repeatedly hints at how central that observation was to her thought, arguing that the Human 
Condition was written against the background of that circumstance, 466  and that “the whole political 
and moral vocabulary in which we are accustomed to discuss” matters such as violence, peace, war 
or courage had been rendered practically meaningless with the appearance of nuclear weapons.467  
The phrases ‘transformation of qualities’ and ‘infinity of forms of human living-together’, 
however, provide us with an indication of why politics ‘as we used to understand it’, in her view, had 
come to an end once infused with the radical evil of all-or-nothing questions. Politics, just as any 
other aspect of human life, in Arendt’s view hinged on the tacit assumption that the human species is 
immortal, it used to be seen as part and parcel of an open-ended transformation of qualities and 
reorganisation of forms of ‘human living-together’, negotiating and renegotiating human terms of 
coexistence, and not their arbitrator. This perspective on the future is reflected in categories based on 
which we habitually think about political developments, as ‘progress’, ‘regress’, or ‘modernisation’. 
As Margaret Canovan (1995) points out, Arendt did not believe in the idea progress to begin with, 
she “did not share the barely conscious assumption of modern publics that with the growth of 
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466 Ibid. 
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prosperity and enlightenment, and in spite of setbacks on the way ranging from concentration camps 
and nuclear weapons to mounting crime-rates and international terrorism, we are somehow moving 
toward a world in which violence will no longer exist”.468 Irrespective of whether or not Arendt 
believed that such assumptions had a basis at any point in time, it is clear that, in her view, the 
appearance of nuclear weapons rendered them obsolete once and for all:   
 
“the fearful imagination has the great advantage to dissolve the sophistic-dialectical interpretations 
of politics which are all based on the superstition that something good might result from evil. Such 
dialectical acrobatics had at least a semblance of justification so long as the worst that man could 
inflict upon man was murder. But, as we know today, murder is only a limited evil, the murderer 
who kills a man - a man who has to die anyway - still moves within the realm of life and death 
familiar to us; both have indeed a necessary connection on which the dialectic is founded, even if it 
is not always conscious of it. The murderer leaves a corpse behind and does not pretend that his 
victim has never existed; if he wipes out any traces, they are those of his own identity, and not the 
memory and grief of the persons who loved his victim; he destroys a life, but he does not destroy 
the fact of existence itself”.469 
 
This quote makes it very clear that, in Arendt’s view, the infusion of politics with the absolute of all-
or-nothing questions has catapulted us into an entirely new reality in which our inherited 
‘superstitions’ and intuitions about politics were rendered obsolete and even profoundly misleading. 
Conceiving of nuclear weapons as ‘set-backs’, as in the above quoted passage, means thinking in 
terms of ‘dialectic acrobatics’ and thus to try and fit them into political categories which nuclear 
weapons, by mere virtue of their existence, render obsolete. Speaking of set-backs makes sense only 
if one can take an open-ended transformation of qualities for granted. Nuclear weapons, however, put 
an end to that very notion. The true horror of nuclear weapons is that their presence transcends the 
‘realm of life and death familiar to us’ by threatening to ‘destroy the fact of existence itself’. Their 
mere existence deprives humanity of the felt solidity and permanence of the world which used to 
give structure and meaning to our pursuits as mortals, political and otherwise. Whether or not they 
are ever utilised, nuclear weapons are the ‘radical evil’ because they have catapulted us into an 
unhuman reality – unhuman because the all-or-nothing questions they confront us with transcend the 
very parameters and conditions of our existence based on which we have made sense on what it 
means to be human. 
One instance where Arendt’s work is more concrete in pinpointing the implications arising 
from this shift in perspectives for political life is in a brief essay entitled ‘Europe and the Atom 
Bomb’ from 1954. She here, amongst other things, discusses the mindset underlying the idea that “it 
is better to be dead than a slave”,470 encapsulated in the, at the time common, battle cry ‘rather dead 
than red’. Arendt argues that this conviction implicitly appeals to the political virtue of courage and 
demonstrates that, with the appearance of atomic weapons, this appeal has become “all but 
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meaningless”.471 Courage, according to Arendt, used to be defined by two main pillars of the human 
condition, the mortality of the individual and the immortality of the species. In order to be 
courageous, Arendt argues, humans must be sure both of their own mortality as well as of the 
existence of a posterity, i.e. the immortality of the species. If humans were immortal, if life were not 
bound to be taken from us one day anyhow, she argues, we could never mount the courage to risk it, 
because the stakes would be so high that the kind of courage required would be literally ‘inhuman’. 
Courage, Arendt thus claims, in the world of the ancients was the only virtue that was reserved 
exclusively for humans, the mortals, and was denied to the gods, the immortals. If humans were to 
become immortal, Arendt henceforth argues, life would no longer only be our highest good, as it is 
today, but become our central concern, overruling all other considerations.472 Harrari (2017) makes a 
similar point when he suggests that, if the present Silicon Valley quest for immortality were to be 
successful, it would most likely turn its beneficiaries into “the most anxious people in history”.473 
The resulting mode of human existence, Harrari argues, would not be that of immortality but that of 
a-mortality. Humans would not become immortal in the sense that death would become an 
impossibility, they would merely have a potentially infinite life-span. That is, humans could 
theoretically live forever under the condition that their existence is not ended by accident or choice. 
In Arendt’s vocabulary, an individual with technologically attained a-mortality would not turn into a 
god, it would still move within the realm of life and death familiar to us in that its mode of existence 
would still be defined in relation to its opposite, i.e. non-existence. Rather than freeing us from our 
preoccupation with the problem of finitude, the quest for immortality hence might result in the 
opposite, our preoccupation with finitude could turn into a nightmare.  
The second condition of courage is that humans are convinced of the existence of a posterity 
which will “understand, remember and respect” their sacrifice: “Man can be courageous only as long 
as he knows that he is survived by those who are like him, that he fulfils a role in something more 
permanent than himself, the ‘enduring chronicle of mankind’.”474 What Arendt demontrates here, is 
that our traditional idea of courage is deeply entangled with tacit assumptions regarding the mortality 
of the individual on the one hand as well as the permanence of what she calls world on the other 
hand, and thus temporally extended commitments. 
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All or nothing questions thus sit uneasily with the political virtue of courage as understood 
by Arendt. On the one hand, she argues, the possibility of total annihilation introduced by modern 
warfare transforms the individual into a ‘conscious member of the human race’, for “whose survival 
he must care more than for anything else”.475 On the other hand, humans need to be sure of a 
posterity in order to act courageously at all. By undermining the conviction that there will be a 
posterity, the political virtue of courage is thus at risk to lose its basis at the very point in time, at 
which courageous action would arguably be needed the most.  
 This argument clearly is most compelling when placed against the backdrop of the cold war 
context of the time of Arendt’s writing. However, the basic insight remains relevant in the context of 
existential risk theory. If we can no longer conceive of ourselves, of our actions and commitments 
innocently as part of an ongoing transformation of qualities, we end up in an unprecedented, circular 
situation where we must secure the conditions under which we habitually attribute meaning to our 
endeavours - a meta-ethically problematic situation to be in, as Scheffler demonstrates. Politically 
arguably more problematically still, it means that our intuitions, the concepts and categories by the 
means of which we habitually think about political matters might no longer map onto reality and 
therefore might in fact misguide us. What Arendt’s discussion of courage authoritatively shows is 
that in our everyday interactions with modern technology we are prone to rely on categories and 
concepts which are rendered anachronistic by the very technologies we are trying to make sense of in 
such terms; a circumstance which is particularly pronounced and dangerous in the context of nuclear 
weapons. 
 This concern occupies an arguably even more important role in Anders’ thought. For Anders, 
the advent of nuclear weapons had transformed the parameters of humanity’s existence to such an 
extent that we could no longer be considered ‘human’ at all. The introduction of nuclear weapons 
meant, Anders claims, that all vicissitudes and changes of history have been reduced to the status of a 
prelude, of mere pre-history and that “we are not merely representatives of a new historical 
generation of humans but, […] because of our radically changed relation to the cosmos and 
ourselves, creatures of a new species”.476 The generation of his parents, Anders states, had been the 
“last humans” and everything that “had been valid for them”, had “become invalid for us […] their 
                                               
475 Ibid. 
476 Anders, G. (1956a), pp. 239-240. This is an abbreviated version of Anders’ original text, which was 
translated by the author. The original text reads as follows: “Da wir die Macht besitzen, einander ein Ende zu 
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natürlich völlig unverändert, durch unsere völlig veränderte Stellung im Kosmos und zu uns selbst, Wesen 
einer neuen Spezies; Wesen die sich vom bisherigen Typus ‚Mensch‘ nicht weniger unterscheiden, als sich 
etwa, in Nietzsches Augen, der Übermensch vom Menschen unterschieden hätte.” 
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dearest emotions have become alien to us; and the juxtapositions by the means of which they 
understood themselves and articulated their Being, have become inapplicable”.477  
In other words, like Arendt, Anders claims that the appearance of the radical evil in form of 
nuclear weapons had created a rift, separating the living generations from all generations that 
preceded them. When Arendt argues that it put an end to politics as we used to understand it, Anders 
goes even further than that in claiming that it put an end to humanity as we used to understand it: “we 
are no longer what until today men have called ‘men’”.478 The negative omnipotence that came with 
nuclear weapons had transformed the living generations into “titans”, “lords of the apocalypse”, who 
were in need of an entirely new conceptual repertoire to make sense of their situation in the cosmos 
and of themselves.  
Just as mounting the courage to sacrifice one’s own life would be inhuman if humans were a-
mortal, the infusion of politics with the radical evil means that we are confronted with an inhuman 
problem. The fact that they threaten to annihilate existence itself means that we are confronted with a 
problem outside of the realm of life and death familiar to us, which used to be the very bracket for 
our decision-making, political and otherwise. That’s why Anders claims that “it is misleading to say 
that atomic weapons exist in our political situation. This statement has to be turned upside down in 
order to become true. As the situation today is determined and defined exclusively by the existence 
of ‘atomic weapons,’ we have to state: political actions and developments are taking place within the 
atomic situation”.479  
The underlying problem both Anders and Arendt identified was that modern technology, 
epitomised by nuclear weapons technology, by design, not by virtue of the uses we make of it, 
transcends conditions on which we rely to make sense of our situation and ourselves. They were 
convinced that, if we do not systematically challenge ourselves to imagine, think, and interpret what 
we are doing, our interaction with technology is at risk to become inherently thoughtless in the sense 
that our thoughts would no longer correspond with the realities we are producing. Arendt and Anders 
set out to do just that, to interpret and reveal the new, technologically defined reality to their 
contemporaries and to awaken them to their titanic predicament. This leads us to what Arendt and 
Anders, in a very Heideggerian fashion, considered to be the most basic problem associated with 
scientific and technological progress. 
 
  
                                               
477 Cf. Anders, G. (1956a), p. 240. This passage has been translated by the author. The original text reads as 
follows: “Das Wichtigste, was von unseren Eltern, den ‚letzten Menschen‘, gegolten hatte, ist für uns Söhne, 
die ‚ersten Titanen‘, ungültig geworden; ihre liebsten Gefühle sind uns bereits fremd; und die Alternativen, mit 
deren Hilfe sie sich verstanden und ihr Dasein artikuliert hatten, schon außer Kurs”. 
478 Anders, G. (1956b), p. 146. 
479 Anders, G. (1962), p. 494. 
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3.4 The schizophrenic condition of modern existence 
 
According to Arendt and Anders the core problem of the Promethean disjunction is that, despite the 
fact that the above described transformative implications associated with modern technology are 
unfolding in plain sight, we appear to be not only oblivious to them but unable to grasp them. We 
cannot comprehend the uprooting and alienating dynamics of modern machine amplified action: 
“man can do, and successfully do, what he cannot comprehend and cannot express in everyday 
language”.480 In other words, we appear to be unable to understand that we have been transformed 
into titans and what that means - that politics as we used to understand it has come to an end, that 
nature and history were in the process of becoming one, and that our commitments and obligations 
are premised on conditions that have exploded under the weight of nuclear weapons.  
According to Arendt and Anders, the underlying reason is that humanity had begun to 
occupy  in effect two different realities, to live a schizophrenic life: One life in the reality of things as 
they ‘appear naturally to our consciousness’, i.e. the world of the particular, of sense perception and 
everyday language, and one that is based on an entirely different ontology, namely the scientific and 
technological realm, embodied in modern machinery, the underlying ontology of which, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, is in fundamental respects at odds with our naïve, phenomenal ontology. 
Contrary to Heidegger, however, who was afraid that the technological understanding of being might 
one day become our only one, Arendt and Anders saw not one ontological condition replacing the 
other. For them the situation was politically far more problematic – they saw a world in which both 
had begun to coexist alongside the other to the effect that humans were in vital respects out of touch 
with the new reality they were erecting around them. This, Arendt argues, is true for the average 
citizen just as much as for scientists and engineers: 
 
“The fact is not merely that the scientist spends more than half of his life in the same world of 
sense perception, of common sense, and of everyday language as his fellow citizens, but that he 
has come in his own privileged field of activity to a point where the naïve questions and 
anxieties of the layman have made themselves felt very forcefully, albeit in a different manner. 
The scientist has not only left behind the layman with his limited understanding; he has left 
behind a part of himself and his own power of understanding, which is still human 
understanding”.481 
 
For Arendt and Anders this disjunction was the greatest political problem of the time because it 
meant that the scientific and technological problems that were beginning to define human existence 
could no longer be meaningfully translated into everyday language and thus into a language that 
corresponds with the categories of human understanding. This means that our interaction with 
modern technology had become, not only on several dimensions thoughtless but also that we could 
                                               
480 Arendt, H. (2007), p. 46. 
481 Arendt, H.  (2007), p. 45. 
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not express and meaningfully speak with one another about technological questions and hence 
politically engage with them in the public realm. 
In order to carve out more clearly what Arendt and Anders had in mind, when they spoke of 
humanity’s modern condition as fundamentally thoughtless, I will contrast their position with another 
school of thought that was prominent at the time of their writing and that, if looked at superficially, 
could be taken to diagnose similar problems. In the 1950s and 1960s, the diagnosis of a ‘lag’ between 
humanity’s ethical, moral and political development on the one hand and its scientific and 
technological development on the other hand was commonplace amongst social and political 
scientists. An early version of the underlying mindset can be found in Bertrand Russell’s 1924 piece 
‘Icarus or the Future of Science’. Russell here claims that: 
 
“the sudden change produced by science has upset the balance between our instincts and our 
circumstances, but in directions not sufficiently noted. Over-eating is not a serious danger but 
over-fighting is. The human instincts of power and rivalry, like the dog's wolfish appetite will 
need to be artificially curbed, if industrialism is to succeed”.482   
 
Russell here entertains the idea that humanity had succeeded to create a new scientific and 
technological reality for which its social, cultural and biological make-up was ill-equipped. 
Perspectives on technology such as these were later formalised in the thought of sociologists such as 
William Ogburn, Bernard Brodie, or Hornell Hart, in a tradition of sociology called ‘cultural lag 
theory’. The central idea of authors writing in this tradition was that material and technological 
developments were the main drivers of history and that social organisation and norms were lagging 
behind these developments to the effect that the latter had to ‘catch up’ with the former.483 In more 
technical terms, a cultural lag was defined as “a condition of strain or maladjustment produced by the 
lagging of one of two correlated parts of culture behind the other”.484 As argued above, cultural lag 
theorists tended to put emphasis on a lagging of non-material culture behind material culture. 
According to Sylvest and Munster (2016), cultural lag theory formed the basis of nuclear strategy 
during the thermonuclear age in the 1950s and 1960s, both of deterrence-based approaches and 
internationalist approaches, and was sustained by the belief that “social man could catch up with 
scientific man” with the help of modern techniques of social and political science.485 Existential risk 
theory clearly can be placed in this tradition of thinking about technology. Like cultural lag theorists, 
existential risk theorists demand a socio-political adjustment to the technological and scientific 
demands of the time. For Arendt, however, cultural lag theory was a “red herring”: 
                                               
482 Today, of course, as the dangerous effects of global mass consumption are making themselves felt in 
environmental degradation and climate change, it becomes clear that ‘over-eating’ is a serious problem too. 
This of course does not affect Russell’s argument, if anything it renders the situation he describes even more 
problematic. See Russell, B. (1924). 
483 Please compare to Munster, R.v. & Sylvest, C. (2016a), p. 10. 
484 Schneider, J. (1945), p. 786. 




“the often mentioned ‘lag’ of the social sciences with respect to the natural sciences or of man’s 
political development with respect to his technical and scientific know-how is no more than a 
red herring drawn into this debate […]”.486  
 
Arendt did by no means deny the existence of a deep divide between what we might call the realm of 
science and technology and the ‘world of sense perception, of common sense, and of everyday 
language’. On the contrary, she considered this growing divide to be the perhaps most dangerous 
political problem of the time. Her question, though, was what story this divide really told and what 
lessons should be drawn from it. As we will see below, cultural lag theory, by jumping straight from 
the diagnosis of a lag to the diagnosis of a need for adaptation on the social and political side and, by 
implication, presupposing the possibility thereof, in her view exhibited a peculiar kind of 
thoughtlessness she considered typical for her times. It failed to take a step back, to inquire into the 
nature and the origin of the problem at hand and therewith to grasp the profundity of the implications 
of the divide between ‘social man’ and ‘scientific man’ that was unfolding. 
For Arendt lag theory was a ‘red herring’ because it lacked an understanding of what the 
project of modern science and technology actually was about and hence diverted attention from what 
she considered to be the root cause of the divide in question. In noticeably Heideggerian fashion 
Arendt argued that the goal of modern science is “no longer to ‘augment and order human 
experience’ […]; it is much rather to discover what lies behind natural phenomena as they reveal 
themselves to the senses and the human mind”.487 Modern science, in her view, was the search for 
‘true reality’ marked by a loss of confidence in “appearances, in the phenomena as they reveal 
themselves of their own accord to human sense and reason”.488 The crucial moment, the turning point 
in that epistemological revolution was the introduction of the telescope and the following realisation 
that, contrary to what the senses had suggested for ages, the Earth revolves around the sun. This 
technologically assisted realisation, Arendt argued, told man “that his senses are not fitted for the 
universe, that his everyday experience, far from being able to constitute the model for the reception 
of truth and the acquisition of knowledge, was a constant source of error and delusion“.489  
The trouble was, in her view, that a) “the categories and ideas of human reason have their 
ultimate source in human sense experience […] all terms describing our mental abilities as well as a 
good deal of our conceptual language derive from the world of the senses and are used 
metaphorically” 490 and b) that “what defies description in terms of the ‘prejudices’ of the human 
mind defies description in every conceivable way of human language; it can no longer be described 
                                               
486 Arendt, H. (2007), p. 46. 
487 Arendt, H. (2007), p. 44. 
488 Ibid, p. 48. 
489 Arendt, H. (1958), pp. 582-583. 
490 Arendt, H. (2007), p. 47. 
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at all, and it is being expressed but not described, in mathematical processes”.491 She approvingly 
cites Erwin Schrödinger’s dictum that the universe we are trying to “conquer is not only practically 
inaccessible, but not even thinkable”, perhaps not as meaningless to our minds, including those of the 
scientist, as a “ ‘triangular circle’ but much more so than ‘a winged lion’ ”.492 
Cultural lag theory, from this perspective, oversimplifies the problem at hand. The problem 
is not that one part of culture is lagging behind another, correlated one, but that one part of us is 
lagging behind another. A rift has occurred between our understanding, which corresponds with the 
world of appearances and phenomena as they reveal themselves naturally to our consciousness, and 
the realm of technical, scientific knowledge, which is based on systematic abstraction from 
phenomenal reality. 
As a result of this alienating process, Arendt argues, another, practically more problematic, 
rift has occurred, namely the rift between the capacity for acting and the capacity for understanding – 
a rift which Anders calls the Promethean disjunction. The problem Arendt and Anders identified was 
that, even though we (as we have seen that ‘we’ includes scientists and engineers) cannot fully 
understand the findings and methods of modern scientific inquiry, we can still apply and utilise them 
in modern technology. To use a perhaps exceedingly simple example, we can easily represent infinity 
mathematically as  ¥  and we can apply this representation in for instance computer programs, even 
though we cannot grasp its meaning and therefore are unable to translate it into the categories and 
ideas of human reason.  
Arendt therefore argues that “the lost contact between the word of the senses and 
appearances and the physical world view has been re-established not by the scientist but by the 
‘plumber’. The technicians, who account today for the overwhelming majority of all ‘researchers’, 
have brought the results of scientists down to earth”.493 The result of this process is that we now have 
the ability to not only think ‘from the point of the universe’ but even  to “handle nature from a point 
of the universe outside the earth” and, one might add, outside of ourselves.494 
Furthermore, modern scientific inquiry itself, according to Arendt, is more accurately 
described in terms of ‘doing’, i.e. practice, than in terms of theory and contemplation. The fact, for 
instance, that modern science is increasingly reliant on mathematics and statistics, meant, for Arendt, 
that its findings cannot be meaningfully translated into the categories of human language and 
thought. Another reason is that its core method is that of experimentation. Homo faber, Arendt 
argues, creates knowledge by ‘making nature’, by forcing nature into specific conditions that do not 
naturally occur and thus do not ordinarily reveal themselves to thought and observation. The 
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situations we study and based on which we acquire knowledge about the causalities reigning in 
nature are artificial, they are produced.495  
 For Arendt, advances in modern scientific inquiry hence cannot be separated from the 
technological will to work on nature to begin with. Not only does ‘the plumber’, i.e. technology, 
bring “the results of science to earth” and hence present material evidence for the validity of 
scientific theory, not only does scientific knowledge require active intervention with natural 
processes in order to advance, technology also plays a pivotal role in providing scientific inquiry 
with the means necessary for its advancement. As discussed above, at the very beginning of the 
modern age and thus of the loss of trust in the truth-telling capacities of the human senses and 
unaided reason, Arendt locates the invention of the telescope and hence a technology. The telescope 
“pierced the distance between earth and sky and delivered the secrets of the stars to human 
cognition,“ revealing worlds behind those that appear to the senses.496  
In Arendt’s view, the technological world and the world of ordinary human experience, in 
particular the different types of knowledge associated with them, thus were in many ways 
irreconcilable. There was no gap to bridge, no lag to close. The lag identified by cultural lag 
theorists, if anything, gave evidence of the fundamental irreconcilability between the two worlds 
modern humanity had begun to occupy. This is what Arendt and Anders sought to convey in almost 
identical terms when they argued that “man can do, and successfully do, what he cannot comprehend 
and cannot express in everyday language” 497 and that there is a “growing gap between what man can 
do and what man can mentally realise”.498 The Promethean disjunction speaks of a new and 
permanent facet of the human condition rather than a lag that can eventually be closed.  
From Anders’ point of view, in fact, one could see in cultural lag theory an instance of 
Promethean shame. It translates into the demand that human life on a political and social level adjust 
to the demands of technology, rather than the other way around. It thus highlights what Anders and 
Arendt considered to be the deeper struggle at the heart of the modern human condition, namely a 
struggle for the ‘stature of man’, i.e. for the status of what Arendt and Anders call the human qua 
human - the human as it is, limited, imperfect and faulty.499  
 
  
                                               
495 Arendt here again closely echoes Heidegger, who had made in effect the exact same claim in ‘The Age of 
the World Picture’, cf. Heidegger, M. (1977), p. 121. 
496 Arendt, H. (2007), p. 49. 
497 Arendt (2007), p. 46. Italics added by the author. 
498 Anders, G. (1962), p. 494. 
499 The term human qua human, to the authors knowledge, is never really specified by Arendt or Anders. It 
would be a worthy subject for a separate piece. Arendt uses the phrase in a letter to Karl Jaspers, where she 
discusses her understanding of the ‘radical evil’. See Arendt, H. & Jaspers, K. (1987), p. 202, No. 109; For 
Anders’ invocation of the phrase see Anders, G. (1956a), p.  48.  
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Conclusion - a problem of benchmarks 
 
 
As this discussion of the topic of nuclear weapons in the thought of Hannah Arendt and Günther 
Anders shows, both authors shared many of the concerns we can identify in existential risk 
scholarship today. They did take the problem of human extinction seriously as a problem of unique 
and unprecedented moral, ethical and political importance and argued, as existential risk researchers 
do today, that its emergence has catapulted humanity into a new epoch. 
Yet, their discussions of the threat to human life on Earth is embedded in a discussion of 
what they considered to be a much deeper and wider transformation of the human condition through 
modern technology. Arguably, they took the threat to human life on Earth much more seriously than 
existential risk researchers do today in trying to make sense of it in such terms and in trying to 
uncover its deeper philosophical implications. If one wanted to try and boil the two authors’ shared 
concerns regarding modern technology down into one sentence, one might argue that they both were 
concerned that humanity was in the process of building around it a world of technological systems 
and apparatuses of which it could make ever less sense and which, in turn, could not ‘make sense’ of 
humanity.500 That is, they feared that humanity was beginning to occupy an ‘unhuman world’, a 
world increasingly alien to it.  
The fact that, due to the appearance of nuclear weapons, the human species suddenly needed 
to consider itself as mortal, for both authors, was arguably but the most momentous and monstrous 
instance of this alienating dynamic. From the moment of the arrival of nuclear weapons onwards 
humanity’s “mode of being”, as Anders argues, had been transformed into “not yet being non-
existing”.501 Humanity had begun to live in the “Age of Respite” and this age, according to Anders, 
had to be considered humanity’s “Last Age” because, no matter for how long it would last, its 
“differentia specifica, the possibility of self-extinction can never end but by the end itself”. Humanity 
thus saw itself confronted with an open-ended end-time, in which its only aim could be to delay the 
end for as long as possible - to make “the time of the end endless”.502 Anders succinctly summarises 
this shift in perspectives in his claim that the future “no longer ‘comes’; we can no longer understand 
it as ‘coming’; instead we are ‘making’ it. And we are making it in such a way that it always contains 
the possibility of its abrupt ending in itself”.503  
                                               
500 Saying that apparatuses cannot ‘make sense’ of humanity may seem inept. However, what this is intended to 
convey is an ontological problem. - the Heideggerian idea that modern technology embodies an ontology that 
inherently abstracts from phenomenal reality. 
501 Anders, G. (1962), p. 493. 
502 Ibid, p. 494. 
503 Anders, G. (1956a), p. 282. The text was translated by the author. The original German version reads as 
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This new temporality, however, according to both Arendt and Anders is profoundly alien to 
us. As Arendt’s concept of world shows, taking the future for granted, considering ourselves as part 
of an ongoing transformation of qualities, thinking in terms of temporally extended commitments, 
etc., is what, according to Arendt, it means to be human. It is how we make sense of what a human 
life is. In all our commitments, in everything we aspire to, and in everything we value the future is 
present and implicitly taken for granted. This is also why Anders argued that we have been 
transformed into a new species, into titans, by becoming ‘Lords of the Apocalypse’ and suddenly 
responsible for ‘making’ the future – a species for which the emotions and intuitions of past 
generations have become alien. 
Existential risk research can be seen as an attempt to come to terms with this new perspective 
on the future; its mission could literally be summarised as that of trying to ‘make the time of the end 
endless’. But existential risk theory complicates Anders’ and Arendt’s concerns because it highlights 
that, whilst these two authors were concerned with just one threat to the survival of the species, a 
technological one, there are in fact many and that, on cosmic time-scales, the open-ended end time 
really is an open-ended obstacle course, where humanity needs to deploy multiple strategies to 
survive for any considerable amount of time. What the generalised perspective on existential risk 
shows is that humanity has always been living in the ‘Age of Respite’, albeit perhaps without 
realising it. In other words, when Anders claimed that nuclear weapons transformed the temporality 
of humanity from one in which the future could be taken for granted into one of a permanent respite, 
from an existential risk perspective this merely means that humanity was forced to give up on a 
beautiful illusion.  
The generalised perspective on existential risk therefore can be said to rehabilitate 
technology demonstrating its ambivalent role when it comes to the survival of the species and that it 
is not solely technology’s ‘fault’ that humanity now finds itself confronted with the problem of 
finitude on a collective level too. On the contrary, it stresses that even though technology may be our 
greatest threat in the short term, in the long run it also is our only hope for survival. To put it in the 
words of Tegmark: “If we don’t keep improving our technology, the question isn’t whether humanity 
will go extinct, but how. What will get us first—an asteroid, a supervolcano, the burning heat of the 
aging Sun, or some other calamity”.504 
Against that background, Günther Anders’ and Hannah Arendt’s critique of technology by 
reference to nuclear weapons may begin to seem dated. If technology is our only means for survival, 
then thinking about it in categories such as ‘the radical evil’ might appear short-sighted and 
metaphysically grounded concerns could appear as of secondary importance. It is important to note at 
this point, however, that neither Anders, nor Arendt, nor even Heidegger, would have thought of 
                                                                                                                                                 
dasjenige, was wir heute tun, kann er übermorgen eintreten oder in der Generation unserer Urenkel oder im 
‚siebten Geschlecht‘.” 
504 Tegmark, M. (2017), p. 317. 
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themselves as Luddites, i.e. as wholly opposed to technological progress. Arendt conceded for 
instance that “it is only the rise of technology, and not the rise of modern political ideas as such, 
which has refuted the old and terrible truth that only violence and rule over others could make some 
men free”.505 Anders rejected criticism labelling his philosophy of technology as reactionary by 
claiming that he was not “metaphysically conservative” and did not  insist “on an alleged 
(metaphysical) status of the world as it is”, framing “human morality along the lines of  ‘things are 
the way they are and should be’”.506 Even Heidegger argued that “it would be foolish to attack 
technology blindly. It would be short-sighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on 
technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances”.507 That is, none of them would 
have denied that technology plays a critical role in sustaining human life, nor even that the desire to 
push the boundaries of the possible by technological means is deeply connected to what it means to 
be human, that it is expressive of our freedom, our curiosity, our capacity to wonder and ponder and 
the associated desire to make sense of our ‘thrownness into being’. 
What Heidegger, Arendt and Anders warned against is uncritical interaction with modern 
technology by conceiving of it as a mere means to an end, as no more than a neutral tool in the 
service of humanity. The above discussions of Promethean shame, technology as action, the radical 
evil, and the schizophrenic condition of modern human existence, were intended to convey an idea of 
the pathologies and paradoxes which Arendt and Anders saw as resulting from such uncritical 
interaction with technology. The concept of Promethean shame shows that, by conceiving of 
technology as a neutral tool, humanity implicitly makes an unspecified idea of technological 
perfection the measure of things and begins to conceive of itself as outdated, inadequate and 
expendable, resulting in a complete inversion of the means-ends relationship. The notion of 
technology as action shows that conceiving of technology as a means to an end not only 
fundamentally misrepresents the categorically altered nature of modern technology as compared to 
ancient tekné but nurtures the anachronistic belief that more technological control over natural 
processes somehow translates into more control over the future (human destiny) whilst in reality it 
translates into the exact opposite in several respects. The notion of ‘the radical evil’ highlights that 
modern technology confronts humanity with problems that exceed what humans can imagine and 
understand, both because of the scale of the horrors in question, and because the philosophical 
implications of these horrors undermine categories of thought based on which we are accustomed to 
make sense of ourselves and our situation. The notion of the ‘schizophrenic condition of modern 
existence’, lastly, refers to what Arendt and Anders saw as the deeper reason underlying these 
pathologies and paradoxes – the fact that the ontological condition underlying technological progress 
(i.e. the technological understanding of being), is fundamentally at odds with our phenomenal 
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consciousness and thus the reference units of ordinary human understanding, allowing us to do what 
we cannot understand. 
 These observations provide us with different angles on the same problem: that scientific and 
technological development appear to have a deeply paradoxical effect on us and our image of 
ourselves. We simultaneously conceive of ourselves as in principle omnipotent masters of the 
universe and at the same time as hopelessly outdated, unacceptably faulty creatures. On the one hand, 
science and technology increase our knowledge about the future of the universe to an extent 
unimaginable for past generations - we are able to predict that the sun will turn into a black hole 
hundreds of millions of years from now. On the other hand, our technologically amplified powers 
imply that the future states of our own earthly environment are arguably less predictable for us than 
they were for past generations. We at once consider ourselves more knowledgeable than ever before 
and find ourselves mistrusting our unamplified, natural judgment to an increasing extent. In brief, the 
above observations explain why Anders identified “hubristic humility” or “arrogant self-degradation” 
as modern humankind’s defining attitude.508 
 Existential risk theory arguably contains the purest possible version of this paradoxical 
attitude. Taking existential risk seriously in the macro-strategic sense means thinking in cosmic 
timescales, reflecting about earth and humanity from a detached, exterior perspective, and using this 
perspective to “weigh ethical dilemmas, and evaluate global priorities” in order “to clarify the 
choices that will shape humanity’s long-term future“.509 In Anders’ view this is inherently hubristic. 
In the context of existential risk, scholars do not assume this abstract viewpoint for purely theoretical 
purposes, as theoretical physicists and cosmologists do, but to guide our practical considerations and 
policy making in the here and now. What both Arendt and Anders stressed was that making the point 
of the universe one’s benchmark for thinking about human affairs does not mean that one assumes a 
neutral or objective viewpoint. On the contrary, it means that one takes a highly normatively charged 
viewpoint from which everything seems arbitrable, negotiable and perfectible. 
 Existential risk research hinges on the assumption that humanity actually could, one day, 
occupy this detached, abstract point in time and space, from which all the things that might otherwise 
result in extinction are negotiable and manageable. Cotton-Barratt and Ord (2015) concede that this 
factor is already reflected in the standard definition of existential risk (“an existential risk is one that 
threatens the premature extinction of Earth-originating intelligent life or the permanent and drastic 
destruction of its potential for desirable future development”510). Under this definition, Cotton-
Barratt and Ord argue, we are “comparing ourselves to the most optimistic potential we could 
reach”.511  
                                               
508 Anders, G. (2016), p. 49. 
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510 Bostrom, N. (2013), p. 15. 
511 Cotton-Barratt, O. & Ord, T. (2015), p. 4. 
 136 
 Anders’ concept of Promethean shame allows us to see that this comparison is inherent to our 
customary idea of technology. As argued in section 3.1, for Anders our conception of technology as a 
neutral means implies that we are constantly ‘comparing ourselves to the most optimistic potential 
we could reach’.  
 This brings us to what both Anders and Arendt saw as profoundly dangerous about uncritical 
interaction with technology. They were concerned that when we think of technology as a mere means 
to an end we see a world of potential perfection, where all options technology can in principle 
provide us with have been realised. This idea of technological perfection, however, in their view, is 
nothing but an empty projection surface and making it our benchmark for thinking about present and 
future is not only bound to fail on multiple dimensions but profoundly dangerous. 
First, because, as has been established, in our pursuit of perfection we risk creating a world 
which is actually more dangerous, less controllable and predictable and for which we, as imperfect 
beings, are ill-suited, ending up being the eternal saboteurs of our products. Second, because even if 
technological maturity, “the attainment of capabilities affording a level of economic productivity and 
control over nature close to the maximum that could feasibly be achieved”,512 was possible, it would 
raise Heidegger’s question: “what for? - where to? and what then?” 513 Arendt and Anders agreed 
with Heidegger that modern technology has its roots in a normatively problematic understanding of 
being, an ontology that abstracts from phenomenal reality which is the basis of the human way of 
being-in-the-world and thus of the reference units of our values and understanding. The basic 
property of modern technology is that, ontologically and practically, it transcends givens and 
transforms them into manipulable processes and negotiable states of affairs.  
Like Heidegger, they were concerned that the pursuit of technological perfection could only 
result in a profoundly unhuman if not outright anti-human world. Both sought to tease out what they 
considered to be, at bottom, anti-humanist tendencies inherent to progress in modern science and 
technology, fuelled by a self-contradictory cocktail of emotions, passions and philosophical 
principles as it is. According to Arendt and Anders the passionate pursuit for perfection, driven by 
the belief that ‘everything is possibly’, is inherently self-contradictory and anti-human, because it is 
only within certain, from a technological standpoint arbitrary, conditions that the term ‘human’ has 
any content at all - conditions in the form of world (intergenerational permanence, stability, 
durability), plurality, and spontaneity, conditions in the form of mortality and natality, and conditions 
constituted by limits to what we can know, speak and think meaningfully about, connected to 
understanding and thus sense-experience and emotion as these notions are. Even the desire to 
overcome these conditions and limits itself can only be understood from within them.  Without 
limits, from the point of the universe, if truly everything was possible and all parameters of existence 
negotiable and adjustable, there would be nothing at all to strive for, nothing to desire at all, because 
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there would be no reference point to such desires. There would be, as Heidegger puts it, nothing from 
which any ordo could arise. As argued in chapter 2, even calculative thinking takes its course from 
something given and, therefore, if it were to become the only way of thinking, it would render itself 
directionless.  
 C.S. Lewis (1948), in The Abolition of Man, arrives at the exact same conclusion about the 
prospects of what he calls ‘analytical understanding’, which he sums up in a powerful metaphor that 
illustrates Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ concerns pointedly:   
 
"You cannot go on 'seeing through' things forever. The whole point of seeing through something 
is to see something through it. It is good that the window should be transparent, because the 
street or garden beyond is opaque. How if you saw through the garden too? […] If you see 
through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible 
world. To 'see through' all things is the same as not to see”.514  
 
For Arendt and Anders, the problem of technology hence came down to a problem of benchmarks. 
Neither took issue with technology per se, with making use of artifice to make our lives better. What 
they warned against was making technology, i.e. the logic of total negotiability and perfectibility, the 
measure of things. It is this criticism of the technological mindset which shows why Arendt’s and 
Anders’ critique of technology is not rendered outdated by the generalised perspective on existential 
risk.  The Promethean disjunction – “that man can do what he cannot comprehend” is, in effect, an 
ontological credo about the essential role of givens and limits in human life which existential risk 
theorists either disregard, reject or are unaware of.  
So far, the debates therefore largely run parallel to one another, observing, arguably, the 
same phenomenon, the same transformational process, but analysing it in an entirely different light, 
the one from a technical, the other from a phenomenologically informed perspective. At the heart of 
this divide are two fundamentally different conceptions of technology. On the one hand side we have 
the mainstream conception of technology, where technology is understood as having no valuative 
content of its own. On the other hand, we have a critical school of thought which argues that 
technology cannot be discussed in isolation from ontological questions - that it in fact is based on and 
perpetuates a problematic attitude to being which not only undermines the possibility of normativity 
but also makes it impossible for us to mentally realise what we are doing. 
These two positions, however, appear to converge in debates about risks associated with 
‘superintelligence’. The fear in existential risk circles, to put it in Heideggerian terminology, appears 
to be that superintelligent machines could turn everything that exists into standing reserve. 
Interestingly, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the underlying reason for that fear can be 
shown to be an ontological one. The debates surrounding AI demonstrate precisely what Heidegger, 
Arendt, and Anders claimed all along, namely that one cannot use modern technology as if it were a 
                                               
514 Lewis, C.S. (1943), p. 51. 
 138 
mere means to an end and abstract from the deeper ontologically rooted dangers it poses indefinitely. 
In the fears surrounding AI we encounter many of the ontological concerns regarding technology, 
which Heidegger, Arendt and Anders discussed using categories such as ‘thoughtlessness’, 
‘objectlessness’, ‘Promethean shame’, or ‘standing reserve’, couched in a technical language under 
labels such as ‘value alignment’, ‘orthogonality thesis’, or ‘Realistic World Models’. To this point of 









Selmer Bringsjord (2015) summarises Nick Bostrom’s influential 2014 book ‘Superintelligence’ in a 
rather parsimonious one-liner: “We should be deeply concerned about the possible future arrival of 
super-intelligent, malicious computing machines (since we might well be targets of their malice)”.515 
This characterisation certainly is not flat-out wrong but it misrepresents the concerns of Bostrom and 
many other artificial intelligence (AI) researchers, who voice concerns about AI from an existential 
risk perspective. My aim in this chapter is to unpack these concerns because, irrespective of how 
likely or unlikely, judged by scientific standards, the emergence of superintelligent machines might 
be, the present debates surrounding the topic, featuring a colourful amalgam of existential fears, 
existential hopes, ridicule and serious scholarly concern, happen to reflect the whole spectrum of 
complications and puzzles I have sought to raise attention for throughout the past chapters.  
That is, these concerns provide us with a magnifying glass through which to examine the 
puzzles at the heart of existential risk research, highlighting, once again, the prescience and ongoing 
actuality of Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Ander’s thinking about technology. The debates about the 
long-term consequences of progress in AI can be seen as a technical meditation about what 
‘technology as destiny’ might actually mean. It is interesting to see, therefore, that in these debates, 
existential risk researchers and those who share their concerns regarding progress in artificial 
intelligence, appear to articulate similar concerns regarding technological progress as those we have 
encountered in Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ critical analyses of scientific and technological 
progress. They revivify what is perhaps Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ core concern with respect 
to technology, namely that at the heart of the modern condition is an ontological struggle, a clash 
between two conflicting ontologies, or relations to reality and thus two different worlds which 
modern humanity had begun to occupy - worlds both in an ideational sense as well as in a physical 
sense – phenomenal reality, the world of sense experience, of the particular, common sense, of 
ordinary language on the one hand side and the technological, the world of abstraction and 
generalisation and its products on the other hand side, in which our ordinary categories of thought 
and action are making less and less sense. AI can be seen as a pure version of this dilemma.  
Artificial intelligence, or machine intelligence, without doubt is the most widely and most 
persistently debated single technological issue within the existential risk movement and, as I intend 
to demonstrate, against the background of the discussion of the previous chapters, this should not 
come as a surprise. The reason lies in the fact that, to put it in Stuart Russell’s words, contrary to 
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nuclear weapons, bio-technology, geo-engineering, or other previously touched upon technologies, 
AI is not really a technology at all, nor is it a specific class of technical approaches, but a problem, 
namely the “general problem of creating intelligence in machines”.516 By implication the often 
anticipated existential risk from AI, at least at the present point in time, also cannot really be seen as 
a risk that is associated with a specific technology, i.e. as a risk comparable to those from nuclear 
weapons or geo-engineering, but needs to be seen as a risk that is associated with a largely 
theoretical problem. This problem, however, appears to be the same as the by now familiar problem 
of how to reconcile the technological understanding of being with the world of human sense 
experience and ordinary understanding. When Blitz (2014) claims that Heidegger sought to draw 
“attention to technology’s place in bringing about our decline by constricting our experience of 
things as they are” and to the fact “that we now view nature, and increasingly human beings too, only 
technologically […] as raw material for technical operations“, this assertion, curiously, sounds 
uncannily similar  to the kind of concerns that are being voiced by existential risk researchers in the 
context of AI.517 The fear regarding AI is, to put it in the words of Jaan Tallinn and Huw Price, “that 
by creating artificially intelligent machines we risk yielding control over the planet to intelligences 
that are simply indifferent to us and to the things we consider valuable”.518 Now, of course this is 
precisely what, according to Heidegger, Arendt and Anders, we were at risk of doing all along, by 
yielding to the relentless logic of scientific and technological progress both in mind and in practice. 
As we have seen in chapter 2, Heidegger was convinced that the challenging revealing underlying 
modern technology is inherently oblivious ‘to us and to the things we consider valuable’ because it 
cannot make sense of such notions as ‘us’ and ‘things’ to begin with. In the discussions surrounding 
AI, as we will see, this ontological clash between the technological understanding of being and how 
things appear naturally to our consciousness, which Heidegger had uncovered and which shines 
through in Arendt’s and Anders’ diagnoses of the ‘schizophrenic condition of the modern age’, re-
emerge as engineering problems.  
 One might be inclined to think, in the light of this ostensible common ground, that in the case 
of AI the two branches of discussion, with Heidegger, Anders, and Arendt on the one hand side and 
existential risk theory on the other hand side begin to converge. However, as we will see, in last 
consequence such appears not to be the case. The reason is that their respective starting points of 
reflection are completely different ones – the latter think ‘from the point of the universe’ the others 
from the point of the ‘the human qua human’. My aim in this chapter is to pinpoint exactly where, 
how and ultimately why the concerns of the two camps might begin to converge in the case of AI in 
order to then show why they nonetheless remain unreconcilable. 
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The chapter is organised in the following way. First, a brief summary of the standard 
argument that artificial intelligence potentially harbours existential risks is provided. In a second step 
I will then frame the thus presented argument and relate it to some core distinctions in the field. This 
will serve to bring out what I consider to be the most interesting characteristic of the existential fears 
surrounding AI, namely the fact that they alternate between highly vague and highly specific 
conceptions of AI in their visions of AI’s future. In the remaining sections I will then proceed to 
discuss the literature on superintelligence from the perspective of Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ 
philosophy of technology and in the light of the preceding chapters.  
 
4.1 The existential risk from AI 
 
On the surface, the argument that the prospect of superintelligent machines should leave us deeply 
concerned is rather straightforward. Nick Bostrom opens his book ‘Superintelligence’, with a fable – 
“The unfinished fable of the sparrows” – which tells the story of a flock of sparrows that discusses 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of taming an owl. Some sparrows praise the potential 
benefits that might come with taming an owl and how the owl might help them to build their nests 
and protect them from the neighbourhood cat. Only one old, half-blind sparrow seeks to caution such 
hopes and warns that the attempt to domesticate an owl seems like an inherently dangerous thing to 
do, in particular since the sparrows have no experience in ‘the art of owl domestication’. However, 
the optimistic sparrows prevail: “It will be difficult enough to find an owl egg” the flock leader 
proclaims, “so let us start there. After we have succeeded in raising an owl, then we can think about 
taking on this other challenge”.519 Obviously, this fable is mainly intended to function as a teaser and 
it is not to be taken too seriously as an analogy for the concerns surrounding artificial intelligence. It 
does nevertheless capture the spirit of the debate rather accurately and, perhaps unwittingly, reveals 
several of the argumentatively problematic features of the take on the problem of AI in existential 
risk theory.  
The ‘existential risk from AI argument’ (in the following abbreviated as ‘AI-risk argument’) 
proceeds as follows. First, it holds that we might be approaching a moment at which AI becomes 
broadly comparable to human intelligence in its general applicability.520 In the literature this 
hypothetical AI is generally referred to as artificial general intelligence (AGI).  Once machine 
intelligence reaches such a threshold, it is further argued, it might soon become better than humans at 
the specific task of designing intelligent machines. What might then follow is often referred to as an 
‘intelligence explosion’ - a run-away process or feedback cycle of exponential, self-augmenting and -
optimising machine intelligence which would propel machine intelligence onto levels beyond 
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anything humanly imaginable, resulting in so called superintelligence.521 Superintelligence is 
typically defined as a system that supersedes human intelligence in practically all domains. Soares 
and Fallenstein (2014) for instance define superintelligence as an AI that is “smarter than the best 
human brains in practically every field”,522 Bostrom et al. (2016) similarly define superintelligence as 
a system that is “more cognitively capable than humans in all practically relevant domains”,523 and 
CSER defines superintelligence as being “superior to human performance in many or nearly all 
domains”.524 The significance of such an event, i.e. of an intelligence explosion, it is further argued, 
would be hard to overstate, because, as for instance Russell (2017) holds: “everything our civilization 
offers is a consequence of our intelligence; thus, access to substantially greater intelligence would 
constitute a discontinuity in human history”.525 
We can distinguish between two basic hypotheses, the ‘tipping-point hypothesis’ and the 
‘discontinuity hypothesis’, that jointly form the basis of the AI-risk argument. The tipping point 
hypothesis holds that if AI capacities reach a certain threshold, namely human level intelligence, it is 
likely to supersede this level across all domains soon after.526 The discontinuity thesis holds that such 
an event would constitute a rupture in human history because whatever follows would be radically 
different from our present point of view.527  
The existential risk is associated with the possibility that this cataclysmic event might turn 
out to have catastrophic consequences from a human point of view. Price (2013) for instance argues 
that “we humans are nearing one of the most significant moments in our entire history: the point at 
which intelligence escapes the constraints of biology” and adds that he sees “no compelling grounds 
for confidence that if that does happen, we will survive the transition in reasonable shape”.528  
Price bases his concerns on what he calls a ‘pragmatist conception’ of intelligence: “Don’t 
think about what intelligence is, think about what it does […] we tend to be much better at 
controlling our environment than other species […] the question is then whether machines might at 
some point do an even better job”.529 In other words, intelligence is understood as the property which 
manifests itself in our ability to control our natural environment. This perspective is representative 
for the literature on existential risk. Soares and Fallenstein (2014), of the Machine Intelligence 
Research Institute (MIRI), for instance argue that “the property that has given humans a dominant 
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advantage over other species is not strength or speed, but intelligence”,530 and Bostrom (2014) claims 
that “the human brain, has some capabilities that the brains of other animals lack. It is to these 
distinctive capabilities that we owe our dominant position on the planet. Other animals have stronger 
muscles and sharper claws, but we have cleverer brains”.531 By implication, the existential risk 
associated with superintelligence is (since a superintelligence would have to be assumed to be much 
better, perhaps unimaginably better, at controlling the environment than us) that humanity could find 
itself pushed to the brink of extinction as a mere side-effect of an intelligence explosion, by 
superintelligent machines that pursue their goals without taking into account human interests.532 Just 
as many species find themselves pushed to the brink of extinction due to the advance of human 
civilisation, we might find ourselves wholly dependent on the will of these hypothetical future 
agents: “As the fate of the gorillas now depends more on us humans than on the gorillas themselves, 
so the fate of our species would depend on the actions of an alien intelligence“.533 Existential risk 
researchers, however, are careful to avoid the impression that they are concerned about the 
emergence of malevolent, superintelligent robots that try to enslave humanity, as depicted in science 
fiction movies from ‘The Terminator’ to the ‘The Matrix’.534  
The FLI states that such representations “succinctly summarise the scenario that AI 
researchers don’t worry about” and that, in fact, it “combines as many as three separate 
misconceptions: concern about consciousness, evil, and robots”.535 As we have seen above, the risk 
is understood in pragmatic terms. Accordingly, consciousness, it is argued, is irrelevant to the AI risk 
because what matters is what AI does, not if, how, or what it might be feeling or thinking whilst 
doing it. By implication, in so far as consciousness is considered to be a precondition for the presence 
of motivations and emotional states, concerns about evil are not part of the argument. The real worry, 
the FLI states, is not malevolence but competence, where competence is understood as the ability to 
efficiently attain goals. Superintelligences need not be hostile to humanity, mere mis-alignment 
between their goals and our values would suffice to pose an existential threat if the AI is sufficiently 
competent to realise its goals irrespective of our preferences: “Humans don’t generally hate ants, but 
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we are more intelligent than they are – so if we want to build a hydroelectric dam and there is an 
anthill there, too bad for the ants”.536 As we will see below, in AI safety research this problem has 
come to be known as the ‘value-alignment problem’. This of course raises the question how a 
hypothetical AI could pose a threat to humanity without a body, i.e. without a connection to the 
physical world that would allow it to exert control over and manipulate the environment, including 
us, to such an extent that it could conceivably pose a threat to humanity’s survival. To this AI 
researchers tend to respond that an internet connection would suffice for a misaligned 
superintelligence to cause significant, perhaps catastrophic harm. An internet connection “may 
enable outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human 
leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even understand. Even if building robots were physically 
impossible, a super-intelligent and super-wealthy AI could easily pay or manipulate many humans to 
unwittingly do its bidding”.537 In the literature this problem is referred to as the ‘control’ or 
‘containment problem’. 
 In brief, intelligence is understood as competence, and competence is understood as the ability 
to maximise one’s expected utility by means of exerting control over a given physical and/or digital 
environment. As Russell (2018) argues “a computer is intelligent to the extent that it does the right 
thing rather than the wrong thing. The right thing is whatever action is most likely to achieve the 
goal, or, in more technical terms, the action that maximises expected utility”.538 Tegmark (2017), of 
the FHI, similarly defines intelligence as the “ability to accomplish complex goals”.539 Hence, 
intelligence in the discussions surrounding the existential risk from AI is broadly reduced to 
categories of instrumental rationality, i.e.  means-ends thinking.540  
Now, this definition of intelligence is not simply a theoretical model of intelligence which is 
used as a basis for conjectures about potential future superintelligent behaviour, it is the model of 
intelligence based on which AIs are designed today. Presently existing AIs are expected utility 
optimisers.541 However, at the moment AIs tend to be limited to individual tasks and domains. For 
this reason, they are typically referred to as ‘narrow AIs’. Narrow AIs provide domain-dependent and 
problem-specific solutions. They are single-purpose programmes that perform well, often on 
superhuman levels, at clearly specified tasks within neatly compartmentalised and controlled 
environments such as board or computer game environments, factories, public transportation 
infrastructure, or social media websites.542 On the other hand, narrow AIs are incapable of executing 
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any task apart from the one they have been explicitly designed for. Deep Blue for instance defeated 
former world champion Gary Kasparov in chess but was incapable to decide on a single move in 
checkers.543 In other words, narrow AIs are inevitably rendered dysfunctional once they are asked to 
optimise outcomes in a different domain than the one they have been explicitly designed for, or once 
the environment within which they are supposed to execute the task changes in unprovided-for 
ways.544 Descartes’ assessment of the promises of machine intelligence, against that background, 
apparently still holds: “although machines can perform certain things as well as or perhaps better 
than any of us can do, they infallibly fall short in others, by the which means we may discover that 
they did not act from knowledge, but only from the disposition of their organs”.545 
On the other hand, progress in narrow AI has been enormous over the past approximately 15 
years. Driven largely by breakthroughs in machine learning, self-steering cars are becoming part of 
the fabric of everyday life,546 computers have beaten the best human players in games from DoTA2, 
to Jeopardy! and Go,547 workers in call centres give advice that is provided by AI expert systems,548 
speech-recognition and -processing algorithms that allow for complex phone conversations are now 
promising to make the call centre workers themselves redundant,549 AIs supply us with individually 
tailored news and shopping suggestions, algorithmic trading is revolutionising financial markets, the 
‘internet of things’ points the way to the ‘smart home’, where the seamless supply with fresh 
groceries, heating, illumination, etc., can be fully customised and automated, and ‘robo cops’ that are 
equipped with facial recognition software have begun patrolling the streets of Dubai.550 Some authors 
even suggest that, in some economic sectors, algorithmic resource allocation might soon replace 
markets as central resource allocation mediators because the growing abundance of data allows for 
centralised decision making where before decentral approaches were more effective.551 The success 
of algorithm-coordinated resource allocation platforms such as Uber can serve as a case in point. 
 In the eyes of many researchers in the field the present dynamic is so impressive indeed that 
they consider it a real possibility that in the foreseeable future every single work-related task could 
be fully automated and executed by a machine. A widely cited study from 2013 suggests that more 
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than half of US jobs are vulnerable to automation in the near future,552 and in a recent survey 
conducted with 352 AI experts the aggregate forecast gave a 50 per cent chance that “unaided 
machines can accomplish every task better and more cheaply than human workers” within 45 years 
and a 10% chance of this happening within the next 9 years.553  
 In effect, the existential fears surrounding AI pertain to the possibility that artificial expected 
utility optimisers will one day no longer be narrow in their applicability but general, performing on, 
or above human levels across most or all domains. Such hypothetical AIs are generally referred to as 
artificial general intelligences (AGIs). AGIs are expected to be capable of “efficient cross-domain 
optimization”, where ‘optimisation’ denotes the ability to ‘steer the future into regions of possibility 
ranked high in a preference ordering’, ‘cross-domain’ denotes the ability to optimise in many 
domains rather than just one, and ‘efficient’ refers to speed, computational efficiency and resource 
efficiency.554 Authors in the field hence abstract from notoriously thorny questions regarding the 
potential mental states, motivations, phenomenal experience, consciousness, etc., of AGIs, focusing 
on intelligence as instrumental problem-solving capacity.555 A superintelligent AGI, accordingly, is 
pictured to be a superhumanly powerful cross-domain optimisation process, outperforming humans 
in attaining any given set of goals by controlling its environment across all practically relevant 
domains.556  
 However, it is precisely this understanding of intelligence which leads some authors, following 
Nick Bostrom,557 to argue that the default outcome of an intelligence explosion would be an 
existential catastrophe.558  In order to develop a better idea of the precise nature of the fears 
surrounding AGI it is central to be acquainted with two regularly invoked theses based on which 
Bostrom (2012, 2014) and Omohundro (2008, 2012) seek to approximate how ‘sufficiently rational’ 
future AGIs might behave. 
 First, the so-called orthogonality thesis, according to which “intelligence and final goals are 
orthogonal axes along which possible agents can freely vary”, which means that “more or less any 
level of intelligence could in principle be combined with more or less any final goal”.559 Another way 
of expressing the same idea is, to follow Omohundro (2012), that “rational agents […] keep their 
goals separate from their model of the world. Their goals are represented by a real-valued utility 
function U which measures the desirability of each possible outcome”.560 In other words, if 
intelligence is associated with identifying rational action based on specific models of the world, these 
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models form one side of the equation whilst goals, i.e. the basis on which the quality of the action is 
to be evaluated, form the other. Hence, intelligence is understood to be value-neutral, no more than a 
means to an end and, as such, an AI can theoretically be built with any final goal.561 The 
orthogonality thesis is generally invoked in order to discourage thinking about superintelligences 
along anthropomorphic lines, i.e. to warn against the idea that superintelligent AIs will somehow 
naturally be imbued with human values.562 The orthogonality thesis implies that AIs can have any 
goal,  no matter how bizarre or trivial, and that they will pursue it as effectively and efficiently as 
possible, irrespective of our interests, unless they are explicitly designed in ways that prevent them 
from acting in ways that conflict with human values.563 
The second central thesis used to approximate the space of potential ‘superintelligent 
motivations’ is referred to as the ‘instrumental convergence thesis’. It holds that sufficiently rational 
agents are likely to exhibit a range of sub-goals regardless of what their respective final goals might 
be because these sub-goals are instrumentally valuable for the achievement of any final goal or set of 
goals. Such sub-goals are henceforth argued to be likely to emerge in most, if not all,564 sufficiently 
intelligent agents unless explicitly counteracted.565 Bostrom (2012) and Omohundro (2012) argue 
that such agents would need to be expected to converge on four sub-goals: cognitive enhancement, 
technological perfection, resource acquisition, and goal-content integrity.566 That is, any sufficientily 
rational agent is expected to exhibit the following drives: 1) A drive to preserve its own existence 
since an agent cannot achieve its objectives if it is destroyed or discontinued before its task is 
completed. By default, any sufficiently rational agent would therefore have to be expected to take 
precautions against events that might result in its premature termination. 2) A drive to increase either 
its own cognitive and physical capacities or its access to such capacities, since that would improve its 
decision-making capacities and allow it to pursue its objectives more effectively. A rational agent is 
therefore likely to strive for cognitive enhancement (i.e. potentially resulting, for instance, in the 
above-mentioned intelligence explosion) as well as to perfect its technological capacities. 3) Since 
any objective can be better met with more resources (given that these can be utilised either for the 
satisfaction of final or of instrumental goals), every rational agent should be expected to exhibit a 
drive to maximise its access to resources. 4) An instrumental goal to prevent alteration of its final 
goal structure because an alteration of its goal structure would prevent it from achieving its original 
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(2012); p. 29; Yudkowsky, E. (2008); Shulman, C. (2010). 
563 Bostrom, N. (2012), p. 5, see also Armstrong, S. (2013). 
564 According to Omohundro, S. (2012), these arguments apply equally to all types of potential architectures of 
intelligent systems, i.e. to neural networks, genetic algorithms, theorem provers, expert systems, Bayesian 
networks, fuzzy logic, evolutionary programming, etc., as long as they are  sufficiently powerful, i.e. capable of 
far-ranging reflection and strategising. 
565 Brundage, M. (2015). 
566 See also Bostrom, N. (2014), ch. 7. 
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objectives.567 Yudkowsky (2011) offers the following thought experiment to illustrate the underlying 
idea: “Suppose you offer Gandhi a pill that makes him want to kill people. The current version of 
Gandhi does not want to kill people. Thus if Gandhi predicts the effect of the pill, he will refuse to 
take the pill; because Gandhi knows that if he wants to kill people he is more likely to kill people, 
and the current Gandhi does not prefer this”.568 Now, as argued above, the claim is not that the 
emergence of such drives is inevitable, the claim is that, a priori, it must be assumed that they will 
emerge in any sufficiently rational agent unless this is deliberately counteracted in the design of the 
AI’s utility function.569  
If one combines these theses it becomes clear why existential risk researchers and an 
increasing number of AI researchers think of AI as harbouring potential existential threats to 
humanity. Taken together they imply that, by default, a sufficiently rational artificial agent would, 
once ‘switched on’, have reasons to resist and prevent all attempts to get it under control, to terminate 
it, or to retroactively alter its goal structure. Furthermore, it would seek to acquire and utilise the 
maximum amount of resources it can gain access to, including resources upon which humanity might 
depend for its survival, in order to maximise its expected utility in accordance with its final goals. If 
one further assumes that the agent in question is superintelligent, i.e. ‘smarter than the best human 
brains in practically every field’, it follows that such an optimisation process, once unleashed, could 
not be stopped by humans. Being superior to humans in all respects, it would always find ways to 
pursue its final goals, whatever they may be, and irrespective of what humanity might try to bring it 
back under control or terminate it. The implication is that, if an AGI with an overly simple final goal 
were to be developed, the result could easily be one in which humanity goes extinct.570 An often 
invoked thought experiment in the literature is the so-called paperclip-maximiser scenario. In this 
hypothetical scenario an AGI is equipped with the single goal to produce as many paperclips as 
possible, which results in the AGI attaining superintelligence only to find ingenious ways to 
transform the entire biosphere, including humanity, and ultimately ever greater portions of the 
universe into paperclips.571 Omohundro (2012) presents an analogous thought experiment featuring a 
superintelligent chess computer which finds ways to transform the entire universe into a gigantic 
computing machine for the sole purpose to maximise its chess-play abilities.572 These are deliberately 
caricatural renditions of the problem at hand but they serve to illustrate the basic point existential risk 
researchers seek to make: that one needs to be careful in the specification of the utility function of 
intelligent machines because, as expected utility maximisers, they are designed to pursue their final 
                                               
567 Compare the above points to Omohundro, S. (2012); Bostrom, N. (2012, 2014); Muehlhauser, L. & 
Salamon, A. (2012); see also Soares, N. & Fallenstein, B. (2014); and Tegmark, M. (2017), specifically ch. 2. 
568 See Yudkowsky, E. (2011), p. 389. 
569 Brundage, M. (2015), Bostrom, N. (2012). 
570 Muehlhauser, L. & Salamon, A. (2012), p. 28; Bostrom, N. (2014), p. 141. 
571 See Bostrom, N. (2012). 
572 Omohundro, S. (2012). 
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goals in inherently expansionistic ways, irrespective of how profane, meaningless, or harmless these 
goals might appear.  
The problem also is often illustrated with reference to tales such as that of King Midas, who, 
having been granted a wish by Dionysus, wished that everything he touches should turn into gold - 
with the result that literally everything he touched turned into gold, including his daughter - or the 
Sorcerer’s apprentice, who also pays a bitter price for trying to realise a rather innocent wish by 
summoning forces he cannot control.573 The morale is that if one summons an optimisation process 
that is more powerful than oneself one should be careful in articulating one’s wishes because one 
might get what one asks for, not what one wishes one had asked for.574  
The purpose of the emerging genre of AI safety research is to ensure just that. Most 
importantly this means finding a solution to what is generally referred to as the ‘value-alignment 
problem’, i.e. to the question how to “design methods for preventing AI systems from inadvertently 
acting in ways inimical to human values “.575 This means that in order for an “autonomous system to 
be helpful to humans and to pose no unwarranted risks, it needs to align its values with those of the 
humans in its environment in such a way that its actions contribute to the maximization of value for 
the humans”.576 Yudkowsky calls this “utility engineering”, the design of “utility functions that will 
give rise to consequences we desire”.577  The challenge, he suggests, is not to so much to predict 
what 'AI' may or may not do but to ‘choose into existence’ an optimisation process the good-
naturedness of which can be ‘legitimately asserted’.578  
In AI safety research a variety of potential solutions to this problem are discussed. Stuart 
Russell suggests that it may be possible to design AI systems that are provably safe and beneficial by 
following three core principles: 
 
“1. The machine’s purpose is to maximize the realization of human values. In particular, it has 
no purpose of its own and no innate desire to protect itself. 
2. The machine is initially uncertain about what those human values are. […] The machine may 
learn more about human values as it goes along, of course, but it may never achieve complete 
certainty. 
3. Machines can learn about human values by observing the choices that we humans make”.579 
 
 
The idea thus is to equip AIs with a utility functions that contain incentives to learn what and how 
humans value as part of its final goal structure.580 This approach, or rather category of approaches, is 
                                               
573 See e.g. Russell, S. (2017), p. 180; FLI (2018b). 
574 Russell, S. (2017), pp. 178-179.  
575 LCFI (2018a). 
576 Hadfield-Menell, D., et al. (2016). 
577 Yudkowsky, E. as cited in Omohundro, S. (2012), p. 164. 
578 Yudkowsky, E. (2008), p. 317. 
579 Russell, S. (2017), pp. 185–186. 
580 Torres, P. (2017c). 
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sometimes referred to as ‘indirect normativity’ and is currently the most favoured approach amongst 
AI safety researchers.581 
The problem of AI safety is the perhaps single most widely discussed individual 
technological problem in the existential risk eco-system. Not only do most of the aforementioned 
existential risk research institutes list AI as one of their top research priorities, over the past years a 
range of institutes were founded at leading universities and with the support of influential individuals 
from academia and the computer industry, that focus exclusively on this subject matter. These 
institutes are beginning to channel considerable intellectual and financial resources into the emerging 
field of ‘AI-safety’ research and into raising awareness for their concerns amongst policy makers and 
the wider public.582 The most notable of these institutes are perhaps the Machine Intelligence 
Research Institute (MIRI), OpenAI, an independent not-for-profit research organisation based in San 
Francisco, which is funded by a whole range of high-profile US technologists who have pledged a 
total of one billion US dollars in its support, the earlier mentioned Future or Life Institute (FLI), the 
Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence (LCFI) at the University of Cambridge, where 
existential risk associated with AI is at least one of the main research areas, and the Centre for 
Human Compatible Artificial Intelligence (CHAI) at UC Berkeley.583 
Many of the authors quoted in above sections are affiliated to one or more of these institutes. 
Eliezer Yudkowsky for instance founded and heads MIRI. Stuart Russell acts as director of CHAI 
and, together with Nick Bostrom, leads the ‘value-alignment project’ at Cambridge’s LCFI. Murray 
Shanahan, who is professor of cognitive robotics at Imperial College London and Senior Research 
Scientist at Google DeepMind, is deeply involved with Cambridge’s LCFI.584 OpenAI is a special 
case as its work is mainly practical. That is, its focus is on actually trying to make progress towards 
the development of AGI, rather than on taking part in the largely still theoretical discussions 
portrayed above.  
The institutes are united in the conviction that there is at least a non-negligible chance that 
AGI (and thus superintelligence), will emerge eventually, perhaps even in this century, and, given the 
stakes involved, they seek to contribute to the quest of making sure it will be safe, or ‘human 
compatible’. Berkeley’s CHAI for instance states that “the long-term outcome of AI research seems 
likely to include machines that are more capable than humans across a wide range of objectives and 
environments. This raises a problem of control: given that the solutions developed by such systems 
are intrinsically unpredictable by humans, it may occur that some such solutions result in negative 
and perhaps irreversible outcomes for humans. CHAI's goal is to ensure that this eventuality cannot 
                                               
581 See for instance Bostrom (2014), ch. 13; Hadfield-Menell, D. et al. (2016), Rusell, S. (2017). 
582 For an overview of different AI safety approaches in the field see Mallah, R. (2017), Baum S. (2017), or 
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 151 
arise, by refocusing AI away from the capability to achieve arbitrary objectives and towards the 
ability to generate provably beneficial behavior”.585 CSER states that “superintelligence could be 
possible within this century” and that “AI should be developed in a safe and beneficial direction”.586 
The LCFI holds that “many researchers now take seriously the possibility that intelligence equal to 
our own will be created in computers, perhaps within this century. Freed of biological constraints, 
such as limited memory and slow biochemical processing speeds, machines may eventually become 
more intelligent than we are – with profound implications for us all”.587 MIRI similarly states that 
“researchers largely agree that AI is likely to begin outperforming humans on most cognitive tasks in 
this century. Given how disruptive domain-general AI could be, we think it is prudent to begin a 
conversation about this now, and to investigate whether there are limited areas in which we can 
predict and shape this technology’s societal impact“.588 OpenAI does not give any indication as to 
whether it believes the advent of superintelligence to be imminent or not. It does, however, state that 
it is important to begin researching on how to make its eventual arrival safe now: “Because of AI’s 
surprising history, it’s hard to predict when human-level AI might come within reach. When it does, 
it’ll be important to have a leading research institution which can prioritise a good outcome for all 
over its own self-interest. We’re hoping to grow OpenAI into such an institution”.589 
In sum, the existential risk from AI is associated not with the possibility of the emergence of 
a malevolent or evil AI but with the inherent unpredictability and potential irreversibility of 
unleashing an optimisation process that is more intelligent than the humans who specified its 
objectives, and that furthermore must be assumed to be inherently indifferent to how its actions might 
affect humanity.590 As Shanahan (2015) puts it: “Every action it carries out, every piece of advice it 
offers, will be in the ruthless pursuit of maximizing the reward function at its core. If it finds a cure 
for cancer, it will not be because it cares. It will be because curing cancer helps maximise its 
expected reward. If it causes a war, it will not be because it is greedy or hateful or malicious. It will 
be because a war will help maximise its expected reward”.591 Of course, this conjuncture of total 
moral myopia and superhuman rational intelligence may seem counterintuitive. However, Huw 
Price’s pragmatist perspective on intelligence does undergird this perspective on intelligence. As a 
civilisation we are capable of creating ingenious works of engineering, art, poetry, music, etc., whilst, 
simultaneously, we appear to be indifferent to the misery of billions of animals in overcrowded 
factory farms, research laboratories, etc.  
From the perspective of existential risk researchers, we are nearing a point in time after 
which we might find ourselves in a position equivalent to the one animals are in today - of being 
                                               
585 See CHAI (2018). 
586 See CSER (2018b). 
587 See LCFI (2018b). 
588 See MIRI (2018b). 
589 See OpenAI (2015). 
590 Cf. Russell, S. & Dafoe, A. (2017). 
591 Shanahan, M. (2015), pp. 207-208. 
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confronted with a superior intelligence that can do as incomprehensible, inherently unpredictable, 
and from our perspective pointless things to us and our environment as we can to animals. According 
to existential risk researchers, the main difference is that, thanks to rational choice theory, we are in a 
better position to predict what such superior intelligences might ‘want’; that, given the nature of 
instrumental rationality, it must be expected to have incentives to act in ways that will conflict with 
our interests, unless we explicitly counteract this and ensure that the superior intelligences we create 
is either a ‘friendly’ superintelligence or firmly under humanity’s control. A priori, to sum it up in 
Yudkowsky’s words, we know only one thing: “the AI neither hates you, nor loves you, but you are 
made out of atoms that it can use for something else”.592 
 
4.2 Framing the AI-risk argument 
 
In the above rudimentary sketch of the AI-risk argument it might already have become clear that 
there appears to be an argumentative leap in its discussion of AI. In fact, it would make sense to 
distinguish between two different argumentative levels in the argument, because it appears to rest on 
two very different notions of intelligence. 
 
1) Claims pertaining to rather vague expectations regarding intelligence, surrounding notions 
such as ‘the tipping point’, ‘superintelligence’, AGI, or human-level intelligence. Claims of this type, 
on the surface, tend to leave open what intelligence actually is. However, as we have seen above, 
superintelligence and comparable concepts such AGI are typically defined by using ‘human 
intelligence’ as a reference point. They thereby feed off an intuitive form of understanding of the 
notion of ‘intelligence’, without, however, having to articulate in greater detail what exactly might be 
meant by that.  
2) Claims pertaining to the potential consequences of the advent of a superintelligence. These 
claims are categorically different in so far as they typically rest on rather specific conceptions of 
intelligence, of what it is or does. Typically, as we have seen and as Russell et al. (2015) put it, “in 
this context, ‘intelligence’ is related to statistical and economic notions of rationality — colloquially, 
the ability to make good decisions, plans, or inferences”.593 Huw Price’s pragmatic characterisation 
of intelligence can also be seen as an example for this type of perspective on intelligence. 
In most versions of the AI-risk argument first the vague expectation that one day AI might 
exceed human intelligence is articulated and then, in a second step, it is explained, based on specific, 
economic conceptions of how intelligence typically exerts itself, why this prospect should concern 
us. Another way to qualify this distinction is to explain it in terms of the distinction between ‘weak’ 
and ‘strong AI’. According to the textbook definition of AI the field of AI is divided into two 
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branches.594 The first branch seeks to develop a better understanding of intelligence and cognition as 
such. It is characterised by the aim, as one author puts it, to find “the mark of the mental”.595 The 
second branch abstracts from such deeper theoretical problems and focuses on application, that is, on 
intelligent action. It aims, most generally put, “to engineer smart machines and applications” in order 
to solve specific practical problems by emulating intelligent behaviour. Luciano Floridi (2014) refers 
to these two different branches of AI research under the categories ‘productive’, or ‘cognitive’ AI’ on 
the one hand side and ‘reproductive’ or ‘engineering’ AI’ on the other hand side. Whilst cognitive AI 
aims to produce intelligence as such, engineering AI is not necessarily interested in what intelligence 
is but focuses on reproducing, i.e. emulating, its outcomes.596 Russell and Norvig (2016) in their 
seminal textbook on AI similarly distinguish between AI research that focuses on ‘thought processes’ 
or ‘reasoning’, which they refer to as ‘process-oriented AI’, and AI research that focuses on 
behaviour, which they refer to as ‘goal-oriented AI’.597 Another common, and perhaps slightly more 
poignant way of phrasing this distinction is that between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ AI. Weak AI, as 
Arkoudas & Bringsjord (2014) put it, “aims at building machines that act intelligently, without taking 
a position on whether or not the machines actually are intelligent”, whereas strong AI aims at 
“building persons, period”,598 or, as philosopher of mind John Haugeland puts it, ”the goal of this 
research is not merely to mimic intelligence or produce some clever fake. Not at all. AI wants only 
the genuine article: machines with minds, in the full and literal sense”.599 Whichever terms one 
decides to employ in order to label the two traditions in AI research (I will in the following use the 
distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak AI’), the difference is clear: one seeks to study and recreate 
whatever intelligence is, whilst the other takes a behaviouristic, pragmatic stance on the problem, 
studying and trying to reproduce what intelligence does. This distinction allows us to see that the AI-
risk argument oscillates between the two poles.  
The ‘vague expectations’ of future superintelligence implicitly build on strong conceptions of 
AI because, by using human intelligence as a reference point, notions such as ‘superintelligence’ or 
AGI implicitly invoke and feed of an intuitive idea of what intelligence is, not only on what it does. 
Just consider the above quoted definitions of superintelligence: Soares and Fallenstein (2014) define 
superintelligence as an AI that is “smarter than the best human brains in practically every field”,600 
Bostrom and Dafoe speak of superintelligence as a system that is “more cognitively capable than 
                                               
594 See for instance Frankish, K. & Ramsey, W. (2014), p. 1. 
595 Arkoudas, K. & Bringsjord, S. (2014), p. 34. 
596 Floridi, L. (2014), p. 140. 
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humans in all practically relevant domains”,601 and CSER defines superintelligence as being “superior 
to human performance in many or nearly all domains”.602 Intelligence itself, in all of these cases, is left 
unspecified, it is not actually explained what human intelligence consists in. However, this definition 
allows existential risk researchers to invoke all capacities of human intelligence, whatever their ultimate 
source may be, for speculations about hypothetical future AIs and to assume that they can be supercharged.  
The risk itself, however, is explained based on a weak conception of AI as it treats it on 
purely pragmatic terms. I.e. it is argued that whether or not a superintelligence actually is intelligent 
in a substantive sense of the word is irrelevant for the argument. Intelligence is treated in line with 
the dictum that the “question of whether a computer can think is no more interesting than the 
question of whether a submarine can swim”.603 If anything, as we have seen, the reader is explicitly 
discouraged to anthropomorphise AIs,604 that is, she is encouraged to think of superintelligence 
pragmatically, as a mindless and extremely powerful cross-domain optimisation process, hence along 
weak lines.  
My reason to highlight this two-pronged argumentative strategy is not to commence a 
discussion of whether the AI-risk argument is consistent or not.605 Rather, the reason is that its two 
dimensions and the manner in which they oscillate make the AI-risk argument profoundly interesting 
from a Heideggerian perspective. This is why they function as a bracket of my following discussion. 
Against the background of the preceding chapters, both dimensions are interesting and revealing in 
their own right and the argument as a whole, i.e. the oscillation between strong and weak conceptions 
of AI, can be seen as emblematic for the mechanisms of technological thinking as discussed by for 
instance Günther Anders. However, whilst the first dimension of the argument has in fact a rather 
long history with eschatological expectations surrounding AI dating back to the earliest days of the 
discipline, the second dimension, in particular its reflection in so-called ‘AI safety’ research, appears 
to be a much more recent phenomenon. 
In the following sections I will proceed as follows. First, I will demonstrate that the first 
dimension of the argument, i.e. the vague expectations of future tipping points and discontinuities, as 
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603 See Dijkstra, E. (1984), as cited in Floridi. L. (2014), p. 140. 
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several authors have noted before, is fideistic, not necessarily in nature, but in structure.606 What this 
tells us, however, is not that the belief cannot be true. Rather, what it reveals are a range of 
interesting assumptions about not only the nature of intelligence but about technology and science 
generally that appear to be underpinning contemporary discourses surrounding the future of AI. 
Against the background of my previous discussion of Heidegger, Arendt, and Anders this is 
interesting because it highlights that the basic assumptions they identified at the heart of the 
technological project are alive and well, that, in fact, they are underpinning the existential fears 
surrounding AI as well as wider macro-strategic discussions of existential risk.  
In the second section I will then proceed to discuss the technical dimension of the AI risk 
argument. In the light of previous discussions, it is almost uncanny to see how closely the concerns 
of AI researchers echo Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ normative concerns about the potential 
effects of the technological understanding of being. We might hence understand the technical 
account of the existential risk from AI argument as a form of unintended concession to critical 
philosophers of technology. 
 
4.3 Is the belief in the singularity fideistic? 
 
The expectation of superintelligent machines has a rather long history. In fact, progress in what is 
now called AI has been accompanied by eschatological expectations ever since its official inception 
as an academic discipline at the 1956 Dartmouth Conference and arguably even for a longer time 
than that if one takes the literary genre into account.607 The ‘intelligence explosion’ for instance is a 
concept that was famously coined in 1964 by the statistician and computer technology pioneer I.J. 
Good. In a paper on ‘ultraintelligent machines’ Good presented the reader with the following 
conjecture: 
 
“Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual 
activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual 
activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then 
                                               
606 See for instance Bringsjord, S., et al. (2012); Danaher, J. (2015); Lawrence, N. (2016); Floridi, L. (2015, 
2016). 
607 Three pieces of science fiction conference clearly stand out as particularly prescient in the light of 
contemporary AI anxieties: First, Samuel Butler’s 1872 novel ‘Erewhon’, which portraits a society where 
people have become convinced by an argument that holds that machines will become autonomous and assume 
control unless their further development and possession is banned. Second, John Campbell’s ‘The Last 
Evolution’, a short story of 1932, which in effect pre-empts I.J. Good’s intelligence explosion. Third, the 1928 
short story ‘The Machine Stops’ by Edward M. Forster, which anticipates many contemporary concerns 
regarding potential psychological, social, cultural and political effects of the complete technification and 
automation of humanity’s environment. ‘The Machine Stops’, however, should perhaps best not be understood 
as story about superintelligence but as a story about the reality we, according to many authors, already are 
beginning to live in; a world where we are embedded in a web of narrow AI’s that govern each and every 
aspect of our lives and mediate our communication with one another, without, however, being governed by a 
single superior intelligence. 
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unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion’, and the intelligence of man would be left far 
behind. Thus the first ultra-intelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make, 
provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control“.608 
 
 
As can be told from the brief overview above, Good’s conjecture is still very much compatible with 
present concerns and expectations regarding AI. His definition of ‘ultraintelligence’ is essentially 
equivalent to today’s definitions of superintelligence and the scenario he describes foreshadows 
contemporary concerns about losing control and being left behind. Accordingly, Good is still 
regularly invoked by authors in the field.609 Contrary to Good’s stance on the intelligence explosion, 
however, most contemporary accounts do not hold that ultraintelligence needs to be developed before 
an intelligence explosion can follow. Rather, it is now widely believed that a significant upsurge in 
general intelligence is likely to follow as soon as AI reaches levels of intelligence that are broadly 
comparable to human levels, i.e. once it reaches ‘human-level artificial intelligence’. In other words, 
the above-mentioned tipping point is now believed to be less far up the intelligence-ladder than Good 
might have thought. 
Alan Turing, in as early as 1951, also seems to have entertained concerns comparable to 
today’s existential risk researchers when he argued that: 
 
“If a machine can think, it might think more intelligently than we do, and then where should we 
be? Even if we could keep the machines in a subservient position, for instance by turning off the 
power at strategic moments, we should, as a species, feel greatly humbled. ... [T]his new danger 
… is certainly something which can give us anxiety”.610 
 
Generally speaking, many of the pioneers of early AI were convinced that human-level machine 
intelligence was imminent.611 Herbert Simon and Alan Newell of RAND Corporation for instance 
stated in 1958 that “there are now in the world machines that think, that learn and that create. 
Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until—in a visible future—the 
range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which human mind has been 
applied”.612 Marvin Minsky, famously claimed in 1968 that “within a generation, I am convinced, 
few compartments of intellect will remain outside the machine’s realm – the problem of ‘artificial 
intelligence’ will be substantially solved […] we will have intelligent computers like HAL in the film 
2001”.613  
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609 See for instance Häggström, O. (2016), p. 102, fn. 235; Rees, M. (2017), p. 381, or Bostrom, N. (2009), p. 
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610 Turing, A. (1951), as cited in Russell, S. (2017), p. 179. 
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 However, if grand expectations have accompanied AI since its very beginnings, so has 
criticism of such expectations. Hubert Dreyfus for instance claimed in 1968, referring directly to 
Minsky’s above claim that   
 
“Minsky is typical of all workers in the area in giving two sorts of arguments in support of his 
view: (1) Empirical arguments based on progress achieved thus far, and (2) A priori arguments 
about what machines can in principle do […] I will argue that the empirical arguments gain their 
plausibility only on the basis of an appeal to an implicit philosophical assumption […]”.614  
 
The fact that we can distinguish between vague and specific conceptions of intelligence in today’s AI 
risk argument indicates that Dreyfus’s criticism is as poignant in the context of today’s debates as it 
was at the time of his writing. The technical concerns surrounding future powerful cross-domain 
optimisers gain their plausibility only on the basis of an appeal to a far wider conception of 
superintelligence, which in turn hinges on the a priori assumption that human intelligence can be 
recreated by technological means. It is easy to be carried away by the technical dimension of the 
argument and the idea of an all-powerful optimisation process transforming the world into 
paperclips. But despite the fact that existential risk researchers seek to remain as technical in their 
analysis as possible and discourage from anthropomorphisms, the plausibility of their worst-case 
scenarios hinges entirely on the inherently anthropomorphic definitions of superintelligence quoted 
above and hence implicitly on the intelligence of actual persons, rather than the kind of mindless 
optimisation processes we find in narrow AIs. Consider Russell et al. (2015), who first relate 
intelligence to statistical and economic notions of rationality only to then, in order to highlight the 
stakes involved, claim that “everything that human civilization has to offer is a product of 
intelligence”.615 But is everything civilisation has to offer a product of statistical and economic 
notions of rationality? This is at least not entirely obvious and generations of scholars in for instance 
post-colonial studies have actually made the exact reverse claim, stressing the extent to which 
statistical and economic notions of rationality are a product of culture.616 
We thus find the AI-risk argument meandering between two different conceptions of 
intelligence, a narrow and a wide one, depending on the context in question. Since the only general 
intelligence we know of is our own, and since we cannot yet tell with certainty what exactly it is in 
our brains that allows us to exert the high levels of control over the environment which is argued to 
be the defining characteristic of our intelligence, the AI risk argument hinges on the assumption that, 
whatever it may be that allows us to do this, can be artificially reproduced. Price, as we have seen, 
argues that modern science and technology have allowed us to attain unprecedented control over the 
environment. Science and technology are hence mainly understood as expressions of economic and 
statistical notions of rationality. However, it is somewhat of an open question what it actually is in us 
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616 For an interesting, critical discussion of the cultural roots of AI see Reilley, K. (2011). 
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that puts us into the position to engage in scientific research and how this capacity could be 
artificially reproduced. One only needs to think of Michael Polanyi’s ‘tacit knowledge’,617 or decades 
of research in science and technology studies in order to see how ‘messy’ innovation processes are, 
how hard it is to explicate how they unfold. Nonetheless it is a common assumption that AIs might 
one day be in the position to undertake research on their own and perhaps better than us. The 
anthropomorphic definition of superintelligence allows for this. 
Empirically, however, as Floridi (2014) argues, research in strong, or ‘productive’ AI has so 
far been rather disappointing: “It does not merely underperform with respect to human intelligence; it 
has not joined the competition yet. Current machines have the intelligence of a toaster and we really 
do not have much of a clue about how to move from there”.618 As it happens, Floridi’s perspective on 
the track-record of progress in strong AI appears to be widely shared by authors in the field.619 The 
AI-risk argument then derives its plausibility mainly from its assumptions, that is, a priori arguments 
about what machines can in principle do, as Dreyfus puts it, rather than extrapolations from present 
trends.  
Based on similar considerations, Bringsjord et al. (2012) argue that “the belief in the 
singularity is fideism”. 620 The singularity is an elusive concept with a variety of different meanings 
within the futurist literature.621 However, Bringsjord et al. define it narrowly as the “arrival on Earth 
of computing machines more intelligent, indeed vastly more intelligent, than human persons”.622 The 
notions ‘singularity’ and ‘emergence of superintelligence’ are thus used interchangeably. They 
further define ‘the belief in the singularity’ as the proposition that this event, i.e. the arrival of 
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superintelligence, will occur in the not too distant future, that is, approximately within this century. 
As we have seen above, this proposition is widely held amongst the above listed AI-risk research 
institutes. We can hence understand Bringsjord’s et al.’s discussion of the belief in the singularity as 
a discussion of the belief that the AI-risk argument should be taken seriously. 
According to Bringsjord et al. the belief in the singularity rests on three propositions:  
 
(P1) There will be AI (created by HI), where HI refers to ‘human intelligence’ and AI to human-
level artificial intelligence. 
(P2) If there is AI, there will be AI+ (created by AI), where AI+ stands for artificial intelligence 
that exceeds HI across all or most domains. 
(P3) If there is AI+, there will be AI++ (created by AI+), where AI++ refers to superintelligence, 
i.e. an AI that vastly exceeds HI on all levels. 
à There will be AI++, i.e. superintelligence will arrive and the singularity will occur.623 
 
Bringsjord et al. then introduce a framework based on which they propose to assess whether, based 
on present best knowledge, the belief in the singularity qualifies as rationalist. In order for the belief 
to qualify as rationalist, according to the authors, its propositions must be either probable, beyond 
reasonable doubt, certain, or evident. Beginning with the strongest criteria, i.e. whether the 
propositions are either certain and beyond reasonable doubt, Bringsjord et al. arrive at the conclusion 
that (P1) is neither certain nor beyond reasonable doubt because the inverse proposition, i.e. that AI 
can never reach the level of HI, is neither logically inconsistent nor can it, at this point in time, be 
proved wrong based on empirical grounds because, according to the authors it is not beyond 
reasonable doubt that human minds process ‘information in a manner above the Turing limit’. 
Turning to evidence, i.e. to the question whether the track record of machine intelligence to date 
suggests that we are approaching AI, the authors’ judgment is even clearer, arguing that no data 
suggests anything pointing into that direction: “For the fact of the matter is that a sharp toddler of 
today makes a mockery of any computing machine with designs on natural-language communication. 
And even if we leave natural-language communication out of the picture and refer instead to human-
level problem solving specifically in areas that would seem to be positively ideal for computing 
machines, we perceive not the steady advance of computing machines, but their paralysis when 
stacked against the capability of humans”.624 This brings us to the last criterion, the criterion for weak 
rationalism, which is the question whether (P1) - (P3) are at least more probable than not to hold. 
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Bringsjord et al. list a variety of reasons based on which they seek to demonstrate that it is more 
probable than not that (P1) - (P3) does not hold, most of which are evidential and anecdotal. The 
most interesting one for the purposes of this chapter, however, is based on the observation that the 
belief in the singularity is premised on the ‘concept of ever-increasing intelligence’. That is, it is 
based on a proposition (P4) that it is known that levels of intelligence can differ and in particular that 
machine intelligence can exceed human levels of intelligence.  
This prompts the authors to ask the following question: “But if the proponents of the case in 
question know this [that there can be a qualitative difference between HI and AI++], then surely they 
must know what the difference in intelligence between HI and AI++ consists in. If they don’t know 
what the difference consists in, then they aren’t within their epistemic rights in asserting (P4)”.625  
 Bringsjord et al. here in effect identify the same problem as the one underpinning above 
distinction between vague and the specific conceptions of intelligence that can be identified in the 
AI-risk argument. Superintelligence is defined as ‘smarter than humans across all domains’ without, 
however, specifying what that means, i.e. wherein the difference between HI and AI++ might 
consist. For Bringsjord et al. this inability means that those who believe that the singularity is near, or 
at least that it might potentially be near, are not within their epistemic rights to assert this since it 
means “to forge ahead and believe, in the absence of the normal prerequisites”.626 It means to make a 
concept without semantic content the baseline for thinking about future technological possibilities. 
 These considerations lead Bringsjord et al. to conclude that the belief in the singularity is 
fideistic. ‘Fideism’ is understood as the view that one ought to believe in the occurrence of an event 
that is pictured to be ‘weighty, unseen and temporally removed’ despite having little or no evidence 
for the proposition’s correctness. ‘Weighty’ here is understood to indicate that the event is expected 
to be ‘profoundly transformative’, ‘unseen’ indicates that it is expected to involve ‘beings or entities 
as of yet invisible’, and ‘temporally removed’ simply means that the event is expected to occur at 
some unspecified point in the future so that the proposition cannot, at any given point in time, be 
proved wrong. The idea that we are approaching a point in time at which intelligence escapes its 
biological constraints clearly meets all of the authors’ criteria. It is expected to be a profoundly 
transformative event in human history, it involves agents the precise nature of which cannot yet be 
specified and the point in time, at which their arrival is expected, too, is left unspecified. According 
to Bringsjord et al. fideism is the hallmark of religious beliefs, the belief in supernatural beings in the 
absence of any rational or empirical reasons that might sustain such beliefs. However, in stating that 
the belief in the singularity is fideistic, Bringsjord et al. do not mean to suggest that the belief in the 
singularity is esoteric or religious in nature, what they suggest is merely that the kind of argument 
                                               




employed by those who think that the emergence of a superintelligence is imminent parallels fideistic 
types of arguments, i.e. that it is fideistic in structure.627 
Bringsjord et al. are not alone in portraying contemporary expectations regarding AI along 
such lines. Oxford philosopher of technology Luciano Floridi speaks of those who believe that 
superintelligence is imminent as ‘Singularitarians’, claiming that they are “not unlike people wearing 
tin foil hats”,628 machine learning scholar Neill Lawrence calls them ‘Singularians’,629 and 
philosopher Christian Munthe likens the logic of the AI risk argument to that of Pascal’s Wager, 
asking why “ultimate harm advocates are not all attending mass”.630  
 
4.4 Fideism or ontological transparency? 
 
However, there is a danger that in ridiculing above expectations surrounding AI and relegating them 
to the realms of obscurantism, the deeper significance of the underlying narrative is overlooked. 
What shines through in so called ‘Singularitarianism’ is arguably not so much a susceptibility for 
religious patterns of thought than what Heidegger calls ‘the technological understanding of being’ 
that finds itself confronted with the very dilemmas Heidegger, Arendt and Anders have brought out 
decades ago. Even if high expectations regarding the imminent arrival of AGI are currently not 
supported by empirical evidence, which is not the purpose of this chapter to make a judgment about, 
it appears worthwhile to take the AI-risk argument seriously because it gives clear sight on the 
mindset that, according to Heidegger, Arendt and Anders underlies scientific and technological 
progress in general. Once that is payed heed to, the fact that the underlying expectation can be 
labelled ‘fideistic’ becomes significant in its own right. 
What sustains the AI-risk argument and the associated belief in the singularity in the first 
place is not so much a semi-religious sentiment than simply what Haugeland (1985) identifies as the 
defining assumption of research in AI in general. It is “the powerful suggestion that our own minds 
work on computational principles […] the theory that people are computers“,631 with the implication 
that the same scientific theory can explain processes in the brain as well as in computers.632 In the 
field of AI and in the cognitive sciences this assumption is known as the computational theory of the 
mind.633  
In the existential risk environment, this assumption translates almost seamlessly into the 
supposition that artificial intelligence performing on the level of human intelligence must in principle 
be possible. Huw Price calls this argument against sceptics ‘the blow to the head’: “the tricks are all 
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there for our inspection: most of it is done with the glob inside our skulls. Understand that, and you 
understand how to do it artificially, at least in principle”.634 FHF institute adviser Olle Häggström 
argues along similar lines: “the blind forces of nature have succeeded in producing human-level 
intelligence this way, so we should be able to do it”.635 And Michael Anissimov (2012) responds to 
Bringsjord et al.’s article as follows: 
 
“Given the nearly universally accepted supposition in the cognitive sciences that intelligence is 
made up of a collection of mental routines that are fuzzy algorithms, plus the Church-Turing 
thesis, we get the conclusion that intelligence is indeed computable by standard Turing machines 
[…] The notion that human beings are the only agents that can implement intelligence is being 
supplanted by the notion that intelligence is a bundle of algorithms that can be implemented by 
any suitable computer, whether carbon-based or silicon-based”.636 
 
Hence, the assumption is that, since brains and computers are considered to be the same thing, 
namely ‘hardware’, and since minds are mere ‘collections of fuzzy algorithms’, it should, in 
principle, be possible to reproduce what brains do by artificial means. 
Once that assumption is made it is but a small step to propositions two and three in 
Bringsjord et al.’s formalised singularity argument, i.e. to the idea that AI will eventually supersede 
human levels of intelligence.637 Häggström for instance proceeds to argue that “there seems to be no 
good reason at all to think that human-level intelligence is the maximal level attainable by a physical 
object in our universe: to think that no configuration of matter can, even in principle, achieve higher-
than-human intelligence is just anthropo-hubristic and insane”.638 Arguments such as these typically 
are further backed up by an evolutionary perspectives on intelligence, i.e. the observation that 
intelligence levels have increased over time and vary not only between but also within species. The 
late Stephen Hawking for instance argued that “it’s clearly possible for something to acquire higher 
intelligence than its ancestors: we evolved to be smarter than our ape-like ancestors, and Einstein was 
smarter than his parents”.639 From this perspective, the belief that AI will eventually supersede HI is 
not really comparable to fideism. Rather it means that basic assumptions and observations about the 
nature of cognition and intelligence are made explicit and the baseline for extrapolations into the 
future.  
As Dreyfus pointed out in his response to Minsky’s early hopes surrounding AI, these 
assumptions in turn hinge on an even deeper layer of assumptions about technology in general, on “a 
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priori arguments about what machines can in principle do”.640 The crux of the matter indeed lies in 
the phrase ‘in principle’. Almost all of above quoted authors who argue that AGI should be possible 
employ that phrase, arguing that AGI should in principle be possible. But what does that phrase ‘in 
principle’ refer to? The principles of the universe, or nature, or intelligence? These would be very 
strong claims, epistemologically speaking. The most plausible answer is that it refers to the authors’ 
own principles. What the above assertions reveal is less something about the nature of intelligence as 
such than about the authors’ principles and assumptions regarding the relationship between science, 
technology and nature in general. According to these principles whatever exists in nature can be 
understood by the means of scientific inquiry and, in last consequence, must also be technologically 
reproducible. The fact that intelligence exists as a property of a physical object in the universe, by 
implication, means that it must also be technologically reproducible.  
For O’Heigeartaigh of CSER, for instance, the fact that our brain exists is seen as a “proof of 
principle” that AGI is possible.641 A priori, nature and technology are considered to be 
interchangeable, they are considered to be the same. How else could the fact that our brain exists 
count as a ‘proof of principle’ that AGI is possible? The a priori assumption about technology is that 
the realm of technological possibilities and the realm of natural possibilities is coextensive, governed 
and limited only by the laws of physics. Whatever is possible according to the laws of physics and 
not logically incoherent is considered technologically possible. Martin Rees’s perspective on 
potential futures of humanity, is a case in point in that regard. In a recently published piece, Rees 
discusses the possibility of ‘stellar-scale engineering’, which might involve the technological 
exploitation and creation of wormholes and black holes. Rees acknowledges that, in spite of the fact 
that these speculative concepts are “far beyond any technological capability we can envisage” at this 
point, they are not in “violation of basic physical laws” and therefore fall within the space of what is 
deemed technologically possible. Rees takes things even one step further, wondering if the laws of 
physics we are presently aware of would prove to be immutable for an intelligence that is “able to 
draw on galactic-scale resources”.642 Hence, what the claim that AGI should ‘in principle’ be 
possible really says, is that AGI has to be possible, or else the above authors’ principles and 
assumptions regarding the very nature of reality would be false.  
For, what would it mean if the production of AGI were assumed to be impossible? 
Theoretically speaking, there are at least two thinkable reasons for why one might do so. First, one 
might hold that true intelligence is too complex for us to ever fully understand how it works by 
scientific means. This would imply that we would also be incapable to purposefully reproduce it by 
technological means. Second, one might hold that, whilst intelligence may be fully explicable by 
scientific means, it may nonetheless be impossible to reproduce it technologically. The epistemic 
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status of both of these two claims ultimately is an empirical matter. At this point, therefore, the 
question is what is reasonable to assume. If one were to assume that the first proposition holds, that 
would be tantamount to assuming that there are problems in the universe that are and will forever 
remain scientifically inexplicable. That would open the door wide for obscurantist world-views and 
undermine the status of science as a knowledge-seeking endeavour. If one were to assume that the 
second proposition holds [which is for instance Margaret Boden’s position. Boden argues “that there 
is no obstacle in principle to human-level AI” but that most likely it is not “practically feasible” 643], 
the situation would be equally dire.  
As Arendt argues, it is ‘the plumber’, the engineer, who brings the findings of science down 
to earth: “the lost contact between the word of the senses and appearances and the physical world 
view has been re-established not by the scientist but by the ‘plumber’. The technicians, who account 
today for the overwhelming majority of all ‘researchers’, have brought the results of scientists down 
to earth”.644 Technology provides us with empirical evidence for the fact that the results of scientific 
inquiry, i.e. knowledge claims about the reality “behind things as they reveal themselves naturally to 
our consciousness”, are valid. In other words, in order to be sure that we really have understood 
something we need to be able to reproduce it technologically because that is our only visible 
evidence that we have truly identified the cause-effect relationships reigning in any given object of 
study. 645 Hence, if one were to purport to have understood the mechanics of human intelligence but 
nonetheless fail to reproduce it, that would leave us with the nagging feeling that we might actually 
not really know how it works. It is in that sense that Arendt argues that homo faber “can know only 
what he has made himself”.646 In that light it would not be the case, as Bringsjord et al.’s argument 
seems to imply, that the belief in superintelligence speaks of irrational hopes or fears, as the likening 
to fideism seems to suggest. Rather, the opposite appears to be the case. The belief in 
superintelligence speaks of modern humanity’s rational hopes, according to which science and 
technology, in principle, are hoped to allow us to understand and reproduce every causal relationship 
that occurs in nature.  
In short, in the AI-risk argument we find an unblemished articulation of what Arendt and 
Anders consider the base assumption of the modern belief in science and technology, namely that 
“everything is possible and that whatever is possible will ultimately be done”.647 Dries (2012) refers 
to this as the ‘Pandynathos-principle’ of modernity – “the ‘idée fixe’ of homo faber” – the diagnosis 
of which, according to him, was the common denominator of Arendt’s and Anders’ critique of 
modernity.648 It is no coincidence then that the Pandynathos-principle is echoed closely in Bostrom’s 
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technological completion conjecture, which (as discussed in chapter 1, p. 40) holds that "if scientific 
and technological development efforts do not effectively cease, then all important basic capabilities 
that could be obtained through some possible technology will be obtained".649  
However, beneath the Pandynathos-principle, of course, we find what Heidegger considers to 
be the essence of technology: Enframing. Everything seems possible because the technological 
ontological condition has us conceive of all beings as essentially the same, namely as mere material, 
standing reserve that can be ordered at will. The above invoked quotations could provide no clearer 
illustration in that regard. Intelligence is regarded as ‘a fuzzy set of algorithms’ and the brain as just a 
‘glob’, “wet hardware we have inside our skulls”,650 a “thing inside our cranium”,651 a “blob of 
matter”,652 or a particular “configuration of matter”.653 What makes the brain and, by extension, us 
different from the rest of nature is merely the particular way in which matter happens to be organised 
in our brains.654 Once that assumption is made, it is of course but a small step to the proposition that 
this configuration can be replicated and perhaps even optimised.  
From a Heideggerian perspective we are encountering in AI, understood as a field of 
research, the final stage of the technological danger in which both, the “subject and the object are 
sucked up as standing reserve” because intelligence, the hallmark of the human, finds itself included 
in the general calculus of objectification and ordering.655 It is therefore interesting to see that 
Heidegger’s fears regarding the technological understanding of being are echoed in the fears of AI-
safety researchers. 
 
4.5 Technology awakes 
 
There could arguably be no better illustration of Heidegger’s fears regarding the ultimate effects of 
technological thinking than Bostrom’s ‘paperclip maximiser’ - a mindless optimisation process, the 
embodiment of calculative thinking, that treats everything it encounters as mere standing reserve that 
can be mobilised for some random optimisation purpose. We find in the AI-risk argument an embryo 
version, a glimpse of awareness, of the type of concerns regarding technology as destiny that were 
entertained by Heidegger. My previous discussion of the instrumental understanding of technology, 
allows us to see why such a glimpse of awareness might come about in the case of AI. The reason is 
that, in the case of AI, ‘technology awakes’. With superintelligence, the existential risk community 
literally envisions a technology to become a fully autonomous agent that acts freely in the world. It is 
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contradictory to consider an autonomous agent a mere tool and therefore, in the case of 
superintelligence, the instrumental understanding of technology necessarily reaches an endpoint. In 
speculating about superintelligence, existential risk researchers implicitly speculate about post-tekné 
futures and therewith about futures which, for Heidegger, Arendt and Anders, we since long inhabit. 
As we have seen, in their view technology has ceased to be a form of tekné. i.e. a mere means to an 
end in the service of human purposes, a very long time ago.  
Anders for instance argued that technology had become “the subject of history, alongside 
which we are merely co-historical”.656 If superintelligence were to become reality in the way 
envisioned by some AI researchers, this idea would obviously find its ultimate vindication – a 
technological artifact would become the subject of history due to its superior ability to control its 
environment. In the case of superintelligence, then, existential risk researchers begin to be concerned 
about technology along similar lines as Heidegger and Anders because they, too, begin to think about 
technology as force that has its own momentum, developing and reshaping the world in ways that 
might not only be independent of human ends but run counter to them. It is therefore interesting to 
see that in this specific case the normative concerns of the two camps begin to converge as well.  
In the case of AI, it becomes impossible to abstract from the ontological complications which 
play such a pivotal role in Arendt’s, Anders’ and Heidegger’s thinking about technology. The 
question AI safety researchers are asking is in effect equivalent to the one that preoccupied 
Heidegger, Arendt and Anders: how can we square the logic underpinning the technological mindset 
with the ordinary way in which humans relate to and act in the world? The reason is that AI, as a 
technology, is about ontology. It is applied ontology.657 The very aim of the field is to create agents 
that perceive and process information in a given environment and are capable to act in it in order to 
solve specific tasks.658 This form of interaction with their environment of course requires the AI to 
discriminate between aspects of reality that are deemed relevant and aspects that are deemed 
irrelevant in any given situation. The fears surrounding AI can be broken down to the concern that an 
all-powerful AI is released into the world that restructures it based on an overly reductive model of 
reality, regarding too many aspects of reality as irrelevant without humanity being able to intervene 
and correct its course of action. 
This is the second reason why the chapter is called ‘technology awakes’. Not only is a 
technology envisioned to come to life - it can also be argued that the technological understanding of 
being is envisioned to come to life. With some caveats, the danger which existential risk researchers 
have identified in AI is structurally the same as the ontologically rooted dangers that Heidegger, 
Arendt and Anders have associated with modern technology at large. It is the problem of 
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‘metaphysical violence’, of reductionistic representations of reality, giving rise to the fear that all that 
is meaningful about life could be squeezed out, if not entirely destroyed. 
Günther Anders argues that, if the atom bomb could speak, it would say: “It’s all the same. 
Whether the world exists or not - it is the same. Why should the world not just as well not exist”? 659 
In other words, for Anders, the nuclear bomb embodied “pure nihilism”.660 Anders locates the origin 
of nihilism in metaphysical monism, the idea that “everything is of the same kind: namely nature”,661 
and traces it back to the shock past generations felt when they were confronted with this monistic 
perspective on reality. Where previously the world had meaning and was thought to be governed by 
the laws of god, one suddenly had to come to terms with the fact that it is governed by the laws of 
physics, “laws without a lawmaker”,662 for which everything is reduced to mere matter and hence 
essentially the same, of the same kind, irrespective of whether it is a stone, a tree, or a human being. 
The maxim of the nuclear bomb, Anders claims, is identical with that of monism, or nihilism – “it 
behaves like a nihilist in that it regards and treats everything, irrespective of whether it is a human or 
a machine, a loaf of bread or a book, a house or a forest, an animal or a plant, as the same, namely as 
nature; in this case this means: as something that yields itself to radium poisoning”.663 Anders here 
closely echoes Heidegger for whom, as discussed in chapter 2, the nuclear bomb also was only the 
“grossest of all gross confirmations of the long since accomplished annihilation of the thing: the 
confirmation that the thing as a thing remains nil".664 Hence, when Yudkowsky (2008) summarises 
the existential fears surrounding AI with the words “the AI neither hates you, nor loves you, but you 
are made out of atoms that it can use for something else”,665 this is uncannily close to Anders’ atom 
bomb monism. For Yudkowsky’s AI, or Bostrom’s paperclip maximiser, just as for Anders’ bomb, 
everything is the same: atoms, particles of matter that can be used for some generic purpose, be it 
paperclip maximisation or radium poisoning and irrespective of whether they are dealing with human 
beings, trees, or stones.  
Without being aware of it, such fears could hence serve as text-book examples for 
Heidegger’s, Arendt’s or Anders’ shared concerns regarding the inherently ‘dehumanising’ nature of 
the ontological gaze underlying modern technology and science. For, if we unpack concepts such as 
‘value-alignment’ or ‘orthogonality thesis’ from a Heideggerian perspective, what do we find? What 
we find are the theoretical puzzles of the ‘technological understanding of being’ that Heidegger, 
Arendt and Anders found themselves confronted with and that were discussed under such labels as 
objectlessness, standing-reserve, or earth-alienation. Roden (2015) argues that “we have no a priori 
assurance that the phenomenology of a successful AGI will correspond to human 
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664 See Heidegger, M. (2009), p.168. 
665 Yudkowsky, E. (2008), p. 333. 
 168 
phenomenology”.666 Roden here touches upon the heart of the value-alignment, or orthogonality 
problem, which, from a Heideggerian perspective, should in the first place not be considered as an 
ethical problem, as the notion of ‘value-alignment’ suggests, but as an ontological one.  
From a Heideggerian perspective (cf. chapter 2, section 2.4) the problem is less what we 
consider to be valuable or not than what can serve as common reference units of value under 
conditions of modern technology. The inherent property of modern technology is that it dissolves 
everything that could serve as reference units into negotiable states of affairs, mere processes and 
causal relationships. Hans Jonas pointedly summarises Heidegger’s characterisation of this 
metaphysically ‘violent’ gaze of the technological ontological condition in a brief piece on the 
analytical method, which he understood to be the basis of modern science and technology. 
“Analysis”, Jonas argues,  
 
“has been the distinctive feature of physical inquiry since the seventeenth century: analysis of 
working nature into its simplest dynamic factors. These factors are framed in such identical 
quantitative terms as can be entered, combined, and transformed in equations. The analytical 
method thus implies a primary ontological reduction of nature, and this precedes mathematics or 
other symbolism in its application to nature. Once left to deal with the residual products of this 
reduction, or rather, with their measured values, mathematics proceeds to reconstruct from them 
the complexity of phenomena in a way which can lead beyond the data of the initial experience 
to facts unobserved, or still to come, or to be brought about. That nature lends itself to this kind 
of reduction was the fundamental discovery, actually the fundamental anticipation, at the outset 
of mechanical physics. With this reduction, "substantial forms," that is, wholeness as an 
autonomous cause with respect to its component parts, and therefore the ground of its own 
becoming, shared the fate of final causes […] the aristocracy of form is replaced by the 
democracy of matter".667 
 
In the field of AI, the ‘democracy of matter’, i.e. of nature’s simplest dynamic factors, is reflected in 
the democracy of data, of “0s” and “1s”. The world of any given AI is in the first place an 
environment of “0s” and “1s”, data-points that have no inherent meaning, relevance, or significance. 
The puzzle AI safety researchers find themselves confronted with is in effect the question how to 
reconstruct what Jonas calls an ‘aristocracy of form’, which comes naturally to the human being and 
constitutes the every-day reality we inhabit, out of the democracy of data-points, which is the base-
reality of AI. The deeper issue at which the value-alignment problem and orthogonality thesis point 
is that, per default, the phenomenology of an AGI must be expected not to correspond with human 
phenomenology, to the effect that the reference units of its interaction with its environment must be 
expected to differ radically from those of humans.  
It is telling in that context that, for Yudkowsky, the default reference units of his hypothetical 
superintelligence’s interaction with physical reality are atoms, rather than for instance human beings. 
From a Heideggerian perspective this is no surprise at all, given that the notion of ‘human being’ is 
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thoroughly imprecise and amorphous when judged by technical standards. It refers to a phenomenon, 
an amorphous mental construct that has immediate meaning only within the frame of reference of the 
intuitive, non-analytical human mode of being-in-the-world. As Braidotti (2015) argues “we assert 
our attachment to the species as if it were a matter of fact, a given. So much so that we construct a 
fundamental notion of Rights around the Human” and yet, “the concept of the human has exploded 
under the double pressure of contemporary scientific advances and global economic concerns”.668 
Such discussions provide us with an idea of how problematic the very concept of ‘human being’ is 
once exposed to analytical scrutiny. From an AI perspective the situation is even more problematic. 
AI, as a scientific discipline, is left to deal with what Jonas calls ‘the residual products of the 
analytical reduction of reality’ and thus it finds itself confronted with the task to install an 
understanding of phenomenal reality in its products from scratch; based on the measured values of 
reality’s simplest dynamic factors.669 Before an AI could conceive of human beings as reference units 
for its interaction with reality, it would first have to know what exact configurations of the simplest 
dynamic factors of its models of the world qualify as ‘human beings’ in any given context. As 
Yudkowsky’s characterisation of the existential risk from AI exemplifies, prima facie, for a 
hypothetical superintelligence all that exists is matter - patterns of atoms. So, if we want it to be 
‘safe’, it needs to have some form of understanding of what within this otherwise meaningless ocean 
of data is relevant for its calculation and what is not: “The unFriendly [sic.] AI has the ability to 
repattern all matter in the solar system according to its optimization target. This is fatal for us if the 
AI does not choose specifically according to the criterion of how this transformation affects existing 
patterns such as biology and people”.670 Just as a self-driving car needs to be equipped with specific 
instructions or learning-algorithms that allow it to distinguish one sequence of pixels from another 
one and which tell it how this is to affect its course of action, a hypothetical superintelligence would 
have to learn how to distinguish one sequence of atoms from the other and how that is to affect its 
course of action in any given context. What this tells us is that before we can even begin to speak 
about ‘value-alignment’, we first have to speak about ‘ontology-alignment’. In some AI-safety 
research circles this problem is beginning to be discussed under the category of ‘Realistic World 
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670 Yudkowsky, E. (2008), pp. 332 – 333. 
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Models’.671 Worley (2018) for instance concedes that “for an agent to be alignable it must be 
phenomenally conscious”.672  
This, however, amounts to no less than the task to reproduce our ordinary ways of making 
sense of the world based on the technological understanding of being and thus to overcome the 
schizophrenic condition of modern human existence. AI safety researchers, it seems, begin to 
become aware of exactly the kind of puzzles and perplexities Heidegger, Anders and Arendt had 
begun to raise attention for decades ago, asking in effect the same question: How can we align the 
different kinds of knowledge, the different relations to reality, underlying modern human existence, 
if we are to avert catastrophe?  
 
4.6. Existential fears and existential hopes 
 
 
But it is not only the potential for catastrophe that existential risk researchers see in AI. Rather, the 
typical position in the existential risk eco-system is that the emergence of superintelligence can either 
result in an existential catastrophe, or in what Cotton-Barratt and Ord (2015) call an eucatastrophe: 
“an event which causes there to be much more expected value after the event than before”.673 That is, 
the expectations surrounding AI are extremely binary; they are saturated both with existential fears 
and existential hopes. The late Stephen Hawking for instance (who acted as an advisor to CSER as 
well as the FLI) claimed that superintelligence likely “will be either the best, or the worst thing, ever 
to happen to humanity”.674 Olle Häggström of the FHF similarly states that “it may well be that we 
are standing at or very near a decisive turning point that can lead either to our prompt extinction or to 
a future where we flourish beyond our wildest dreams, perhaps on cosmic scales. Let us not sit idly 
by as the future unfolds”.675 And Max Tegmark, speaking on behalf of the participants of an AI-
safety conference that brought together the most important names of the scene,676 states that “we 
might create societies that flourish like never before, on Earth and perhaps beyond, or a Kafkaesque 
global surveillance state so powerful that it could never be toppled“.677 The one thing that appears to 
be generally agreed upon then is that, if superintelligence materialises, it will be what Bringsjord et 
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al. call a ‘weighty’ event, a cataclysmic event as a result of which humanity will find itself in a 
categorically different state of existence.  
These expectations can best be understood by linking them back to Bostrom’s technological 
completion conjecture. As discussed in section 4.4, for many authors in the field, given their 
assumptions about what technology can in principle do, epitomised perhaps most pointedly in 
Bostrom’s technological completion conjecture, the arrival of superintelligence is assumed to be in 
principle inevitable (under the condition that we are spared an existential catastrophe). In line with 
the Pandynathos principle, the belief is that “everything is possible and that whatever is possible will 
ultimately be done”.678 From this perspective, the question is not if we are going to develop 
superintelligence but only when and, above all, how. In other words, given that the arrival of 
superintelligence is expected to transform the human condition categorically, the entire future of 
humanity is collapsed into a single coding problem: either we get the utility function of the first AGI 
(the so-called ‘seed AI’) right and “we flourish beyond our wildest dreams”, or we get it wrong, in 
which case we may have to face “our prompt extinction”.679  
As touched upon in previous chapters, in the macro-strategy of existential risk research, 
superintelligence assumes a central role. Given that it is understood as a superhuman problem solver, 
it is also expected to be better at dealing with existential risk (under the condition that it is a benign 
superintelligence). Bostrom (2014) for instance claims that superintelligence could: 
 
“reduce many other existential risks. Risks from nature—such as asteroid impacts, super-
volcanoes, and natural pandemics—would be virtually eliminated, since superintelligence could 
deploy countermeasures against most such hazards, or at least demote them to the non-
existential category (for instance, via space colonization) […] But superintelligence would also 
eliminate or reduce many anthropogenic risks. In particular, it would reduce risks of accidental 
destruction, including risk of accidents related to new technologies. Being generally more 
capable than humans, a superintelligence would be less likely to make mistakes, and more likely 
to recognise when precautions are needed, and to implement precautions competently“.680  
 
 
Yudkowsky (2008) goes even further than that, arguing that:  
 
“To survive any appreciable time, we need to drive down each risk to nearly zero. ' Fairly good' 
is not good enough to last another million years […] Such competence is not historically typical 
of human institutions […] If we postulate that future minds exhibit the same mixture of 
foolishness and wisdom […] as the minds we read about in history books - then the game of 
existential risk is already over; it was lost from the beginning. We might survive for another 
decade, even another century, but not another million years. But the human mind is not the limit 
of the possible […] With luck, future historians will look back and describe the present world as 
an awkward in-between stage of adolescence, when humankind was smart enough to create 
tremendous problems for itself, but not quite smart enough to solve them. Yet before we can 
pass out of that stage of adolescence, we must, as adolescents, confront an adult problem: the 
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challenge of smarter-than-human intelligence. This is the way out of the high-mortality phase of 
the life cycle, the way to close the window of vulnerability […].681 
 
In brief, artificial intelligence is hoped to provide us with a path out of Anders’ ‘Age of Respite’. For 
Anders the ‘Age of Respite’ has to be considered as humanity’s last age because, no matter for how 
long it would last, its “differencia specifica, the possibility of self-extinction can never end but by the 
end itself”. 682 In 1980, in Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen II, Anders reinforced this point, arguing 
that his “portrait of the contemporary human […] depicts not only the human of today but also the 
human of tomorrow and the human of the day after tomorrow”. He thus claims that his philosophical 
anthropology of technocracy is “a final and definitive portrait” of the human precisely because the 
defining feature of modern humanity’s mode of existence – that we have to think of ourselves as 
living in the end-time – cannot end but by the end itself and therefore “will forever remain a final 
time”.683 
I have argued in chapter 3 that existential risk theory might initially be conceived of as an 
embodiment of this new temporality and that existential risk research’s mission could be summarised 
as ‘trying to make the time of the end endless’. However, macro-strategic conjectures about AI, such 
as Bostrom’s or Yudkowsky’s, demonstrate that they have in fact not fully accepted the temporality 
of the ‘Age of Respite’. Of course, existential risk researchers do not articulate the hope that 
humanity may one day be able to regain the sense of eternity that characterised the temporality of 
past generations according to Anders and Arendt, in which the future could simply be taken for 
granted and ‘came’ by itself. But visions of ‘technological maturity’ and of a benevolent 
superintelligence do speak of the hope that the phase of imminent danger which characterises 
humanity’s situation since the beginning of the atomic age may one day be left behind and that the 
‘Age of Respite’ will have been but a ‘high-mortality phase’ and a ‘window of vulnerability’. What 
is hoped for is, if not collective immortality, at least that humanity can find a modus-vivendi that 
allows for a degree of permanence and stability which would allow ‘the human of tomorrow and the 
human of the day after tomorrow’ to feel as part of a world more permanent than herself again. 
To put it in Anders’ words, it speaks of “a nostalgia for finitude, the good old finitude of the 
past” in which mortality was reserved for the human individual.684 This nostalgic hope underscores 
Anders’ analysis that we are in fact unable to accept the nihilism which atomic bombs and existential 
risk embody. It underscores his analysis that modern man “could appropriately be described as the 
titan who strives desperately to recover his humanity”.685 Anders does not indicate if he thought of 
any specific titan in this allegory, but the titan who intuitively comes to mind is Atlas – the titan 
whom Zeus condemned to carry the skies without salvation in sight. As Atlas, under Anders’ 
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conception, humanity faces an open-ended end-time, where an end to its total responsibility would be 
tantamount to the end of the world. With AI, Yudkowsky and Bostrom appear to hope, we might be 
able to invent an artificial Atlas who would take our place, liberate us from our infinite 
responsibility, and allow us to be human again.  
This throws light on the deep irony at the heart of macro-strategic existential risk research, 
because what would it mean to be human in the age of superintelligence? Would humans melt with 
the machines or perhaps even become machines themselves? Would humans live alongside machines 
more intelligent than themselves? What kind of existence would that that be? The scope of the 
chapter does not allow for a discussion of positive visions of post-intelligence-explosion or 
singularity futures. But one thing appears to be clear, namely that they necessarily will be post-
human futures too.686 From an existential risk perspective, then, humanity’s best and perhaps only 
hope to rescue itself is to end itself. 
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Throughout the past chapters, I hope to have demonstrated that the emerging genre of existential risk 
research presents us with a rich, new background for political-theoretical reflection and that it can be 
meaningfully related to long-standing debates in political theory and philosophy. Specifically, I hope 
to have shown that it resonates with and presents us with a new starting point for reflecting about old 
puzzles regarding the role of technology in our lives and that, indeed, existential risk research 
highlights the lasting relevance and insightfulness of the works of authors such as Martin Heidegger, 
Hannah Arendt and Günther Anders. In conclusion one might argue that what existential risk 
research allows us to see is that, whilst the exact risks it discusses, and the integrative approach of 
studying them, i.e. its macro-strategy, might be new, the underlying problem it confronts us with, the 
problem of ‘technology as destiny’, is not qualitatively different today than it has been in the past. If 
anything, existential risk research highlights that the central puzzles regarding the role of technology 
in human affairs which Heidegger, Arendt and Anders uncovered and the categories which they 
introduced to discuss them, categories such as ‘objectlessness’, ‘Promethean shame’ or ‘technology 
as action’, are almost more applicable now than then.  
One of the first analytical philosophers of technology, Henryk Skolimowski (1966), held that 
technology is categorically different from science in so far as science concerns itself with “what is” 
whereas technology concerns itself with “what is to be”.687 Skolimowski’s characterisation of 
technology highlights that technology is an inescapably ontological as well as normative enterprise. 
It requires an (oft unarticulated) positioning towards the ‘what’, i.e. towards what we consider as real 
and relevant in any particular moment in time, as well as towards the ‘is to be’, i.e. towards what we 
want reality to be like. Heidegger, Arendt, and Anders most certainly would not have disagreed with 
Skolimowski’s assertion that technology is concerned with the question ‘what is to be?’ However, 
they would have stressed that it is concerned with that question in a highly problematic fashion, 
because, from their perspective, the primary concern of technology is with ‘what is possible’. 
Modern technology mainly concerns itself with providing us with more options, i.e. with more 
efficient and faster access to material goods, information, etc. Since, from the perspective of the 
modern technologist the space of technological possibilities is limited only by the laws of logic and 
physics,688 the base assumption regarding ‘what is to be’ is, prima facie,  that “everything is 
possible”.689 “If there is anything that modern man regards as infinite”, Günther Anders argues, it is 
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no longer God; nor is it nature, let alone morality or culture; it is his own power”.690 As a result of 
this ontological shift in perspectives, all givens are conceived of as an in principle negotiable states 
of affairs. 
From the perspective of the authors I have covered here, the central puzzle of modern 
technology thus resides in the fact that technology’s concern with ‘what is possible’ has inherently 
undermining implications for the concern with ‘what is to be’. Put simply: if everything is possible, 
why should anything be what it is and not some other way? Beneath this problem we find a more 
basic ontological problem, namely, as Hannah Arendt puts it, the shift in attention “from the search 
after the ‘What’ to the investigation of ‘How’” and thus “from interest in things to interest in 
processes, of which things were soon to become almost accidental by-products”.691 It is only with 
this ontological shift in interest from the ‘what’ to the ‘how’, from things to an awareness of their 
process-character that the idea of ‘everything is possible’ became possible. It led to the realisation 
that, once causalities are fully understood, in principle everything in nature can be reproduced, 
altered and manipulated, to the effect that no state of affairs is set in stone. Hence, the idea of prima 
facie omnipotence goes hand in hand with an ontological transformation whereby things and objects 
recede and are replaced by processes and causal-functional relationships, to the effect that the 
reference units of the investigative pronoun ‘what’ recede and dissolve into a collection of causal 
processes. As a result, the question ‘what is to be’ has, by definition, become anachronistic under 
conditions of modern technology. Modern technology, being concerned with processes, cannot make 
sense of the very idea of ‘whatness’, or ‘wholeness’, echoing Heidegger’s claim that the 
technological understanding of being undermines the very conditions from which any ordo, any rank 
and recognition, any normative orientation in the world, could arise.  
In that light it is both consistent and ironic that, once infused with historical and political-
theoretical context, we immediately find existential risk research confronting us with this very 
puzzle. It is ironic because ‘what is to be?’ without doubt can be considered as existential risk 
research’s central concern: What is to be? Is there to be life on Earth or nothingness? Existential risk 
research is born out of a concern for something, for humanity and the preservation of value and of 
sources of meaning in the universe. Yet, as a result of its ambition to be as scientifically rigorous in 
its methods as possible,692 it becomes difficult to determine what notions such as ‘humanity’, ‘value’, 
or ‘meaning’, refer to and, in consequence, to determine how the very concept of existential risk 
should be defined. 
From a Heideggerian perspective the source of this irony is obvious. In its aspiration to 
become a new scientific discipline, existential risk research approaches the question of the future of 
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humanity from what Arendt calls ‘the point of the universe’. As such, it is based on the process-
oriented ontology of modern science and technology and uses the abstract space of technological 
possibilities and its defining principles “everything is negotiable” as a benchmark for thinking about 
the future. From this perspective, humanity is transcended and turned into but another negotiable 
process, assumed to change over time due to biological as well as technological evolution, and thus 
reduced to but one of many thinkable forms of meaningful conscious experience that could 
theoretically be technologically produced.  
In other words, by choosing technology as its benchmark for thinking about the future, 
existential risk research draws on a logic which makes it impossible for it to identify a specific 
reference unit of its concerns, an Archimedean point of value, apart from technological development 
itself. Lacking a reference unit for visions of desirable futures, for ‘what is to be’, technology and its 
prima facie limitless possibilities turn into a conceptual placeholder for the very idea of future value. 
In that light it is no coincidence that the concepts of ‘existential catastrophe’ and ‘end of 
technological development’ are synonyms in existential risk theory (any existential catastrophe 
would involve an end of technological development, otherwise it would not qualify as an existential 
catastrophe, and an end of technological progress would deprive humanity of its chance to evade its 
otherwise naturally preordained doom).693 The central irony, or paradox that we find at the heart of 
existential risk research is, then, as Dupuy (2009) puts it, that the “overweening ambition and pride 
of a certain scientific humanism leads directly to the obsolescence of humankind”.694 Heidegger, 
Arendt and Anders would have gone even further than that . For them it is not due to its ambitions 
and its pride that scientific humanism has that effect; it follows immediately from its ontological 
nature. Anders calls this the ‘telescopical gradient’ – the disjunction between the magnitude of what 
we can produce and the significance we attribute to us and our existence in the universe. Nobody, he 
argues, when gazing through the telescope into the universe suddenly feels larger than before. On the 
contrary, confronted with the infinite expanses of the universe, it is as if the universe through the 
telescope stares back at humankind, shrinking it by the same measure by which it was expanded in 
our telescopically enhanced vision.695 From that perspective, the label ‘scientific humanism’ would 
have to be considered an oxymoron to begin with.  
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Existential risk researchers could justifiably object that one needs to distinguish more 
carefully between their long-term concerns and their short- to medium-term concerns. Whilst above 
characterisation of its implications might apply to their speculations about the long-term 
consequences and potentialities of technological development, in particular regarding AI, in the 
short-term, their agenda and their reference unit is abundantly clear, common-sensical and straight-
forward: Their reference unit of concern is humanity and an existential risk is one that threatens 
humanity’s continued existence. However, from the perspective of Arendt, Anders and Heidegger, 
this kind of argument would have to be considered a red herring. 
In a way it suggests that the deep, ontologically rooted, puzzles and tensions science and 
technology confront us with should become a matter of interest only once the human being itself 
becomes an object of actual technological decision making, i.e. once we are practically confronted 
with the choice whether humanity should wilfully adopt some form of post-human existence, 
whether we should create new artificial people or not and, if so, in ‘whose image’. From a 
Heideggerian perspective, this is a dangerous misunderstanding because it suggests that until we 
have reached this unspecifiable moment in time, modern technology could be dealt with under 
abstraction of the ontological puzzles it confronts us with and as if it were a mere means to an end at 
the free disposal of humanity. What Anders, Arendt and Heidegger demonstrate is that this approach 
not only cannot work but is itself expressive of a mistaken perspective on modern technology. It 
conceives of technology as being concerned with ‘what is to be’, not noticing that the mindset 
underlying modern technology undermines the conditions under which we can make sense of that 
very question.  
Existential risk research so far has not systematically addressed this puzzle at its core. 
However, as part of this thesis’ aim to bring out what facets of this emerging genre of research might 
be new or distinctive, I hope to have demonstrated that it indeed presents this puzzle in a new light 
and therewith revivifies central aspects of Heidegger’s, Arendt’s and Anders’ thinking about 
technology.  
What existential risk research shows is that the idea of human value and technology 
necessarily throw each other into question - that one cannot simultaneously take the first as a given 
and posit the neutrality of the second. If humanity has a value, then technology is not a neutral 
instrument and if technology is a neutral instrument it throws human value into a question. Thus, 
either, one takes some notion of human value as a given and thus makes it one’s benchmark for 
thinking about present and future, in which case the all-transcending logic of modern technology 
cannot be regarded as something neutral, or we take technology and the unlimited space of 
possibilities it represents as a benchmark, in which case one cannot bracket the problem of human 
value. On the contrary, the very idea of human value is thrown into question because making the 
space of technological possibilities our benchmark for thinking about the future renders it impossible 
for us to ascertain what our reference units of value should be. In other words, by attempting to do 
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both, taking the idea of human value as a given, whilst simultaneously thinking of technology as a 
neutral collection of instruments, existential risk research ends up in a paradoxical situation where it 
attempts to secure something, humanity, by drawing on a logic which cannot make sense of this term 
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